My blog has moved!

You should be automatically redirected in 6 seconds. If not, visit
http://knealesm.wordpress.com
and update your bookmarks.

Thursday, 29 August 2013

Christian beard wars

Christianity Today featured an article titled 'The Wars Over Christian Beards'. It states:
You’re more likely to see a beard in the pulpit today than at any time since the 1800s. But beards--especially among clergy--were once serious, symbolic matters. They separated East from West during the Great Schism, priests from laity during the Middle Ages, and Protestants from Catholics during the Reformation.
I was particularly impressed by Thomas Moore's insistence that his beard should be kept off the chopping block at his beheading. He stated "my beard has not been guilty of treason, it would be an injustice to punish it". Even more excellent was Henry VIII's childish tax on beards in response to Moore's barbate stand, bettered only by Cranmer's decision to grow facial hair to commemorate Henry's death and mark a break with clean-shaven Catholicism.

Somewhat ironically, according to Punch, it seems historic dissenting Christians didn't sport beards so widely, despite the apparent signal of dissent shown by wearing one. Fortunately, as shown by this more recent taxonomy of beards entitled 'The Beards of Ministry', dissenting beard-wearing has increased during the last century.

Nevertheless, I shall continue to sport a beard and stand in a long line of excellent beard wearers including such luminaries as William Tyndale, John Calvin, Thomas Cranmer and C.H. Spurgeon amongst others. As Spurgeon himself said:


Monday, 26 August 2013

God is a Liberal Democrat - really?!

The Telegraph, Mail and Guardian have all picked up on Steve Webb's assertion that God 'must be a liberal'. Webb, himself a Liberal Democrat MP and Minister of State for Pensions, claims 'the most fundamental reason why Christians should feel at home in the Liberal Democrats is that the character of God, as revealed in the Christian Gospel, would suggest that God must be a liberal'. He goes on to argue 'there is no other conclusion that can be drawn from a reading of the New Testament'.

Now, clearly Christian Labour and Conservative party members - not to mention the many Christian members of many smaller, fringe parties - disagree. I am unsure whether Webb is claiming that Christians in other parties truly know that God sides with the Lib Dems and they rebelliously refuse to acknowledge God's own political preferences; or, whether he genuinely believes that all theological understandings of scripture that do not lead to immediate Liberal Democrat membership are somehow misinterpretations of scripture. In either case, this seems something of a bold, unsubstantiated claim.

At the most basic level, Webb states the issue the wrong way round (if, indeed, this issue should be stated at all). At best, Webb could try to argue that the Liberal Democrats most closely represent God's revelation of himself (though even this would be something of a tall order, hotly disputed). However, he has not chosen to argue that the Liberal Democrats most closely represent scripture but that God himself would be a Liberal Democrat - quite the claim indeed! Even before we look at Liberal Democrat policies and typical voting patterns of Liberal MPs, Webb suggests that God, by his very nature, is a Liberal. I must admit, I missed that in any of the historic creeds but perhaps Athanasius included it in a footnote somewhere. Unfortunately, Webb doesn't leave much room for doubt. He doesn't suggest the Lib Dems most closely adhere to scripture but argues that in God himself is revealed the very nature of a Liberal.

Now, putting one's own political persuasion to the side, there is no getting away from the fact that Christian's exist across the political spectrum in the vast majority of political parties. Nor can we escape that all parties, at some time or other, alight upon policies that accord with scripture and, equally, often find themselves falling foul of scriptural principles too. Indeed, it is for this reason that many think politics is all too worldly and compromised, believing scripture  would have us take no part in it. The very nature of scriptural interpretation means that Christians of different theological persuasions and backgrounds will place greater or lesser store by different issues. Many will highlight social need, some personal morality whereas others find different issues more pressing still. Moreover, although many Christians may agree a particular need exists this does not imply they agree on the means by which such needs ought to be met.

For the Christian, the political task is to determine which issues of the day are most pressing and which solutions most closely conform to scriptural principles (or, in some cases, which least divert from scripture). Inevitably, Christians are going to disagree over the key issues and the best approach to tackling them. To align oneself uncritically to any particular party is therefore problematic. That is not to say  one cannot join, support or vote for a particular party or align oneself in any way with a political view. It is to say that an uncritical stance with a party or political ideology will inevitably end up conflicting with scripture some time or other.

This means that Christians can join, support and vote for the Liberal Democrats (if, indeed, one comes to such a considered position). But to claim, like Steve Webb, the Lib Dems are somehow the very party of God himself is not simply to overstate the case but ignores the compromised position of all political parties. It overemphasises the good the Liberals may do at the expense of the unscriptural things they almost certainly do and utterly misunderstands the nature of a holy God who could have no part with many of the things in which all political parties engage. If God could not always bear the choices of his chosen people, under a theocratic state enshrined by himself, what chance have secular British political parties of that?

Sunday, 25 August 2013

Learning from the idiot in the room

Here is a great article from Mez McConnell titled 'Learning from the idiot in the room'. Let me strongly urge you to read it.

In it, he urges us to consider the following things when discussing with people from outside our theological/ecclesiastical "tribe":

  • How is what this person saying challenging my long held beliefs?
  • How have they arrived at their conclusions? What’s their (biblical) thought process been and how/why is it different to mine?
  • Are my personal prejudices against this person (and/or their tribe) stopping me from really listening and engaging with this person? Have I made my mind up not to learn before we even start? Is this going to be more about debate and point scoring than mutual learning?
  • Is there something I can actually learn here without compromising my doctrinal beliefs?
  • Could I be wrong?
  • Have I changed my mind about anything in the last few years? Have I ever, come to that matter?

Ask yourself (as I ask myself), how often do I do these things? Am I unable to learn from another person because of my own pre-existing prejudice? Is the idiot in the room really the person I'm talking to or the person in the conversation I know rather better?

Friday, 23 August 2013

Knowing vs feeling in worship



Here is Alistair Begg on knowing vs feeling in worship.

His point is an interesting one and pertinent for those suffering with depression, grief or other constraining emotions. Feelings are fleeting and regularly lie to us - what we feel is often not the same as that which is true. If our worship is predicated on our feelings, it may be based on a fleeting lie that - although feels right at the time - is contrary to that which is true. If, however, our worship is first based on that which is true - irrespective of our feelings at that moment - we will certainly worship God in truth and, as a result, it is likely our feelings will follow suit.

Interestingly, it is this principle upon which Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) is based. As I have previously explained here, the principle behind CBT is to track negative feelings and thought patterns and counter-balance them with statements of truth. Where our feelings may seem real, and thus lead us to act in ways that feel rational at the time, CBT helps us to compare whether such feelings stand up to truth in reality. In turn, knowing what is true (rather than relying on that which feels true) will help us act rationally - in line with objective realities and not subjective feelings - and this often makes us feel better too. The knowledge of truth changes our action and thus alters how we feel.

Now, where better to look for such statements of truth than scripture. Indeed, even David uses this principle to help himself feel better. He states his feeling, compares it to what he knows to be true and relies on what he knows is true rather than what he feels to be true at the time. In many of the Psalms, this clearly alters both his actions and his feeling. Some of the time (e.g. Psalm 38), David appears to feel no better but he nonetheless knows what is true and doesn't act on what he feels is the case at that moment in time. So, even King David used CBT to help him act in line with what he knows to be true rather than what feels true at a particular point in time.

Alistair Begg, in my view, is right to say our feelings should be secondary in worship. If we start with our feelings, our view of truth will coloured by this subjective standard. If it is feelings that are of first import, the truth must conform to what we feel. If we start with what we know to be true, our feelings are more likely to align with what we know. Even if our feelings do not automatically follow the truth in this way (whilst most of the time they probably will, let's not pretend they always do), if truth comes first we can be certain our feelings do not necessarily align with what we know to be true. If nothing else, this should stop us acting rashly upon what feels right in the face of what we know to be true. A 'feelings first' approach is likely to lead us down the path of the backslider - when it feels wrong, hard and tough where do we go? A 'truth first' approach gives us a solid base by which our fleeting feelings may be measured.

Tuesday, 13 August 2013

When is an idol not an idol?

It is apt to interpret the Ten Commandments in light of Jesus extension of their reach. The command of Ex. 20:13 to not murder, according to Jesus teaching, includes hatred and anger (Mt. 5:21f). Similarly, the seventh commandment (Ex. 20:14) encompasses lustful thought (Mt. 5:27f). Thus, on this understanding, follows the statement of Rom 3:23: 'for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God'.

In applying the Ten Commandments today, Christians (rightly) do not limit the second commandment (Ex. 20:2-5) to the mere creation of carved/forged gods. Nevertheless, I wonder how far we have rolled the first and second commandments together without warrant? For example, it is not uncommon to hear preachers ask 'what are the idols in your life?' and go on to explain that idols are anything that has taken the place of God as first in your life.

However, I wonder whether this is a misclassification. In OT times, it is probable the creation of an idol meant an individual was likely to be breaking both the first and second commandments concurrently. I suppose it is possible that one could make an image which supposedly "represents" God without making that image a specific object of worship, thus falling foul of the second commandment alone. However, on the literal OT reading of the moral law, one could easily place another god before Yahweh without making a 'graven image' to worship alongside. 

When interpreting the Ten Commandments for the modern day, most preachers rightly suggest an explanation of idolatry as merely creating carved images is not the extent of this command. However, is it strictly true to argue that anything we place before God is an idol? Such certainly appears to fall foul of the first commandment but not so obviously the second.

Now, let me quickly explain what I am not saying. I am not suggesting those things we often call idols are somehow OK for the Christian. I am not suggesting the consequences of what we often call 'idolatry' are not indeed the very consequences we will face. I am not suggesting it is somehow acceptable to place things before God and make them objects of worship.

Here is what I am suggesting. The problem of "anything that takes the place of God in your life" (a legitimate thing to highlight as sin) seems to fall foul of the first commandment. Lumping idolatry in with this combines the first and second commandments, making no real distinction between the two, without any warrant from scripture to do so. If our typical explanation of idolatry is in reality an explanation of failure to obey the first commandment, contemporary application of the second commandment must surely be something else beyond this.

This begs the question: what should be the application of idolatry for the modern reader? If the first commandment prohibits placing any god before Yahweh, the application of the second commandment surely cannot be the very same thing. Perhaps the first commandment prohibits placing anything before Yahweh (those things we typically define as modern-day idols falling under this bracket) whilst the second proscribes altering the image of Yahweh. That is to say, anything by which we limit or change the character of God is, to all intents and purposes, a modern day idol. To argue that God is not who He claims to be, to change his person, nature, etc is to worship a "false image".

Now, this is something of a tentative attempt to maintain a distinction between the first and second commandments. I am convinced the first and second commandments must have different things in mind, for why have two commandments that target the same thing? Similarly, given they must be addressing two separate problems, it follows the application and reach of these separate commandments must - at least in some way - be distinct. My suggestion above is just an attempt (perhaps a misplaced one) to maintain this distinction and address the reality that two commandments must mean two different things and thus be applied in different ways.

Friday, 9 August 2013

Interested in health, wealth and happiness? Here are 10 things God promises to reward

Here is a great article outlining 10 things God promises to reward.

If you are interested in health, wealth and happiness this article shows you exactly how such things can be obtained*


*Promises of health, wealth and happiness may only apply posthumously. Financial rewards not a guarantee.

Tuesday, 6 August 2013

Free will, sin and the sovereignty of God

I have had cause to think through issues of theodicy, sovereignty and free will of late. Specifically, I have been keen to re-evaluate how far Molinism and classical statements of Reformed theology are compatible. To some extent, one would not expect Molinism to synchronise with reformation theology given that Molina himself was a Jesuit and counter-reformer. Nevertheless, several theologians and philosophers, including Bruce Ware and John Frame, have sought to synchronise aspects of Molinism with a compatibilist view of free will. Specifically, they are keen to argue in favour of God's Middle Knowledge without adopting a framework of libertarian free will.

William Lane Craig, probably the best known contemporary defender of Molinism, outlines three positions on God's sovereignty and human free will here. The specific problem with this Molinist view, as outlined by Craig, is the assumption that there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which an individual would freely choose to respond to the universal offer of salvation. According to scripture, our sin-nature means that without the working of the Holy Spirit one cannot come to faith in Christ. For the Molinist, such intervention is just as deterministic as the Calvinism they eschew yet they continue to uphold this truth. Further, I find the grounding objection compelling - that God could not exhaustively know an individual's free actions by simply knowing their circumstances. If an individual possesses libertarian freedom, God cannot know for certain what this free agent will actually choose in any set of circumstances as they are perfectly able to choose otherwise.

However, Ware and Frame both contend Middle Knowledge is validated and strengthened when viewed within a compatibilist framework of free will. On this view, the grounding objection simply does not apply. God knows precisely how an agent will respond in any given set of circumstances because such knowledge is predicated on the nature of that individual. Ware argues that it is neither God working on the will of the individual, nor the circumstances themselves, that ultimately cause the individual to choose as they do. Instead, he argues, it is the nature of the individual - when particular circumstantial factors are present -  that causes the agent to do what they, by nature, most want to do.

On Ware's view, God's sovereignty is maintained without making Him the author of evil. God grounds his Middle Knowledge in the nature, and thus deepest desires, of each agent. Therefore, God knows an agent will do action A in circumstances X based upon the very nature and deepest desire of the individual. However, God can know (and be assured) if he actualises circumstances Y the agent will freely choose action B, equally according to his nature. Thus, God uses his Middle Knowledge to determine which actions to permit according to the deepest desire of the agent or whether to alter the circumstances. An individual is responsible for their own action because they freely chose them and God is not responsible as he merely permits the choice. It is neither God, nor the circumstances, that  determine the choice but rather the deepest desire of the agent according to his nature. 

God's permission of evil is then best explained through the principle of sufficient reason. This is seen most clearly in Christ's salvific work on the cross. 1 Corinthians 2:8 makes clear had those who crucified Christ known what they were doing, they would never have done it. However, God had sufficient reason to actualise a world in which the deepest desire of the individuals involved, the sinful act of crucifying an innocent, would take place. Namely, the salvation of the world. God did not cause the sin, it was borne from the desire of the agents involved, yet through his middle knowledge God permitted the circumstances through which this sin would take place for sufficient reason.

Jonathan Edwards argued, along these lines, that the will is never neutral. As Ware suggests, every decision is borne from the deepest desire of any agent, rooted in their very nature. The problem, as Dr John Gerstner highlights, comes not in the present but in the pre-fall world. Outlined here, the issue is as follows: "if Edwards was right in saying the will could not be neutral (no decision could stem from neutrality, there must be an inclination toward whatever choice is made) then it HAS to follow that God created man with a nature that was inclined to sin". Gerstner calls this the "thorn in the flesh" of all reformed theologians.

However, this is not a problem if we argue that pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will. Pre-fall, Adam and Eve had no sin-nature and were indeed capable of making neutral decisions. However, post-fall, they inherited a sin-nature and thus lost their libertarian free will. Indeed, God's restraining hand became necessary because libertarian free will would lead to continual, unending sin without restraint. Thus, post-fall, Adam and Eve lost their libertarian free will and inherited compatibilist free will. The Devil's lie - that Adam and Eve were shackled by God - led to the sad irony of their previous libertarian free will being lost and their becoming more shackled than ever they were before. On this reading, Adam and Eve's sin was entirely their own. Post-fall, God permitted (but did not cause) the deepest desires of individual agents - based upon inherited sin nature such that He can know how any being will act in any given circumstance - in order to bring about his divinely appointed will. 

Therefore, we can posit the Molinist view in respect to the pre-fall creation of the world. God indeed actualised a world, including libertarian free will, in which Adam and Eve sinned. However, following the fall - based on the principle of sufficient reason - God limited human agency to a compatibilist framework. Within this compatibilist framework, we no longer face the pitfall of Molinism which maintains, despite acknowledging the reality of human sin-nature, there exists freedom permitted circumstances under which individuals freely choose Christ caused by nothing outside of the agent. Terrence Tiessen is apt to comment:
. . . if the complete set of factors leaves the person with a final choice that is influenced by nothing in or outside himself, then it escapes me how the decision between two equally viable and possible courses of action can be anything but arbitrary. Granted, there are many contributing factors or “reasons” but, since the sum total of them is insufficient to explain this choice rather than that one, the decision appears to be “random.” I see no way to escape that conclusion given all the premises.
On the compatibilist view, decisions are not arbitrary. They are based on the deep-seated desires of the agent which are borne out of the individual's very nature. However, such choices are not caused by God for He uses his middle knowledge to permit certain desires based on the principle of sufficient reason.