O Liberté, que de crimes on commet en ton nom!

Freedom and liberty, the clarion calls of those who typically abuse the very things they claim to defend. The news is awash with yet another American mass shooting. President Obama makes his 15th statement about shootings since he took office. He once again makes a plea for tighter gun controls. The usual suspects reply with their standard cry. In the name of freedom, people continue to be killed all the day long.

It is a gross act of sin to use the cause of freedom to persist with a situation that continuously and repeatedly leads to death. Just as the those on the right would (rightly) have no truck with arguments that rely on freedom to continue the systematic destruction of children in utero, the call for tighter gun controls are no less unimpressed with arguments from freedom while people are being repeatedly killed. While human beings are dying, using freedom and liberty as the basis for letting it continue is nothing short of iniquitous.

This side of the pond, where we have never quite had the same national obsession with personal armaments, may seem easy. The Dunblane massacre in 1996 was the impetus to introduce two firearms Acts which effectively banned the private ownership of handguns. However, even prior to the mid-90s, it was not exactly the norm to own a gun. Nevertheless, this same approach to freedom exists as much here as it does in the US. Our approach to abortion rights is often based on this same spurious reasoning and our recent national debate on the 'right to die' also leaned heavily on such arguments. Though it may not be gun control, we are not immune from the questionable application of freedom despite the obvious, dangerous and highly troubling effects on the people.

As Christians, we don't always stand apart from this specious reasoning either. Yes, we may oppose abortion and euthanasia, we may be pro-gun controls, yet this same tendency can exist in Christian circles too. It is called antinomianism. There can be an insistence upon freedom despite the fact that, in the name of the freedom we proclaim, people are lost. In the name of freedom in Christ, gross acts of sin are justified because "we're free". Freedom once again becomes a call from those who, frankly, want to abuse the freedom that is theirs in Christ. By abusing freedom this way, many who think they are safe remain lost in their sin. Christ did not win our freedom so that we may carry on as before. Our freedom in Christ is not a freedom to ignore his commands and continue in our sin. We have been freed from sin in Christ. To carry on sinning, and to use this hard won freedom as the basis to do so, is the most offensive way to treat Jesus. 

Freedom is a most important civil liberty that must be defended. It is a most important Christian concept that must be defended theologically. However, using freedom as a basis to defend/reject law that was intended to protect the individual, is nothing short of perverse. It doesn't matter whether we are talking civil liberty or Christian liberty, freedom is not there to the detriment of the life of the people. Anyone arguing otherwise has neither stared down the barrel of a gun nor come to terms with the doctrine of Hell.

The problem with protest-free buffers around abortion clinics

There seems to be much news about abortion of late. The blogosphere - and certain mainstream news outlets - have expended much time pouring over recent undercover videos showing the modus operandi of American abortion provider Planned Parenthood (e.g. see here, here and here amongst others). Attention initially focused on PP's callous efforts to abort foetuses in "a less crunchy way" in order to preserve body parts which they can sell on. Things quickly moved on to their "after-birth abortions" which remain virtually impossible to distinguish from the murder of a newly born child (apart from the fact the foetus is not wanted by the mother). 

Many have commented on the glib manner in which PP representatives conversed over lunch about killing infants who have taken their first breath (not just those killed in utero) and noted the cold, detached discussion regarding the resale value of individual body parts. It is the matter-of-factness of it all that seems to have caused the greatest consternation. The details surrounding the reality of abortion clinics have long been in the public domain; the regular goings on are well established. As such, I don't particular want to dig into any of the details surrounding PP here. I rather wanted to look at another story which, though having nothing to do with PP, is linked. 

Today, Yvette Cooper - Labour leadership contender - argued in favour of protest-free buffers around abortion clinics. We are already contending with Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs) from the incumbent government (see here) which seek to inhibit free speech and, to some degree, free thought. Now, in line with the New Labour tendency to such things, Cooper is mooting curbs on the right to protest against abortion, another of the new cultural orthodoxies that cannot be spoken against.

Why has this been raised as an issue? As The Guardian report, The British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS) has complained confirmed that one of their clinics had to close down as a "direct result of protest activity". In other words, as the protest actually had the desired effect, Cooper wants to limit anything that might have a positive outcome for the protesters. She is happy for folk to protest in ways that are thoroughly ineffectual but, as soon as the action begins to work, curbs on freedom must be introduced to protect cultural orthodoxy.

On such things New Labour have form. It was they who stopped anti-war protesters from camping outside Westminster primarily because they found it a nuisance to be reminded of widespread public displeasure at certain military interventions. It is New Labour who began to introduce limits on free speech because certain words or phrases could be deemed "offensive" or "annoying". It was New Labour who inculcated the culture of offence and victimhood which meant certain words and views could not be expressed without the law being brought to boot. Now, Yvette Cooper - who has been part of the New Labour project - wishes to stop dissent regarding yet another culturally accepted norm. Cultural orthodoxy cannot be challenged, protests can only take the form of ineffective, inoffensive nothingness. Anything that may offend or lead to a questioning of the cultural zeitgeist is verboten.

Is there a legitimate discussion to be had regarding the boundaries of legitimate protest? Of course. Is it wrong to intimidate or harass those against whom you protest? Absolutely. But if intimidation and harassment are subjective measures, that which one person finds meek and mild another will find thoroughly intimidating. Where do the boundaries of such things lie?

Let's consider this: if we were discussing a protest outside the doors of a shop found to be exploiting foreign labour, would a buffer-zone be mooted? Would tears be shed for the shop workers? Would there be an outcry if the shop had to shut down? Or, alternatively, consider animal testing laboratories. Are protesters expected to protest away from the lab in such a way that their protest is rendered totally ineffective? Surely it is simply the nature of the clinic that has caused the concern.

Every reasonable person agrees that threats and intimidation are not appropriate tools of protest. However, being "confronted with images of foetuses" can hardly be said to represent a threat. And a static protest standing outside the doors of a clinic is hardly harassment. Following those seeking to go into the clinic up and down the street may fall into that category but a static protest can hardly be considered within the same bracket. As for intimidation, it is possible for anyone to find anything intimidating. It may be intimidating to walk past a group of protesters but if there is not danger to life or limb, no threat of assault, it seems such is congruent with a free and civil society.

The issue is a troubling one and extends well beyond the presenting issue. If we are prepared to reduce protests outside abortion clinics to ineffective and valueless acts, what is to stop legislation from doing the same to other forms of public assembly? If a static protest outside an abortion clinic amounts to intimidation and harassment, then what of the union picket line? What of animal rights protest? What of anti-hunting campaigns? How about the anti-austerity protests or anti-war marches? If we go down this line, there really is nothing to stop future governments finding anything politically awkward to which this approach could not be taken. There will be no means of protest that might possibly have any effect on the issue at hand. By castrating the power of the protest, they render all protest of no value.

Regardless of our view on the rights and wrongs of abortion, it surely cannot be right to restrict the right of others to disagree. It is also short-sighted to disallow tactics that may cause others to change their mind. It sets a dangerous precedent for all forms of protest and reduces protest to a valueless act. If it is politically expedient to do so, there is no reason such powers couldn't extend to any protest on any issue. The policy is a bad one and the precedent it will set is even worse.

The loathsome introduction of judicially enforced eugenics

Here is a most troubling story. Lord Justice Munby - Head of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice in England and Wales - has ordered a 13 year old girl to have an abortion despite her clear desire to the contrary. The Cranmer blog comments here.

The basic facts of the case are these: The girl in question has an IQ of 54 and the comprehension skills of a seven year old. She has been deemed "very damaged", "impaired" and "largely out of control". The father of the child was a 14 year old boy, evidently reckless and irresponsible himself. Nonetheless, it was manifestly clear the girl "had set her mind against termination" and expressed "unambiguous hostility towards termination".

One expert argued "If the pregnancy were terminated I believe that this would cause considerable harm to this young girl, who would see it as an assault. Continuing the pregnancy...may have a less detrimental effect on her given her current circumstances". Nevertheless, Lord Justice Munby argued "a clinical psychologist showed the girl lacked capacity to decide for herself" and ruled "it was clearly appropriate for me to supply the necessary consent to enable the termination to proceed". All of this is over and against the desire of the girl herself and the recommendation of clinical experts.

Cranmer has previously commented on Lord Justice Munby and his underlying legal presumptions (accessible here). Whatever view one holds is rather by the by in this case. It matters not whether one believes, like Cranmer, Christian mores and values should underpin our legal system. Nor should it make a difference if one prefers Lord Justice Munby's position that "the law of this country is secular, and that Christianity no longer informs its morality or values". What really matters - and I see no reason to reach a different conclusion based on a Christian or secular worldview - is whether enforced eugenics (and let's make no mistake, that is precisely what we are talking about) is ever acceptable.

The decision made by Lord Justice Munby was clearly not made on the basis of the girl being a minor. A month earlier, Mr Justice Mostyn had ruled that another pregnant 13 year old girl "had the mental capacity to understand options open to her" and that she was free to "decide what she wishes to do". This makes it evident the decision was based on IQ alone. Moreover, despite expert testimony that continuing the pregnancy would have been preferable for the mother, Lord Justice Munby ruled for a termination. This rather suggests the best interests of the mother were not at heart (for the best interests of the mother were expressly stated as continuation of the pregnancy). 

What then are we to make of the decision to terminate? Seemingly, it was based on little more than the mother's low IQ and comprehension. Given the best interests of the mother were to continue with the pregnancy, it follows the mother's best interests cannot have been forefront in the decision-making process. We are thus forced to conclude that although the low IQ of the mother was the basis for the decision being taken out of her hands, it was also the fundamental basis of the decision to terminate the pregnancy.

Though Christian and secular values may differ over the rights and wrongs of removing the decision-making process from the mother (though not necessarily), surely both would agree that the "best interests" of the mother must be taken into account when reaching a decision. Though, when discussing abortion in the abstract, Christian and secular worldviews may differ over what constitutes "best interests", in this case the best interests were made manifestly clear by expert witnesses. They concluded the best interests of the mother were to continue with pregnancy. 

This begs the question: why did Lord Justice Munby rule to terminate the pregnancy over and against the wishes, and the best interests (in the view of experts), of the mother? One can only conclude that Lord Justice Munby was concerned the child would inherit the mother's low IQ and level of comprehension. The mother's wishes and best interests were apparently moot.

Cranmer gives undue credit by inferring that Lord Justice Munby believed he was acting in the girl's best interests, despite his palpable wrongness predicated on his secularist presumptions. Rather, it seems Lord Justice Munby, despite expert testimony clearly stating the girl's best interests, reached a conclusion contrary to this measure. It is hard to escape any other conclusion but that this represents judicially enforced eugenics. Whatever differences exist between Christians and secularists (and those with a foot in both camps), one finds it hard to believe that many would find this acceptable.

Media silence lifted now Gosnell found guilty of murder

Now that Dr Kermit Gosnell has been found guilty of murder, the media silence surrounding this case has been lifted and the story is beginning to make headlines. Cranmer comments that this case once again raises serious questions about when life actually begins, noting that Pennsylvania and the UK are exceptional. He states "not everywhere has a 24-week limit... Across Europe, the upper limits are: France 12, Germany 12, Italy 12, Belgium 12, Bulgaria 12, Denmark 12, Czech Republic 12, Greece 12, Hungary 12, Luxembourg 12, the Netherlands 13, Poland 12, Slovakia 12 and Sweden, the most ‘liberal’, 18."

Cranmer is quite right to raise these issues. He is equally correct in highlighting the moral inconsistency, pointed out by former Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams, that asserts "the pregnant woman who smokes or drinks heavily is widely regarded as guilty of infringing the rights of her unborn child; yet at the same time, with no apparent sense of incongruity, there is discussion of the possibility of the liberty of the pregnant woman herself to perform the actions that will terminate a pregnancy." Indeed, he is most likely correct that "the nation cries out for a latter-day Shaftsbury or Wilberforce in Parliament who will bang on about this barbarism ad nauseam, day after day, week after week, until something is done about it."

I was struck by one particular comment in the Guardian. Having stated that both sides of the abortion debate "endorsed the verdict", the paper offered statements from a pro-life organisation and a pro-choice group. Unsurprisingly, the pro-life spokesman endorsed the verdict and claimed the result "helped more people realize what abortion is really about" and went on to state that he hoped this would lead to further legislation reducing the number of terminations. So far, so expected.

However, the paper claimed "supporters of legalized abortion said the case foreshadows what poor, desperate young women could face if abortion is driven underground with more restrictive laws". Whilst that comment may be unsurprising, the argument is woeful. Specifically, the argument fails because this did happen without "restrictive laws". Indeed, this happened in a place with higher legal limits and more relaxed attitudes to abortion than much of Europe, and did so without driving anybody underground but to a known, community abortion clinic. This is not foreshadowing what could happen under tighter legislation but is the reality of what has happened under current legislation. Indeed, such was the work of Dr Gosnell that even the comparatively "liberal" Pennsylvanian abortion laws were flouted.

More interesting still, president of Naral pro-choice America  - Ilyse G Hogue - stated "Kermit Gosnell has been found guilty and will get what he deserves. Now, let's make sure these women are vindicated by delivering what all women deserve: access to the full range of health services including safe, high-quality and legal abortion care". This doesn't sound like somebody who has "endorsed the verdict". Indeed, her inference appears to be that Gosnell's main crime - though, nevertheless, still a hideous one - was the poor care for the women at his clinic. However, the verdict found him guilty of the first-degree murder of three children and was not primarily a result of his lack of care for the women in his clinic. Whilst Gosnell's lack of care for the women at his clinic was heinous indeed, it is not the primary atrocity. Ilyse Hogue passes no comment on the verdict of murder and sees vindication for these women as allowing further such abhorrent practices to occur, so long as it happens in a clean and safe environment.

Kermit Gosnell has now been found guilty of three charges of first-degree murder, infanticide, racketeering and more than 200 counts of violating Pennsylvania's abortion laws by performing third-term abortions or failing to counsel women 24 hours in advance. He showed no regard for the life of the children he terminated, the women who came to his clinic, the employees working for him nor the authorities to whom he was subject. 

Whatever side of the abortion debate one falls, these particular crimes cannot be seen as anything other than horrific. Nor can they be couched in terms of what happens under restrictive legislation. Indeed, these crimes occurred in violation of existing legislation that, in comparison to much of Europe, is "liberal". It may be a sign of what happens when legislation is poorly implemented, it may be what happens when legislation is not enforced or it may be what happens when legislation is too permissive. To be sure, there are many possible reasons and opposing sides of the debate are likely to cling to those that reinforce their predispositions. However, what this case most certainly does not show is this is what happens when restrictive laws are enforced.

Media silence on Gosnell makes a mockery of robust journalism and has knock-on effects for free speech

Although not widely reported in the mainstream media, the Gosnell infanticide case has been circulating in the blogosphere. If you are unaware of the details, there is a brief outline here.

The media silence has also been documented in the blogosphere. For example, see here, here and here. In the UK, the story was carried by the Daily Mail and Telegraph, limited to a single article by the BBC (which doesn't appear to have been linked to the homepage and only comes up with an active search on 'Gosnell') and ignored altogether by the Independent, Guardian and Times. As to how Christians ought to respond to this, Andy's Study has made some helpful suggestions.

The media silence on this makes a mockery of robust journalism. It is staggering that papers such as the Guardian will run stories like this without running stories like this. Such reporting hardly supports their advertisement which runs the tagline "the whole picture".

Worse still is the knock-on effect such journalism has on free speech. Whilst we pay lip service to free speech in this country, we increasingly remove topics from the agenda altogether that are simply not up for discussion. When the media refuse to run particular stories, they encourage this removal of discussion from the public forum and push alternative voices to the fringes. In many cases, these alternative views do not go away altogether but, being pushed out of the mainstream, find other outlets without any robust discussion of the view to hold them to account. In many respects, this makes it far easier for such voices to win people to their cause.

President Obama said in an address to the United Nations ‘…laudable efforts to restrict speech can become a tool to silence critics, or oppress minorities. The strongest weapon against hateful speech is not repression, it is more speech’. Rowan Atkinson said something similar in his support for the Reform Section 5 campaign. He commented:

For me, the best way to increase society’s resistance to insulting or offensive speech is to allow a lot more of it. As with childhood diseases, you can better resist those germs to which you have been exposed... if we want a robust society, we need more robust dialogue and that must include the right to insult or to offend.

However, media refusal to report legitimate stories, even where they do not tie in to their predisposed agenda, have real knock-on effects for free speech, those who may disagree and, consequently, those who agree as well.

Disabled people 'should be put down' because they 'cost the council too much money'

A Cornish councillor has claimed that disabled people should be 'put down' because they 'cost the council too much money'. The story is reported on This is Cornwall, though appears to stem from an incident in October 2011. The Guardian reports that Disability Cornwall and Scope have responded to the comments. 

Cllr Brewer has apologised but refuses to resign. As an Independent, he has no party from which to be expelled nor any party leader summarily calling for his dismissal. However, the chairman of Disability Cornwall, Steve Paget MBE, is demanding Cllr Brewer's resignation claiming "he is supposed to be an elected member representing public views and acting on behalf of the public. How anyone can come out with that is just shocking". A spokesman for Scope stated "to hear such an ill-judged and insensitive statement from a councillor is deeply disturbing and demonstrates that they are clearly not fit for office".

However, as in my previous comments here, one is hard pressed to argue that Cllr Brewer is articulating anything other than a consistent view. As Cranmer points out:

His [Cllr Brewer] view is precisely that which our progressive society manifests toward the disabled in the womb - right up to full-term. There is no 24-week limit when it comes to 'getting rid' of those who can't walk, talk, see, hear or catch a ball... you'll even find doctors who will neatly dispose of a baby with a hare lip, for that's an undoubted disability. The glorious achievements of our Paralympians have done nothing to change this.

Disability is a profound burden on parents (emotionally) and on society ('cost too much'), so our 'representatives and elected members' have indeed determined that they may be 'put down'. This has nothing to do with women's rights over their bodies, or with the question of when 'independent' life actually begins. It is a simple fact that society allows disability as a reason for abortion way beyond the 24-week period for the able-bodied, and that implies that disabled people, or the lives of disabled people, are less worthwhile than the lives of 'normal' people.

One must conclude that it is the position of Scope and Disability Cornwall that is inconsistent here. For, no calls have been made to have this statute 'confined to the history books' nor does it lead them to call this provision 'deeply disturbing' and denounce all those who uphold it as 'clearly not fit for office'.

Is it sheer inconsistency or merely that those who advocate this statute don't state it quite as crassly as Cllr Brewer?

* Collin Brewer has since resigned 

After-birth abortion & moral consistency

It was recently reported in the Guardian that some abortion clinics have been offering sex-selection terminations. This led to outrage from pro-life and pro-choice groups and drew criticism from the Health Secretary who condemned the actions as illegal and 'morally wrong'. At the time, I argued that the moral outrage of the Health Secretary and pro-choice groups seemed odd and misplaced. For my thoughts see 'Clinics grants sex-selection abortions'.


Since then two academics, Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva, have published a paper titled 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?'. They argue we should now accept the killing of newborn infants for any of the same reasons we currently accept as justifying abortion. They aver that newborn infants are not real people because an "actual person" is one capable of having plans and aims. Just like a foetus, a newborn child is incapable of making plans and aims thus it is only a "potential person". Therefore, though pain can harm the newborn, death cannot.


It is hardly surprising, given the heat generated by the existence of sex-selection abortions, that this paper has also been roundly condemned. However, as with sex-selection abortions, the condemnation of this paper seems somewhat morally inconsistent. Andrew Brown at the Guardian, argues:

The equation of abortion with infanticide is central to the rhetoric of many anti-abortionists. It is something that most pro-choicers emphatically reject. For them, the moral justification of abortion lies in the fact that an embryo is not a human being, whereas a newborn baby is. The moral status of a foetus changes over time in the womb, and while there will always be arguments about when the change should be recognised, there is wide agreement that a time limit on abortion is morally significant.

It certainly seems to follow from Giubilini and Minerva's reasoning that there is nothing wrong with sex-selective infanticide. There's no doubt that having a child of the wrong sex can be frightfully inconvenient for its parents. So if it's all right to abort a girl for her chromosomes, why not kill the newborns as well?

The truth of the matter, however, is that Giubilini and Minerva are at least being morally consistent, even if morally repugnant. If it is acceptable to terminate a foetus; it must also be acceptable to kill newborn children. As Brown states:

Some modern utilitarian philosophers have argued that there is no huge moral difference between a baby about to be born, at the top of the birth canal, and the same baby when it has emerged into the world. I first heard this from John Harris, at Manchester University. But the conclusion he drew was not that we ought to kill newborns.

But how can we argue anything else if 'moral status' is the basis upon which we justify terminations? Indeed, we recognise in law that the age of criminal responsibility is 10 (and we are considered to be harsh compared to most countries in Europe). Therefore, given that we acknowledge children under 10 cannot be legally responsible for their actions, Giubilini and Minerva could indeed extend their theory to cover all minors (certainly those under 10 at any rate).


For the Christian, the answer is clear. The moral case against termination is not based upon an ability to make plans and aims. The case for the Christian lies predominantly in the sixth commandment (Exo 20:13) for which there is no age defining cut off. Indeed, by right of being made in the image of God, all human beings are to be protected and we know that children are 'a heritage from the Lord, the fruit of the womb a reward (Psa 127:3)'.


Nevertheless, for a society that rejects this Christian view, how can they consistently denounce Giubilini and Minerva?