I have recently seen three articles relating to traditional credobaptist views on baptism. Firstly, Bill Kynes at The Gospel Coalition outlines his view as a baptist willing to admit paedobaptists to membership. In response to this article, Jonathan Leeming at 9Marks argues this position is simply not credible. Finally, an independent yet related post by Andrew Wilson at Think Theology helpfully and briefly outlines the central problem (without giving any solution). Here, he considers the issue with the added complication of subscribing to a Strict Baptist position (which, I should admit, I do). So, comes the question, can baptists consistently admit convinced paedobaptists into membership?
Jonathan Leeming offers two central arguments as to why membership for the paedobaptist is simply inconsistent for the baptist. Firstly, he argues if you are willing to admit paedobaptists to membership you are, by default, a paedobaptist. Secondly, he argues baptism is an objective, subjective, and social sign. However, he contends there is no objective or social sign if the subjective belief of the individual is not present. He states the contention that the objective and social signs happen at baptism, whilst the subjective sign catches up retrospectively upon belief as an adult, is false as without the presence of subjective belief the objective and social signs simply don't exist.
His first argument is particularly poor. Simply because one accepts paedobaptists into membership - who themselves fully believe they have fulfilled Jesus' command to be baptised - does not make one a de facto paedobaptist. It is simply not true to argue that accepting the paedobaptist into membership is the same as telling yourself "paedobaptism is essentially okay".
Leeming's appeal to views on slavery and abortion simply don't help his case. Firstly, the reason "pro-choicers" cannot credibly be anti-abortion is because they actively promote the right to choose. The issue is not that they personally oppose abortion, it is that they specifically and actively encourage it as an acceptable practice (whether they themselves would do it or not)! The convinced credobaptist is not actively encouraging, or practicing, paedobaptism. They do not carry out paedobaptism nor do they teach that it is the prescribed mode of baptism. Unlike "pro-choicers", they cannot in any serious way be considered to be promoting paedobaptist principles.
Secondly, the logic of Leeming's argument is flawed. There are many areas in which we allow individuals freedom but with whom we vehemently disagree. To take Leeming's argument to it's logical conclusion, we must say that permission of anything with which we disagree is, in reality, to support the act no matter how much we oppose it. That would mean Leeming himself must insist upon an American, theocratic Christian state or else he must be, in reality, OK with apostasy and false religion. Worse still, this view would mean God himself - who permits, yet does not condone, sin - must actually be OK with it really. The argument is clearly a nonsense.
The argument that there is no social or objective sign without subjective belief is much more cogent. Nevertheless, I'm not convinced this is insurmountable if one is Reformed (as 9Marks certainly are). If we hold to the traditional Reformed ordo salutis, we note that election, calling and regeneration all occur prior to conversion. Though I'm not sure I'd want to make this argument or press it too far (I am thinking aloud here), one could argue that paedobaptism mirrors the ordo salutis. Baptism, symbolising our regeneration, coming before conversion. Though it wouldn't be usual, nor the proper mode of baptism, if conversion did actually and really come later, it follows (on a reformed schema) that the person was elect at the point they were baptised (though they were unaware of the fact at the time). Therefore, we could view their baptism as effective in retrospect despite it not being the proper mode. Likewise, could one not argue the subjective belief - coming after the fact - makes good the social and objective signs? As above, though it is not the proper and usual mode of baptism, why could paedobaptism not be considered effective following conversion? Though it is 'out of order' does not necessarily mean it was ineffective altogether and carried no significance.
Kynes argues that humility (effectively, "I could be wrong") means he would not refuse to admit a paedobaptist into membership. This is not a good appeal to humility. If one is a convinced baptist, this is something of a moot point as he evidently doesn't believe he is wrong. If he did, he would practice paedobaptism alone, or as well as, credobaptism. That he doesn't promote paedobaptism suggests that he doesn't think he is wrong. Equally, this appeal to humility would not hold water on other issues. One would not argue that "I could be wrong" over the deity of Christ so we better admit those that reject this doctrine to membership. We rightly work out our doctrinal positions prayerfully and then submit to what we believe scripture to teach. I don't see how this issue of baptism is any different. However, Kynes appeals to charity and theology seem more legitimate.
Of course, it is right that those in open disobedience to Christ should not be admitted to church membership. However, the committed paedobaptist would contend they are not disobedient; they have fulfilled Jesus' command to be baptised (albeit out of order and an improper mode). Based upon our agreement of the truth of the gospel and the nature of salvation, does charity not allow us to view the paedobaptism as retroactive? Indeed, as I commented above, the individual was elect at the point of baptism if conversion later truly occurs.
On this basis, I see no reason for baptists to be viewed as inconsistent for admitting paedobaptists to membership. The baptist is not encouraging paedobaptism nor teaching that it is a valid and acceptable mode of baptism. What they are saying is, given the conversion of the paedobaptist, the baptism can be considered "in effect" albeit out of order. As such, the baptist can consistently admit the paedobaptist to membership without condoning or promoting that mode of baptism.
For the Strict Baptist, the addition of communion adds no further complication. If a believer is admitted to membership, that same believer is permitted to partake of communion. The issue for the Strict Baptist lies, not in the communion table but, in the admission to membership which has been handled already.
Wednesday, 25 June 2014
Thursday, 12 June 2014
The loathsome introduction of judicially enforced eugenics
Here is a most troubling story. Lord Justice Munby - Head of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice in England and Wales - has ordered a 13 year old girl to have an abortion despite her clear desire to the contrary. The Cranmer blog comments here.
The basic facts of the case are these: The girl in question has an IQ of 54 and the comprehension skills of a seven year old. She has been deemed "very damaged", "impaired" and "largely out of control". The father of the child was a 14 year old boy, evidently reckless and irresponsible himself. Nonetheless, it was manifestly clear the girl "had set her mind against termination" and expressed "unambiguous hostility towards termination".
One expert argued "If the pregnancy were terminated I believe that this would cause considerable harm to this young girl, who would see it as an assault. Continuing the pregnancy...may have a less detrimental effect on her given her current circumstances". Nevertheless, Lord Justice Munby argued "a clinical psychologist showed the girl lacked capacity to decide for herself" and ruled "it was clearly appropriate for me to supply the necessary consent to enable the termination to proceed". All of this is over and against the desire of the girl herself and the recommendation of clinical experts.
Cranmer has previously commented on Lord Justice Munby and his underlying legal presumptions (accessible here). Whatever view one holds is rather by the by in this case. It matters not whether one believes, like Cranmer, Christian mores and values should underpin our legal system. Nor should it make a difference if one prefers Lord Justice Munby's position that "the law of this country is secular, and that Christianity no longer informs its morality or values". What really matters - and I see no reason to reach a different conclusion based on a Christian or secular worldview - is whether enforced eugenics (and let's make no mistake, that is precisely what we are talking about) is ever acceptable.
The decision made by Lord Justice Munby was clearly not made on the basis of the girl being a minor. A month earlier, Mr Justice Mostyn had ruled that another pregnant 13 year old girl "had the mental capacity to understand options open to her" and that she was free to "decide what she wishes to do". This makes it evident the decision was based on IQ alone. Moreover, despite expert testimony that continuing the pregnancy would have been preferable for the mother, Lord Justice Munby ruled for a termination. This rather suggests the best interests of the mother were not at heart (for the best interests of the mother were expressly stated as continuation of the pregnancy).
What then are we to make of the decision to terminate? Seemingly, it was based on little more than the mother's low IQ and comprehension. Given the best interests of the mother were to continue with the pregnancy, it follows the mother's best interests cannot have been forefront in the decision-making process. We are thus forced to conclude that although the low IQ of the mother was the basis for the decision being taken out of her hands, it was also the fundamental basis of the decision to terminate the pregnancy.
Though Christian and secular values may differ over the rights and wrongs of removing the decision-making process from the mother (though not necessarily), surely both would agree that the "best interests" of the mother must be taken into account when reaching a decision. Though, when discussing abortion in the abstract, Christian and secular worldviews may differ over what constitutes "best interests", in this case the best interests were made manifestly clear by expert witnesses. They concluded the best interests of the mother were to continue with pregnancy.
This begs the question: why did Lord Justice Munby rule to terminate the pregnancy over and against the wishes, and the best interests (in the view of experts), of the mother? One can only conclude that Lord Justice Munby was concerned the child would inherit the mother's low IQ and level of comprehension. The mother's wishes and best interests were apparently moot.
Cranmer gives undue credit by inferring that Lord Justice Munby believed he was acting in the girl's best interests, despite his palpable wrongness predicated on his secularist presumptions. Rather, it seems Lord Justice Munby, despite expert testimony clearly stating the girl's best interests, reached a conclusion contrary to this measure. It is hard to escape any other conclusion but that this represents judicially enforced eugenics. Whatever differences exist between Christians and secularists (and those with a foot in both camps), one finds it hard to believe that many would find this acceptable.
The basic facts of the case are these: The girl in question has an IQ of 54 and the comprehension skills of a seven year old. She has been deemed "very damaged", "impaired" and "largely out of control". The father of the child was a 14 year old boy, evidently reckless and irresponsible himself. Nonetheless, it was manifestly clear the girl "had set her mind against termination" and expressed "unambiguous hostility towards termination".
One expert argued "If the pregnancy were terminated I believe that this would cause considerable harm to this young girl, who would see it as an assault. Continuing the pregnancy...may have a less detrimental effect on her given her current circumstances". Nevertheless, Lord Justice Munby argued "a clinical psychologist showed the girl lacked capacity to decide for herself" and ruled "it was clearly appropriate for me to supply the necessary consent to enable the termination to proceed". All of this is over and against the desire of the girl herself and the recommendation of clinical experts.
Cranmer has previously commented on Lord Justice Munby and his underlying legal presumptions (accessible here). Whatever view one holds is rather by the by in this case. It matters not whether one believes, like Cranmer, Christian mores and values should underpin our legal system. Nor should it make a difference if one prefers Lord Justice Munby's position that "the law of this country is secular, and that Christianity no longer informs its morality or values". What really matters - and I see no reason to reach a different conclusion based on a Christian or secular worldview - is whether enforced eugenics (and let's make no mistake, that is precisely what we are talking about) is ever acceptable.
The decision made by Lord Justice Munby was clearly not made on the basis of the girl being a minor. A month earlier, Mr Justice Mostyn had ruled that another pregnant 13 year old girl "had the mental capacity to understand options open to her" and that she was free to "decide what she wishes to do". This makes it evident the decision was based on IQ alone. Moreover, despite expert testimony that continuing the pregnancy would have been preferable for the mother, Lord Justice Munby ruled for a termination. This rather suggests the best interests of the mother were not at heart (for the best interests of the mother were expressly stated as continuation of the pregnancy).
What then are we to make of the decision to terminate? Seemingly, it was based on little more than the mother's low IQ and comprehension. Given the best interests of the mother were to continue with the pregnancy, it follows the mother's best interests cannot have been forefront in the decision-making process. We are thus forced to conclude that although the low IQ of the mother was the basis for the decision being taken out of her hands, it was also the fundamental basis of the decision to terminate the pregnancy.
Though Christian and secular values may differ over the rights and wrongs of removing the decision-making process from the mother (though not necessarily), surely both would agree that the "best interests" of the mother must be taken into account when reaching a decision. Though, when discussing abortion in the abstract, Christian and secular worldviews may differ over what constitutes "best interests", in this case the best interests were made manifestly clear by expert witnesses. They concluded the best interests of the mother were to continue with pregnancy.
This begs the question: why did Lord Justice Munby rule to terminate the pregnancy over and against the wishes, and the best interests (in the view of experts), of the mother? One can only conclude that Lord Justice Munby was concerned the child would inherit the mother's low IQ and level of comprehension. The mother's wishes and best interests were apparently moot.
Cranmer gives undue credit by inferring that Lord Justice Munby believed he was acting in the girl's best interests, despite his palpable wrongness predicated on his secularist presumptions. Rather, it seems Lord Justice Munby, despite expert testimony clearly stating the girl's best interests, reached a conclusion contrary to this measure. It is hard to escape any other conclusion but that this represents judicially enforced eugenics. Whatever differences exist between Christians and secularists (and those with a foot in both camps), one finds it hard to believe that many would find this acceptable.
Wednesday, 4 June 2014
Romans 11 and "all Israel"... another wisdom of crowds job
Romans 11:11-32 outlines the climax of Paul's dialogue regarding the inclusion of Jews & Gentiles into the kingdom of God. As hotly contested verses go, these are up there. Doug Moo notes most scholars 'agree that the key verse is 11:26: "All Israel will be saved." But the identity of "Israel" and the manner and time of its salvation are contested' (Moo, Encountering the Book of Romans, 2002).
Whilst there are a broad range of potential solutions, there are only three credible possibilities:
Whilst there are a broad range of potential solutions, there are only three credible possibilities:
- "All Israel" refers to a significant number of Jews who will turn to Christ and be saved at the parousia (so Tom Schreiner, Bob Mounce, Doug Moo, et al)
- "All Israel" refers to the entirety of the church. So, the elect Jewish remnant and the fullness of the Gentiles will "come in" ushering in the eschaton (so most Reformers, Stuart Olyott, Tom Wright, et al)
- "All Israel" refers to ethnic Israel but, rather than a significant number at the end of time, only those elect Jews throughout the course of history (so C.M. Horne)
I am pretty happy rejecting one of the above options without too many qualms (I simply don't think it fits the data). However, I am rather torn between the other two options.
I have an inclination as to which option I favour (not much more than that) but I thought the wisdom of crowds might be useful.
So, those so inclined, what are your thoughts?
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