MP claims EDOs should be used against teachers who hold traditional views on marriage

It has been reported in The Telegraph and The Independent that the introduction of Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs) - the latest government anti-terror legislation - will be used against teachers who hold to a traditional view of marriage. A Tory backbench MP has written to one of his constituents and claimed EDOs should be used in "a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong". Both the National Secular Society and the Christian Institute have criticised the comments. This blog has already highlighted some of the issues surrounding EDOs here and here. For a reasoned explanation of the problems surrounding these recent troubling developments, you can do much worse than read the Archbishop Cranmer blog.

Mark Spencer, backbench Conservative MP for Sherwood, has this to say in a letter to a constituent:

I believe that everybody in society has a right to free speech and to express their views without fear of persecution. The EDOs will not serve to limit but rather to guarantee it: it is those who seek to stop other people expressing their beliefs who will be targeted. Let me give you an example, one which lots of constituents have been writing about – talking about gay marriage in schools.

The new legislation specifically targets hate speech, so teachers will still be free to express their understanding of the term ‘marriage’, and their moral opposition to its use in some situations without breaking the new laws. The EDOs, in this case, would apply to a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong.

If this case seems like an (ironically) extreme approach to those holding traditional views on marriage, it is entirely consistent with Theresa May's claim: “I want to see new civil powers to target extremists who stay within the law but still spread poisonous hatred..”; and David Cameron's comment: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens ‘as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone'”.

This is dangerous territory for the government. We have moved from a position where dissenting opinion was tolerated, to a place where it was not, to a situation where only the active affirmation of state orthodoxy will do. Not only will the government refuse to tolerate anybody who actively opposes gay marriage but they are now also making it virtually impossible to do anything other than affirm it without question. It is now official policy that certain views - specifically traditional views on marriage - are illegal to express. This is totalitarian control of the very worst order.

Aside from the clear issues related to freedom of speech and freedom of thought, this particular case becomes even more ridiculous when one remembers that there are parts of the UK that still uphold the traditional view of marriage. Northern Ireland has yet to pass a gay marriage act which, bizarrely, makes the entire Stormont government guilty of extremism according to our new prescribed definition. Just as ludicrous is the thought that our own government, up until a few months ago, were themselves guilty of extremism according to this new definition. Every Westminster MP that abstained or voted against gay marriage should, presumably, be subject to EDOs in retrospect. Even if the government aren't concerned about retroactive action, those who have never fully affirmed the new prescribed direction must surely be investigated as extremists as they remain belligerently unreformed.

We are told that we must all actively support, without reserve, nebulous "British values". And what are those values? Apparently the affirmation of whatever the government tells us they are. And if we do not assent? We are extremists and fall foul of EDOs; even if you are non-violent, not inciting violence and are in every respect obeying the current law. That is, we can be prosecuted even when - to all intents and purposes - we are obeying the government. It is utterly ludicrous and terrifyingly dangerous.

On the Ashers Bakery judgment

The Ashers Bakery judgment has been published and the bakers are found to have broken equality legislation. The full judgment is worth reading and can be found here. For a helpful, and relatively brief, summary of why this is an astonishing (if somewhat unsurprising) result see Archbishop Cranmer.

It bears saying that the principle of equal service is a good and valid one. Few would disagree that service ought not to be denied to somebody simply because of their sexual orientation or political beliefs. A bakery that bakes standardised cakes ought not to refuse service to an individual simply because they are homosexual, subscribe to a political party whom the service provider does not or support a campaign the service provider does not/cannot. The Asher case, however, was never about the provision of a standard service being denied to somebody because of their religious or political beliefs. Rather, this was a case of somebody being denied a particular service that would have been denied to anybody else requesting that same identical service.

Rather than offer a summary of the whole case (others have done a better job of that already), I rather want to direct your attention to a handful of rather concerning elements of the judgment itself.

Point 39 of the judgment states the defendants must have known the plaintiff was homosexual and/or associated with homosexual people because of his support for gay marriage, the claim he worked for a small volunteer organisation and the stated graphic on the cake including the word 'QueerSpace'. Certainly there are plenty of heterosexual people that support gay marriage and there is no particular reason for the defendants to have any knowledge of what 'QueerSpace' actually is or does. The presumption of the judge was that this service was denied because the plaintiff was homosexual. However, point 7 of the judgment states quite clearly that the plaintiff 'had previously purchased items at this branch of the 1st Defendant Company'. Were it the case the defendant was denied service because of his homosexuality - which, according to the judge, was 'abundantly clear' - it is virtually impossible to account for the previous provision of service.

Point 41 of the judgment quotes a number of cases that make concerning statements regarding the nature of discrimination. One judgment avers 'discrimination... is something subtle insidious or hidden' while another states motive and purpose have no basis in judgments on discrimination. point 42 then goes on to argue that the necessary comparator is not a heterosexual person purchasing the same cake but a person of undisclosed sexual orientation purchasing a pro-traditional marriage cake. The comparison is laughable. The very cause of discrimination was not the sexual orientation of the person purchasing the cake, which was not known to the defendants and the judgment offers no great evidence they were aware of such orientation, but the message contained on the cake. Equally, even were the judgment correct on this point, it beggars belief that the previous service to this same individual was then not considered as evidence his sexuality had nothing to do with the refusal of service. As the bakery stated throughout, there have been a number of other cakes that were deemed indecent or offensive that they also refused to bake.

Point 43 acknowledges that the bakery 'cancelled the order as they oppose same sex marriage'. It is something of a logical leap to then find, as in Point 46, 'the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff on the ground of his sexual orientation'. The prior service of the plaintiff, the provision of cakes bearing no specific political slogans, speaks against this. Moreover, acknowledging that it is indeed the message to which they object in no way implies discrimination against the individual. It, not implicitly, but explicitly implies a refusal to assert political and/or religious slogans and opinions that the service provider themselves do not hold and cannot in good conscience state.

Points 53-60 seek to establish that the Plaintiff held a political opinion and was discriminated against on these grounds. On balance, I suspect the judge is correct in asserting this is a political opinion and is almost certainly correct that the defendants knew the Plaintiff's political opinion on gay marriage (as per their letter and the specific writing on the cake itself). However, it is patently not the case that the political opinion held by the Plaintiff was the basis of discrimination. The purpose of the legislation is to stop the refusal of a standard service to those who hold specific political opinions. However, it is not the purpose of the legislation to coerce service providers to create material and products that actively promote political beliefs and opinions contrary to those they campaigned against. Again, had the bakery refused to serve the Plaintiff a standard cake simply because he supported gay marriage, this would legitimately fall foul of the law. That they refused to bake a cake bearing a political slogan to which they themselves object and campaigned against ought to be outside the scope of this legislation.

Point 64 of the judgment is, frankly, ludicrous. It states 'if the Plaintiff had ordered a cake with the words "support marriage" or "support heterosexual marriage" I have no doubt such a cake would have been provided. It is the word gay to which the 2nd and 3rd Defendants took exception'. That is patently not true. It is the campaign in favour of gay marriage to which they took exception. Now, whatever one's views on gay marriage, it is surely inappropriate to force anybody to produce materials and products which actively promote a position and/or campaign to which they themselves specifically disagree. For example, would it be right for a homosexual baker to produce a cake saying "no to gay marriage" despite campaigning in favour for it? It strikes me that would be just as unfair as the case we are discussing.

The absurdities of this judgment are not hard to discern. For one, the defendants have been found guilty of refusing to bake a cake which supports a position that is currently unlawful. In other words, they have been found guilty of standing up for the existing law of their province. 

It has also been deemed illegal to not provide services and products which directly contravene the views and opinions of the service provider. Now, service providers are compelled to produce products and provide services in favour of campaigns to which they themselves specifically campaigned against.

Further, Asher's Bakery were found to have discriminated against a legitimate political opinion. Though gay marriage is currently not legal in the province, it is certainly not illegal to hold the view that gay marriage ought to be legalised. Such a judgment, however, means a BNP member who requests a cake from a Jewish baker bearing the slogan "Hitler: the best leader we never had" would be compelled to produce such a product on the grounds that to do otherwise would be to discriminate against a political opinion that is not illegal to hold.

The bakers' religious views were found to be moot in this case. As such, religious believers will be compelled to offer products and services to those who request blasphemous, religiously offensive or religiously unconscionable products. If an EDL supporter (holding a political view) asked a muslim baker to produce a cake with a picture of Mohammad and the caption "false prophet" underneath (a religious view), would they be compelled to make such a cake on the grounds to do so is to discriminate against political opinion?

There is no doubt that most agree political opinion, sexual orientation and religious beliefs should not be a basis for withholding products and services. Such a position was always intended to stop those who supported one political party, were of one particular sexual orientation or religious belief from refusing to provide services to a person of any other. What they were never intended to do was compel people with deeply held beliefs and convictions to provide services and products specifically advocating and promoting views contrary to their own that would involve the suppression of conscience. It does not take a genius to see a distinction between refusal to serve a gay man because he is gay (evidently wrong) and refusal to provide a product bearing a slogan supporting a position which you have spent some time campaigning against. As far as I can tell, Ashers Bakery were seeking that distinction. Their service of the Plaintiff and their refusal to bake a particular product (rather than serve the man at all) speak to this. One can only hope an appeal judge recognises this too.

Gay Marriage (again)

It was reported in Tuesday's Telegraph that UKIP would "strip Christian weddings of their legal status". Similarly, ten days earlier, Simon Hughes - Liberal Democrat justice minister - said Christian wedding ceremonies "should have no legal status". In both cases, an argument was advanced for the separation of Church and State. Under such rules, all religious groups (not just Christians) would be expected to undertake two ceremonies: a state-recognised marriage followed by a religious ceremony if the couple wish. Hughes argued "you would have a ceremony by which the state recognises the marriage, the wedding, and then the faith community has the ceremony which gives that the authority”. The Archbishop Cranmer blog has commented on the UKIP story here whilst The Christian Institute report on Simon Hughes' comments here.

This blog has made no secret of its position on either Church/State separation (see here, here & here) or gay marriage (see here & here). Rather unusually, one finds oneself in agreement with both UKIP and the Liberal Democrats simultaneously.

For Cranmer, the issue revolves around the disestablishment of the Church of England coupled to his rampant Euro-scepticism. The position espoused by Farage and Hughes would necessitate the disestablishment of the state church which, to His Grace, would be anathema. For the Christian Institute, much of the issue revolves around parity for homosexual marriage. Having previously denounced civil partnerships as "gay marriage in all but name" (see here & here), it is difficult for them to maintain "although the media and some homosexuals like to call civil partnerships ‘gay marriages’, they are not marriages in law or in reality" as they have since tried (see here). Their argument revolves around the existence of civil partnerships which, they claim, make gay marriage null and void. In truth, the objection is less about legal parity as cultural equality, an issue on which the boat sailed some while ago.

For the Christian, it is always difficult to work one's faith out in the public square. What are the issues on which we ought to legislate? Should we seek to implement scriptural commands in civil law? If so, which? How far do we allow for cultural mores that seem antithetical to scripture? Before we can answer the questions surrounding gay marriage, we must first address these basic first principles (my attempt to answer some of these can be read here). 

The non-conformist, dissenting tradition to which I belong has a long history of seeking freedom as a disenfranchised group. How sad it is that many now view evangelicals, most of whom belong to this camp, as limiting to themselves the freedoms for which they fought bitter battles. It is equally unfortunate that those who holds such views often fail to recognise it is precisely those battles won long ago that allow minority groups the freedom to campaign for their own interests over and against the opinion of many evangelicals.

On the issue of gay marriage, the proposals outlined by Farage and Hughes provide an opportunity for Christians to support another minority group's right to freedom (as we ourselves would expect from others) whilst maintaining a clear, scriptural view of the issue at hand. The State may grant legal, contractual living agreements to whomever it will whilst, with the separation of Church and State, the Church may provide ceremonies for whomever it will too. This solution removes discrimination at state level, the absurdity of certain churches forbidden to carry out ceremonies against their wishes whilst affording no protection to those who cannot countenance carrying them out, and grants legal parity to all whilst making provision for each to carry out their marriage (both institution and individual) in the manner befitting their belief and culture.

Coalition for Marriage and the end of the English language (supposedly)

Andy Evans has written an insightful piece regarding the Coalition for Marriage (C4M) claim that government provision for same sex marriage will lead to the dismantling of the English language as we know it. You can view the C4M video here.

I won't expand on Andy's comment too much as he has been much more erudite than me. I will limit myself to the following comments:

• Andy is right to agree this is something of a mangling of language but is absolutely correct this has always been the nature of language itself. So, in reality, this doesn't represent anything of a new departure.
• It is true that people can call whatever they like, whatever they like. As highlighted by this video, we often use such arguments in apologetics. We can rob any word of all its meaning and invest it of any characteristics we will. Ultimately, however, the characteristics of a thing are what define the thing itself, not the word we ascribe to it. We have no problem whatsoever making this connection in respect to defending the existence of God (we can call him a computer if we will), so why should this issue be any different?
• Whilst I am sure C4M have some good points they could make, I'm afraid this simply is not one of them. As Andy rightly notes, this is misleading and manipulative. In truth, such misinformation hardly helps the cause of those who support C4M. Christian people should be characterised by truth and light; this latest video can hardly be said to be that.

The role of the pastor's wife

I should go on record from the outset and state that I am neither a pastor nor a pastor's wife. I would like to think, though perhaps erroneously, this admission does not preclude me from comment. It stands to reason that if 'pastor's wife' exists as a role in the church, the average member should be au fait with the position and understand its function. Equally, if no such role exists, the average church member needs to recognise why not and the implications of that reality. That, at any rate, is my defence for discussing this topic.

There is one undeniable reality surrounding this issue - there is such a thing as a pastor's wife. Some pastors are married and, like it or not, their wives have crossed the imperceptible divide from 'wife' to 'pastor's wife'. So, we must accept that pastor's wives do exist. The issue, however, revolves around whether this label is merely a factual descriptor of an objective reality or whether it, in some way, represents a role in the church.

Let us start by tackling what I, rather facetiously, called 'the imperceptible divide from 'wife' to 'pastor's wife''. The truth is, if we are going to refer to 'pastor's wives', prior to her husband becoming pastor the woman was not merely a wife but was a teacher's wife, a lawyer's wife, an electrician's wife or whatever depending on her husband's previous job. It is, for some reason, only poignant to add the man's job to the term 'wife' upon his calling to the ministry. As an objective descriptor of reality, it seems odd to only bother with it in the pastorate. Either it is a worthwhile descriptor which should be applied across all occupations or, it is of almost no value and should be dropped (for further discussion on this point see 'Using the term pastor as a title'). It is made all the more stark for women who have careers of their own. Why is it their husband's job title supersedes their own? Such women are not only pastor's wives but may be teachers, lawyers, electricians, mothers in their own right.

Although an oddity within the working world, we must nevertheless concede that 'pastor's wife' is a factual description of a woman married to a pastor. However, how far can we say it is a specific role within the church? To put it bluntly, it isn't. There is no recognition in scripture of any such office (for those who do not recognise pastorates, these same arguments apply to the office of elder too). The wife of a pastor, or specifically elder, is only mentioned as part of the qualifications for eldership in 1 Timothy 3:2 and Titus 1:6. In each case, the emphasis is on the man to be 'the husband of one wife'. There is no instituting of an office in the church nor is there any definition of a specific role.

Why is this significant? All too often churches expect pastor's wives to carry out an endless list of duties without the benefit of contract, salary or even gratitude. It is almost as if the church sees the pastor's wage - specifically assigned to him in exchange for his pastoral work for the church - as also buying his wife's service too in some sort of a buy one get one free labour bargain. But, if pastor's wife is not an office outlined in scripture then to expect a pastor's wife to be more active, more involved and carry a greater burden than the average church member is unfair and unreasonable. It strikes me the reason church ministry is the anomaly which insists on referring to the wife of a pastor by her husband's job is specifically to encourage this sort of deal.

We may argue that part of a wife's role is to support her husband in his work and indeed it is. However, it is not the woman's role to do her husband's work. Nor is it the woman's role to do auxiliary work because of her husband's position. Nobody would expect a woman to become a TA and work gratis for a school simply because her husband was a teacher. At the very least, were she to undertake the role, the school would pay her a salary but there would be no compulsion to go for the position because of her husband. Most people would rightly agree this is appropriate. Why then do these basic principles suddenly not apply in the church? It is perfectly possible that churches may find roles which they believe are best carried out by the pastor's wife. That is fine, but she should not be expected to take the role for nothing. Equally, if she does not want the role for whatever reason, she should not be compelled to take it. 

The pastor's wife is not a role or office within the church. It is a factual description of a woman married to a pastor. Therefore, she should have no more burden or expectation placed upon her than any other member of the church. All too often pastor's wives are expected to plug all the gaps in the church and to take on all the jobs that other members are unwilling to bear. The pastor's wife must already act as a support to her husband who is unable to unload on anybody else in the church. This seems burden enough! Churches need to be sensitive to this and recognise that pastor's wives are not simply there to plug gaps in the church and act as cheap, compelled labour.

Redefining Marriage and the C4M

A few days ago I read a great piece on the Coalition for Marriage over at Andy's Study. I'm in broad agreement with his conclusions which, unsurprisingly, are largely the same as my reasons for not signing the petition. Interestingly, Matthew Parris has also joined the debate and made similar arguments in his Times column (which have since been picked up by the Christian Institute). There are a few comments I think worth adding.

It is true that the crux of the argument seems to revolve around who defines the word 'marriage'. Frankly, I find it odd that this has caused any argument at all. The reality is anybody can call anything whatever they will. Simply because one person chooses to define something in a particular way doesn't necessarily make it so. That Christians want to define marriage in a particular way does not necessarily make marriage that which they define. Similarly, that the government want to define marriage in a different way does nothing to alter the reality of what a marriage actually is. The suggestions of Andy's Study and Matthew Parris seem to recognise this and therefore suggest, legally, we do not define marriage at all and allow each his own definition (right or wrong though that definition may be). 

Legally, it seems right to me that all people should have access to the same rights and freedoms (for more fully formed thoughts on this see Should Christians try to bring biblical law into civil society). Contracts to formalise living arrangements - and let's be under no illusions, legally speaking, marriage is not much more than this - should be available to anyone who wants them be they brother and sister, uncle and nephew, or whatever. Civil Partnerships, although currently not available to a whole host of people (a result of the ill-conceived ideas surrounding the legal definition of marriage), would seem to be the natural answer to this. One can have a Civil Partnership, a purely legal contract, without being married. Likewise, those who view marriage as important can have a Civil Partnership as well as being married according to whatever definition they choose to take.

Unfortunately, Christians who are now agitating about the legal definition of marriage somewhat shot themselves in the foot during the debate surrounding the introduction of Civil Partnerships. Had Christians accepted from the outset that Civil Partnership were not marriage, nor equivalent to marriage, the simple solution would be to implement them, available to all, as protection in law alongside marriage for those who deemed it important. Sadly, the fuss kicked up by Christians (see comments by the Christian Institute) make it profoundly unlikely that many will view this as an acceptable solution.

It is a sad reality that many Christians are keen to gain freedoms for themselves and less keen to win them for others. There is irony in that many of those in the dissenting tradition, once a disenfranchised group active in seeking freedoms for many, are now the very people arguing against the freedoms they have been granted. Admittedly, this is far from a phenomenon limited to Christians - it seems to be a very human reaction - however, as Christians we are surely called to be different (again, for more fully formed thoughts on this, see Right-wing Evangelicalism has forgotten its heritage).

I am convinced the answer lies in removing legal definitions of marriage altogether and replacing it with a contract in the form of Civil Partnerships. The only issue that would remain is whether churches would be required to carry out same-sex Civil Partnerships. The sensible answer would seem to be that churches would never carry out any Civil Partnerships, only marriages (in accordance with their own definition - hopefully biblical - of the term). Therefore, civil partnerships - the legal contract - would only be conducted by the State and marriages would be carried out by whomever wished to do so in accordance with their own definitions of what that entails.