If your ecclesiology stands or falls on the word "church"...

Over at Think Theology, Kenny Burchard has written about the fact that Tyndale did not include the word church in his translation of the Bible. He has also shared something of his own ecclesiological journey to help us understand his position. John Stevens of the FIEC also shared his post with the following question: How might thinking/practice differ if "church" was always translated "congregation" in Bible? My short answer is this: if your ecclesiology stands or falls on the English translation of the word church, you are probably doing it wrong.

Burchard made much of the fact that Tyndale pointedly translates e0kklesia as congregation, not church. However, Tyndale's bible used the word congregation because the ecclesiastical standard model set by The Church of his day was errant. Tyndale was not attempting to alter perceptions by using a different word for church, he was trying to escape the association with the established Church. It was the established Church that sought to define ecclesiology based on the translation of the word church, not Tyndale.

Second, majoring on the etymology of e0kklesia meaning "called out ones" rather falls foul of the root word fallacy. As noted some while ago at the Scribble Preach blog:

While combining the two root words (“called out from”) does indeed create something like “called out ones”, the truth is, the word ekklesia is never used that way in the New Testament or its contemporaries. In fact, ekklesia was used to refer to a group of philosophers, mathematicians, or any other kind of assembly in the Greco-Roman world. So unless we’re supposing that actors and gladiators were called to a holy lifestyle by assembling together, we can’t create a relationship between holiness and ekklesia necessarily. While it’s true that the church is composed of “called out” ones – that’s not the particular point of this word. It just means “assembly” or “gathering”.

Burchard argues that the "literal" understanding of e0kklesia means "called out" and seeks to argue, from this, that the word congregation is a better translation as it focuses on community and not on buildings. Yet, the supposed literal "called out" meaning is not the actual meaning of the word. Though congregation is a perfectly valid rendering, it has absolutely nothing to do with being called out or forming a community. It is simply an assembled gathering of people.

Third, and most importantly, just about everybody recognises that the word church has a range of meanings in scripture. Here are just some of them:

• Eph 5:25 - the church - all people, throughout all time, saved by faith in Jesus
• Gal 1:13 - the church - all professing Christians, real or not, that belong to visible congregations
• 1 Cor 11:18 - the church - a gathered meeting
• Rom 16:4f - the churches/the church - a group of separate gatherings and a particular local gathering in one place

If we take Tyndale's congregation translation, that fits perfectly well with the meaning in the latter two passages. However, if we apply his translation to the first two, congregation doesn't translate the meaning terribly well. It is equally fair to say, if we take a leaden view of church as meaning either church buildings or formal gatherings, we also run into problems with some of these passage. However, just about everybody recognises that church has a range of meanings and must be applied in different ways depending on whatever the context demands.

What is more, most approaches to church extend beyond the word e0kklesia. The command in Hebrews 10:25, to make a habit of meeting together, does not stand or fall on this word; e0kklesia isn't even mentioned in the context. Nonetheless, most agree that the writer is telling us to continue going, serving and being part of a local church body (or congregation if you like). Likewise, the biblical imperative to appoint elders and deacons insists on some sort of formal structure within a visible body. If we are using congregation as a means of ridding ourselves of any structure within the church, these leadership passages speak against being able to do so. If we are trying to use church to insist on a greater level of formality and structure than members/deacons/elders then we are likely using that word in a way it was never intended. There are plenty of other examples but these two should suffice to make the point. Ecclesiology, that is the way we do church, is not only determined by our understanding of the word e0kklesia.

So here is the basic issue. If our ecclesiology stands or falls upon the way we translate the word e0kklesia - especially if we leadenly apply our translation in exactly the same way in every context - then there will almost certainly be something deficient about the way we are doing church.

On the historic apology

It can't have escaped your notice that the unstoppable runaway train that is Jeremy Corbyn's Labour leadership bid has been a rich vein of material for this blog of late (see here and here). And today is no exception. In today's Guardian, Corbyn announces that if he becomes leader he will apologise on behalf of the Labour Party for the (most recent) military intervention in Iraq.

I dared to reply to the Guardian twitter update with the following:

@guardian why? He was one of very few who have zero need to apologise!

— Stephen Kneale (@steve_kneale) August 20, 2015

This led to a small twitter-spat (as these things tend to do) which I will not bother boring you with here (for those interested in such things, you can find it here).

This got me thinking about the value of historic and symbolic apologies. On one side of this discussion are those who think they are a symbolic show of future intent. Never mind that Jeremy Corbyn consistently voted against the Iraq war, it doesn't matter that he himself always opposed it, as leader of the Labour Party he would be making an important symbolic gesture moving forward. On the other side of the debate are those who think it is a totally valueless act. His future intent is clear enough when he called for Tony Blair to be tried as a war criminal and has consistently and repeatedly voiced his opposition to military intervention. If the word 'sorry' conveys contrition and remorse, how can those uninvolved in a felony, and who consistently stood against the action, show such penitence? I fall into the latter of these two camps.

Symbolism is only really valid when the symbol applies to the one associating themselves with it. I am sure scores of Iraqi citizens would find value in an apology from the perpetrators. I am far less convinced they will find an apology from a man who consistently voted against the action and has repeatedly and vociferously called out his own government on the decision remotely worthwhile. His views on the issue have been clear from the beginning, remain clear and his plans going forward are no less transparent. An apology under such circumstances is neither symbolic nor meaningful. Only those who are responsible for an act can offer a meaningful apology. An apology from someone who always rejected the action does nothing to change the fact that those responsible are still unrepentant. It is like receiving an apology from the mother of a murderer (who you never held responsible) whilst her son continues to brag publicly about his heinous crime. It is simply a hollow gesture.

That also brings into question the nature of the historic apology altogether. The Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, recently apologised to America for Japanese actions during WWII though he has more recently claimed that modern-day Japan shouldn't have to keep apologising for WWII actions. Angela Merkel has made further apologies for German atrocities under the Nazis. And Tony Blair, though unable to apologise for his own actions in Iraq, seems to have no issue apologising for Britain's past involvement in the slave trade and our part in the Irish potato famine.

It is Blair's own apologies that bring into sharp relief the pointlessness of the historic apology. It is easy to say sorry for actions with which we were personally uninvolved and that we have consistently made clear were wrong. There is little doubt in the modern age that virtually everyone in the Western world despises slavery. There are no policy decisions from any party across the political spectrum that suggest, explicitly or implicitly, any desire to return to such days. To apologise for something universally rejected in the West, and for which we bear no personal responsibility, is but a valueless and hollow gesture. We are really apologising on behalf of others which seems to defeat the very purpose of an apology. I can express sorrow and disgust about the actions of others but I cannot be remorseful or penitent on their behalf. An apology is only worth something if there is a recognition of wrongdoing on the part of the perpetrator. For those of us who always rejected the action, apologising on behalf of others does nothing.

It is ludicrous to me that people who openly and repeatedly reject the actions of the Nazis in modern day Germany are expected to continually apologise for something with which they had no part, neither passive nor active. It is silly that a hollow apology from a modern world leader about the horrors of slavery, when they have repeatedly and consistently stated their opposition to it, is deemed of value. It is rather more telling that Tony Blair has no problem whatsoever apologising for historic crimes in which he had no part but cannot bring himself to say sorry for the very real problems his decisions have directly caused for those who are still alive, affected by such things and for whom an apology would be both laden with meaning and of any intrinsic value. It says to me that the only apology worth anything is one from the individuals responsible. It says to me that is a much harder apology to give because it involves owning up, to those affected, to that for which we are personally responsible. It says to me that anyone can express sorrow and remorse for what they have not done; it is much harder to own what we personally and directly have done and admit we were wrong.

It also brings into sharp relief the words of Jesus Christ in Matthew 7:13f: "Enter by the narrow gate. For the gate is wide and the way is easy that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard that leads to life, and those who find it are few." Many of us are happy to accept that the way is hard. Jesus also said “If anyone would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me. For whoever would save his life will lose it, but whoever loses his life for my sake will find it." And so we expect following Jesus to be tough. But we often don't like the fact that "the gate is narrow... and those who find it are few". It is not simply following Christ that is hard but even entering by the gate - a gate that Christ elsewhere makes clear is himself - is also difficult.

Those from other religions may not understand what is so difficult about salvation by faith alone. What on earth could be difficult about that? It is precisely the same thing that is easy about the historic apology and extremely difficult about the current, only valid, one. To come to Christ necessitates an understanding that we are personally responsible for our own sin. It is not an historic crime in which we have no part and remains entirely the fault of Adam, Paul tells us "for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God" (Rom 3:23). Without acknowledging our own personal responsibility for the sin that separates us from God, there can be no forgiveness. And there is no denying that accepting responsibility for what we have done, acknowledging that we have not lived as we ought and accepting that we have actively pursued what is wrong is difficult indeed!

It also means - if I must accept personal responsibility for my separation from God - that somebody else cannot be penitent on my behalf. If I am separated from God because of my sin, it is simply no good for my father, mother, brother, sister, friend or colleague to be terribly sorry on my behalf. My personal responsibility has in no way been accepted if I am personally unwilling to seek forgiveness for what I have done. It is only when we accept that we have done wrong and that forgiveness is found in repentance and faith in Christ alone that we can be made right with God. It is something that requires a personal and heartfelt penitence. A meaningful apology - that is true repentance and genuine faith in Christ - are the only means of real forgiveness.

By contrast, historic apologies are neither personal, do not accept responsibility and are not an acceptance of wrongdoing. It is pleading on behalf of another who has potentially shown no remorse whatsoever. If we want the word 'sorry' to mean anything at all, let's please stop insisting we use it on behalf of others.

Jeremy Corbyn's campaign and what it has to say about two-stage separation

I have watched on over recent weeks as Jeremy Corbyn has been associated with "Jew-haters", conspiracy theorists, murderers, Holocaust deniers and other terrorists and extremists. In his most recent interview with Cathy Newman on Channel 4, Corbyn denied sympathising with Holocaust deniers and vociferously rejected such views in no uncertain terms. On today's World at One on Radio 4, Corbyn denied knowing the 'extremist' Dyab Abou Jahjah who has links to Hezbollah. He also denounced the actions of Hamas and Hezbollah in no uncertain terms whilst still maintaining the importance of open dialogue.

I am reasonably happy with such denials. I am rather in agreement with the need to keep lines of communication open for dialogue that leads to peace. I do think it is possible to speak to terrorist organisations and unsavoury characters without endorsing everything they say, do and stand for. I am, nonetheless, much less impressed with his continued refusal to denounce the IRA in the same terms as he has Hezbollah and Hamas (see here). If he can censure Hezbollah and Hamas in the clearest possible terms whilst maintaining the need to talk to them for the purposes of a peace process, there is no reason the same cannot be said to the IRA. I strongly suspect this is down to his ongoing friendship with the Irish Republican top brass compared to his mere supposed general association with those linked to Middle Eastern terror groups.

Leaving aside the glaring exception of the IRA, Corbyn has consistently denied sympathising with the views espoused by those he has been accused of courting. He has publicly rejected the violent means of Hezbollah, Hamas and their respective supporters. Corbyn has also condemned Holocaust denial in the strongest terms stating "Holocaust denial is vile and wrong. The Holocaust was the most vile part of our history. The Jewish people killed by the Nazi Holocaust were the people who suffered the most in the 20th century." Despite pictures emerging of him sitting beside Dyab Abou Jahjah, I think Owen Jones' defence of Corbyn is quite reasonable and eminently likely. Frankly, I believe Corbyn when he says he doesn't remember the man and knew nothing of his views; not least given his brazen, unrepentant willingness to admit to the vast majority of links that many deem questionable.

In short, I don't think Jeremy Corbyn is anti-Semitic, a Holocaust denier nor a "Jew-hater". I do not think he supports Hezbollah and Hamas. I am yet to be convinced he wholeheartedly rejects the actions of the IRA and doesn't seek to justify their means as "necessary".

In Owen Jones' defence of Corbyn, he comments:

If he knew somebody had anti-Semitic views or indulged Holocaust denial, he would find their views utterly repulsive. But having spent his life attending more meetings and protests than virtually any other MP, he will have encountered and met countless people. I can’t remember people I’ve shared platforms with and met (which has led to many embarrassing moments in my case) and the idea an MP like Corbyn juggling his constituency and campaigning work and meeting the number of people he does will remember is pushing human capabilities to an extreme degree.

I am utterly sympathetic to this defence. Christians who advocate a policy of co-belligerence (e.g. here) should understand this. On issues of agreement, we may share a platform with those whom we would otherwise disagree. For example, in the Reform Section 5 campaign, Christian groups found themselves sharing a platform with all sorts of atheistic and secular groups due to agreement on the issue at hand. It seems likely in the Palestinian Solidarity movement one is likely, on that issue, to share a platform with others who hold unsavoury views in other areas. The same is almost certainly true in the pro-zionist camp - agreement on the issue is likely to lead to one sharing a platform with some who hold unsavoury views in other areas.

The issue is one of two-stage separation. If it can be reasonably demonstrated that Jeremy Corbyn himself supports Holocaust denial, sympathises with anti-Semites and supports the violent means of sundry terrorist organisations then we are well within our rights to denounce his campaign on such grounds. If, however, he does not hold or sympathise with such views but happens to support some other issues which those who hold these views also happen to support that is rather different. For example, it is possible to support the maintenance of the Union in Northern Ireland without in any way linking oneself to the terrorist activities of Loyalist paramilitary groups (so Unionism has been arguing for over a century). The same goes for Irish unification without supporting Republican paramilitaries (or so the Nationalists have been arguing to some while). It is, however, wholly unreasonable to denounce Ian Paisley - who has consistently denounced the actions of Loyalist paramilitaries - for having occasionally found himself in the same room as paramilitary men who share his view on the Union. Likewise, to denounce Mark Durkan - who has consistently denounced the tactics of Republican paramilitaries - for having occasionally found himself in the same room as Provisional IRA men is equally unreasonable. This guilt by association two-stage separation is unfair, it is no way to determine the actual views of an individual.

The approach to Jeremy Corbyn's campaign is reminiscent of two-stage separation in churches. It is the view that says A must separate from B, not because of any issue with B, but because B is associated with C who is deemed beyond the pale. Occasionally, it becomes three, four or more stage separation. It is a view that infers guilt by association and can often end up condemning nigh on everybody. If we are working with the sense that it is not possible to even share a platform or be in the same room as those with whom we disagree on unrelated issues, we may as well shut the House of Commons down. We cannot possibly expect people to be so certain of any link they may make that they must background check every individual they meet at any given rally they attend.

This blog has previously commented on the issue of two-stage separation within the Christian world. If our unity is based on gospel truth, it is inevitable that we will ultimately share fellowship with churches who are no exactly like us. That is not to say there are no ministries we ought to denounce in no uncertain terms but there are clearly large areas of theological truth which will be relegated to matters of secondary importance. They are those issues on which there may be a right answer but which do not form a basis of separation. Moreover, there will be issues on which we share a platform without agreeing with those whom we campaign. It is entirely possible, for example, that in the name of co-belligerence a Christian may find themselves on the same platform as a Muslim. It is highly likely that, in so doing, there may be dispensational, pro-Israel, CWI-supporting believers sharing a platform with some Muslim who hold less than salubrious views toward Israel and its citizens.Yet, because we agree on the issue at hand, we share a platform without endorsing all the views of those thereon.

If we want to be able to defend co-belligerence, we must be careful we don't fall into this guilt-by-association trap toward others. If links are symptomatic of views, then we ought to be careful to bring personal views into the light and make sure we are denouncing the actual views of the individual rather than our presumed view based on some of things we may know about their associations. If we want to be able to support gospel unity, we will have to be very careful about precisely those positions we wish to denounce. Are they essentials? Do they undermine the gospel? Are we sure the people we are disassociating with actually hold the views we deem anti-gospel or are we presuming that based on others they know? For the sake of the gospel, let's keep the main things the main things. If we must disassociate with someone, let's make sure we are doing so rightly. Let's determine fellowship based on the actual views of those we know, not based on the presumed views of third-parties with whom they associate.

The problem with protest-free buffers around abortion clinics

There seems to be much news about abortion of late. The blogosphere - and certain mainstream news outlets - have expended much time pouring over recent undercover videos showing the modus operandi of American abortion provider Planned Parenthood (e.g. see here, here and here amongst others). Attention initially focused on PP's callous efforts to abort foetuses in "a less crunchy way" in order to preserve body parts which they can sell on. Things quickly moved on to their "after-birth abortions" which remain virtually impossible to distinguish from the murder of a newly born child (apart from the fact the foetus is not wanted by the mother). 

Many have commented on the glib manner in which PP representatives conversed over lunch about killing infants who have taken their first breath (not just those killed in utero) and noted the cold, detached discussion regarding the resale value of individual body parts. It is the matter-of-factness of it all that seems to have caused the greatest consternation. The details surrounding the reality of abortion clinics have long been in the public domain; the regular goings on are well established. As such, I don't particular want to dig into any of the details surrounding PP here. I rather wanted to look at another story which, though having nothing to do with PP, is linked. 

Today, Yvette Cooper - Labour leadership contender - argued in favour of protest-free buffers around abortion clinics. We are already contending with Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs) from the incumbent government (see here) which seek to inhibit free speech and, to some degree, free thought. Now, in line with the New Labour tendency to such things, Cooper is mooting curbs on the right to protest against abortion, another of the new cultural orthodoxies that cannot be spoken against.

Why has this been raised as an issue? As The Guardian report, The British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) has complained confirmed that one of their clinics had to close down as a "direct result of protest activity". In other words, as the protest actually had the desired effect, Cooper wants to limit anything that might have a positive outcome for the protesters. She is happy for folk to protest in ways that are thoroughly ineffectual but, as soon as the action begins to work, curbs on freedom must be introduced to protect cultural orthodoxy.

On such things New Labour have form. It was they who stopped anti-war protesters from camping outside Westminster primarily because they found it a nuisance to be reminded of widespread public displeasure at certain military interventions. It is New Labour who began to introduce limits on free speech because certain words or phrases could be deemed "offensive" or "annoying". It was New Labour who inculcated the culture of offence and victimhood which meant certain words and views could not be expressed without the law being brought to boot. Now, Yvette Cooper - who has been part of the New Labour project - wishes to stop dissent regarding yet another culturally accepted norm. Cultural orthodoxy cannot be challenged, protests can only take the form of ineffective, inoffensive nothingness. Anything that may offend or lead to a questioning of the cultural zeitgeist is verboten.

Is there a legitimate discussion to be had regarding the boundaries of legitimate protest? Of course. Is it wrong to intimidate or harass those against whom you protest? Absolutely. But if intimidation and harassment are subjective measures, that which one person finds meek and mild another will find thoroughly intimidating. Where do the boundaries of such things lie?

Let's consider this: if we were discussing a protest outside the doors of a shop found to be exploiting foreign labour, would a buffer-zone be mooted? Would tears be shed for the shop workers? Would there be an outcry if the shop had to shut down? Or, alternatively, consider animal testing laboratories. Are protesters expected to protest away from the lab in such a way that their protest is rendered totally ineffective? Surely it is simply the nature of the clinic that has caused the concern.

Every reasonable person agrees that threats and intimidation are not appropriate tools of protest. However, being "confronted with images of foetuses" can hardly be said to represent a threat. And a static protest standing outside the doors of a clinic is hardly harassment. Following those seeking to go into the clinic up and down the street may fall into that category but a static protest can hardly be considered within the same bracket. As for intimidation, it is possible for anyone to find anything intimidating. It may be intimidating to walk past a group of protesters but if there is not danger to life or limb, no threat of assault, it seems such is congruent with a free and civil society.

The issue is a troubling one and extends well beyond the presenting issue. If we are prepared to reduce protests outside abortion clinics to ineffective and valueless acts, what is to stop legislation from doing the same to other forms of public assembly? If a static protest outside an abortion clinic amounts to intimidation and harassment, then what of the union picket line? What of animal rights protest? What of anti-hunting campaigns? How about the anti-austerity protests or anti-war marches? If we go down this line, there really is nothing to stop future governments finding anything politically awkward to which this approach could not be taken. There will be no means of protest that might possibly have any effect on the issue at hand. By castrating the power of the protest, they render all protest of no value.

Regardless of our view on the rights and wrongs of abortion, it surely cannot be right to restrict the right of others to disagree. It is also short-sighted to disallow tactics that may cause others to change their mind. It sets a dangerous precedent for all forms of protest and reduces protest to a valueless act. If it is politically expedient to do so, there is no reason such powers couldn't extend to any protest on any issue. The policy is a bad one and the precedent it will set is even worse.

I like Jeremy Corbyn but on this one thing I simply cannot agree

I'm going to go on record - I really like Jeremy Corbyn. He is not some archaic throwback to 1970s Labour politics but a politician who, on a wide number of issues, has proven himself several decades ahead of the curve. He is reconnecting with long lost Labour core voters as well as reaching swathes of young people who have grown tired of bland, centrist politicians who stand for next to nothing. He has achieved this without spin and slickness but rather by speaking his mind based on a set of political principles that he has communicated clearly and held consistently.

Jeremy Corbyn really is my sort of candidate. When I see how in tune he is with public opinion, I am not particularly surprised. He is pro-nationalisation of public services, he is in favour of high tax on the wealthy and considers this a good way to bring down the deficit, he is for rent controls and overhauling the private rental sector, he sees little value in upgrading trident, he backs the living wage, he is against tuition fees and has generally been on the right side of every suggested military intervention over the last few decades. On all these issues, I am in agreement with him. I really do share many of his core convictions and I think his explanation re common misconceptions surrounding his candidacy are spot on.

But there is one area on which I simply cannot agree and which sticks in my craw. There may be more than one such issue but, if there are, his opinions on them are not being widely reported. Nonetheless, there is one particular issue that stands out as something of a blind spot. In fact, I would go as far as to say it is an inconsistency from a man who has been, in almost every other respect, unimpeachably consistent on his guiding political principles. That issue is his unwavering support for the IRA and his staunch refusal to condemn their actions. There are several reasons why I find this a problem. 

First, as a man wedded to the concept of direct democracy, it is apparent he does not apply this principle to the Northern Irish context. It has always been my basic position that so long as the majority wish to remain in the Union, the status quo ought to be maintained. The point at which a 60-70% majority wish to unify with the Republic of Ireland, the province ought to change hands (1). At present, the majority (by a c.10% margin) wish to remain within the Union so thus it ought to be. To continue to publicly support the Republican movement in the region, regardless of the democratic will of the people, is to fly in the face democracy itself. The majority in Northern Ireland do not wish to be united to Ireland and, lest we try to co-opt the Republic of Ireland into the voting majority (and as separate state we shouldn't), the majority in the ROI do not particularly want to be unified with the North either. It is a limited number, a minority within the region of Ulster, who are pressing for Irish unification. To support and press their aims is to ride roughshod over democracy itself. This is a patent inconsistency from a man who so supports the will of the people that he wants to reinstate direct election of the entire Labour cabinet by a vote of the party membership.

Second, as a man committed to CND and (rightly) outraged by various recent military interventions in foreign countries, it seems incredible that he cannot bring himself to condemn the more obviously illegal IRA bombing and murder campaigns that took place on home soil. He would be critical of British Army behaviour during The Troubles, he would see issues with Protestant Loyalist groups such as the UVF and UDA, so why can he not accept the same issues regarding the IRA? Most agree that the British Army did not always act reasonably and responsibly in Northern Ireland. All will agree Loyalist paramilitary men were guilty of heinous acts of murder. But neither of these things justify the murderous IRA campaign. In fact, the Loyalist paramilitaries only formed in response to increased IRA action and the British Army were initially sent to the province to protect the Catholic community from the resultant increase in Loyalist paramilitary action. None of this justifies the behaviour of the British Army nor any Loyalist group (the former often acted questionably and the latter should certainly be condemned by all). Nonetheless, to justify one whilst condemning the others seems to be a clear case of justifying the means because you support the ends. Worse still, it actually undercuts Corbyn's (largely correct) opposition to military interventions in Iraq and Syria. Most people agree with  the intended ends of military intervention but found the means both morally questionable and practically ineffective. However, any moral outrage Corbyn may have regarding military intervention cannot be justifiably maintained whilst he refuses to condemn the means undertaken by the IRA in pursuit of their own agenda.

Third, Corbyn has always maintained that talking to terrorists was an essential part of any peace process. On this we can agree. Without speaking to the parties involved in conflict, one can never expect to reach any sort of solution. In the Northern Irish context, this approach formed the basis of the now (largely) successful peace process and power-sharing agreement.

Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to argue that talking to terrorist organisations is a necessary component of any successful peace process whilst simultaneously condemning their activities. Presumably Corbyn would have seen the importance of including the UVF and UDA in such talks despite clearly disagreeing with their agenda and tactics. It is simply reprehensible to allow certain atrocities to pass simply because we are sympathetic to the aims of those who commit them. The right-wing very often do it with military interventions and dealing with certain dictators whilst the left will often turn a blind eye to those advancing some revolutionary cause or in dealing with other despots closer to their position. It is simply intellectually dishonest to decry violence and murder, and especially to claim pacifism as a cause, and yet make allowances for the acts of murder committed in the name of a cause we rather admire. Either it is morally abhorrent to engage in bombing campaigns, murder and "disappear" your victims or it is not. If it is, we cannot simply tolerate those things because they are done in the name of a cause we rather like. To do so is to disrespect the victims and their families in the most egregious way. It is hard to view Corbyn's refusal to denounce the IRA's activities in any other way.

To hear Jeremy Corbyn refuse, five times no less, to condemn the actions of the IRA is a blot on his campaign and a stain on his character. To refuse to acknowledge their behaviour as repugnant - no matter how much he may sympathise with their aims - is nothing short of disrespectful to all IRA victims and their families. It is the sort of refusal that would (rightly) not be OK if it were directed at victims of Islamic State, those who suffered at the hands of the Nazis in Germany nor even the victims of the Loyalists fighting on the other side of the divide within the same conflict. If it is not OK in all these other cases, we surely can't be OK with this being an exception.

Let me say it again, I really like Jeremy Corbyn. I support vast swathes of his policy. But if I could change one thing about his campaign, if I could get him to apologise for just one thing, I would almost certainly make it this.

Notes

1. This is my basic position on all issues of national self-determination and it applies to Scotland, Wales and any other province that wishes to gain independence or join with another state.

MP claims EDOs should be used against teachers who hold traditional views on marriage

It has been reported in The Telegraph and The Independent that the introduction of Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs) - the latest government anti-terror legislation - will be used against teachers who hold to a traditional view of marriage. A Tory backbench MP has written to one of his constituents and claimed EDOs should be used in "a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong". Both the National Secular Society and the Christian Institute have criticised the comments. This blog has already highlighted some of the issues surrounding EDOs here and here. For a reasoned explanation of the problems surrounding these recent troubling developments, you can do much worse than read the Archbishop Cranmer blog.

Mark Spencer, backbench Conservative MP for Sherwood, has this to say in a letter to a constituent:

I believe that everybody in society has a right to free speech and to express their views without fear of persecution. The EDOs will not serve to limit but rather to guarantee it: it is those who seek to stop other people expressing their beliefs who will be targeted. Let me give you an example, one which lots of constituents have been writing about – talking about gay marriage in schools.

The new legislation specifically targets hate speech, so teachers will still be free to express their understanding of the term ‘marriage’, and their moral opposition to its use in some situations without breaking the new laws. The EDOs, in this case, would apply to a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong.

If this case seems like an (ironically) extreme approach to those holding traditional views on marriage, it is entirely consistent with Theresa May's claim: “I want to see new civil powers to target extremists who stay within the law but still spread poisonous hatred..”; and David Cameron's comment: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens ‘as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone'”.

This is dangerous territory for the government. We have moved from a position where dissenting opinion was tolerated, to a place where it was not, to a situation where only the active affirmation of state orthodoxy will do. Not only will the government refuse to tolerate anybody who actively opposes gay marriage but they are now also making it virtually impossible to do anything other than affirm it without question. It is now official policy that certain views - specifically traditional views on marriage - are illegal to express. This is totalitarian control of the very worst order.

Aside from the clear issues related to freedom of speech and freedom of thought, this particular case becomes even more ridiculous when one remembers that there are parts of the UK that still uphold the traditional view of marriage. Northern Ireland has yet to pass a gay marriage act which, bizarrely, makes the entire Stormont government guilty of extremism according to our new prescribed definition. Just as ludicrous is the thought that our own government, up until a few months ago, were themselves guilty of extremism according to this new definition. Every Westminster MP that abstained or voted against gay marriage should, presumably, be subject to EDOs in retrospect. Even if the government aren't concerned about retroactive action, those who have never fully affirmed the new prescribed direction must surely be investigated as extremists as they remain belligerently unreformed.

We are told that we must all actively support, without reserve, nebulous "British values". And what are those values? Apparently the affirmation of whatever the government tells us they are. And if we do not assent? We are extremists and fall foul of EDOs; even if you are non-violent, not inciting violence and are in every respect obeying the current law. That is, we can be prosecuted even when - to all intents and purposes - we are obeying the government. It is utterly ludicrous and terrifyingly dangerous.