The tyranny of liberalism inculcates illiberal counter-extremism measures

If you cannot conceive why so many people are pleased that Jeremy Corbyn has won the Labour leadership election, the reasons are plethora. One major factor is the sense that the party will now undo decades of vacuous New Labour policy which has dragged the party further to the right and away from its founding principles. Another reason is the tyranny of liberalism that began in the New Labour era and has been perpetuated by the so called "heir to Blair". It is telling that both the left-wing of the Labour Party and the right-wing of the Conservative Party have both been the most vociferous defenders of civil liberties in the face of this oppressive centrism that so lauds the values of tolerance and acceptance that it simultaneously denies anyone the right to disagree with its moral pronouncements (which, ironically, it claims is grounded in no set of morals at all!)

This centrist tyrannical liberalism is the epitome of amorality and illiberality. I have far more time for moral and social Conservatives, who actually ground their beliefs in a set of moral principles and a proper understanding of what it is to be a liberal society, than I have for this vacuous centrism. Likewise traditional Socialist values - especially those grounded in the Christian Socialist tradition - have always made their arguments in moral terms. The very term liberalism, and the supposed post-war liberal consensus, once meant defining particular rights and allowing all such practices that do not impinge thereon. These rights were once determined from accepted moral values. However, these terms have come to mean a set of moral statements, without any underpinning moral framework, which must be upheld at all costs. All dissenting opinion will not be tolerated and must be quashed. What once stood for inherent freedom for the individual has come to mean cultural oppression. What claims to be a stand for tolerance is, in actual fact, the refusal to tolerate anything else.

This troubling tendency of the last three decades was perfectly illustrated by a report in yesterday's Telegraph. The report opens with the ominous words:

Imams, priests, rabbis and other religious figures will have to enrol in a “national register of faith leaders” and be subject to government-specified training and security checks in the Home Office’s latest action on extremism.

The report claimed:

Whitehall will “require all faiths to maintain a national register of faith leaders” and the Government will “set out the minimum level of training and checks” faith leaders must have to join the new register.

In short, the proposal demands leaders within all faiths become state registered with the state determining the minimum level of training required to fulfil their job requirements.

There are several things to note about this. Firstly, this is being driven through as part of the government's latest round of anti-extremism measures. Once again, in the name of security, age old civil liberties, such as freedom of religion, are being eroded. It is shocking to see a supposedly liberal government enacting a policy that is worryingly similar to that of the Communist regime in China.

Second, it cannot fail to escape anybody's notice that anti-extremism measures and counter-terror legislation were introduced as a result of 9/11, 7/7 and other more recent atrocities. We have been well acquainted with terrorism in Western Europe for well over a century (cf. IRA and its offshoots; UDA, UVF and their offshoots; ETA; Terra Lliure et al). It is clear enough that the increase in such legislation is not a result of such groups. This legislation has been a result of particular terrorist activities which comes from one particular source. It is specifically a response to Islamist terrorism (or Jihadism).

All sensible observers recognise Islam comes in a range of forms, going well beyond Sunni and Shia branches. It should be clear to even the most casual observer that Islam is not one monolithic bloc and clearly most Muslims do not subscribe to Islamist terrorism nor even the Salafi strain of Sunni Islam. Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the glaringly obvious fact that the major threat of terrorist activity in recent decades has come from these pernicious forms  of Muslim thought. It is in response to this particular form of terrorism that anti-terror and anti-extremist legislation - however well thought through or otherwise - has been introduced.

What is most troubling is that this latest attempt at anti-extremist legislation should include those of "all faiths". How many reform Jews have we heard of jumping onto buses and blowing themselves up? How many rabbis have we heard encouraging such behaviour or encouraging British citizens to kill in the name of the Israeli state? We are not hearing of swathes of Sikhs using their (legally permitted) kirpan to strike fear into the heart of British society. Militant Hindus (though some certainly exist on the Indian sub-continent) are not the subject of major police counter-terror initiatives. Christian leaders are not encouraging their communicants to attack the infidel. Why, then, are "all faiths" always found subject to measures designed to target one particular group of people, within one particular branch, of one particular religion?

Are the government truly trying to argue that, regardless of the rights and wrongs of the issue, taking a traditional line on heterosexual marriage is akin to Salafi Jihadism? Is it really the case that evangelical street preachers pose a similar threat to national security as those who seek to intentionally blow themselves up in the name of martyrdom? Are orthodox Jews really the same threat to British culture as those who actively proclaim allegiance to the Islamic State?

If this is a problem confined to one particular religion, it is highly unreasonable to use this as a catch-all way to extend these rules to all religions. If it is unfair to tarnish all Muslims with the same brush - knowing, as I do, many Imams and Muslim parents who are terrified that their own children may buy into these pernicious extremist ideologies, it most certainly is - how much less fair is it to include those who don't even subscribe to the wider religion in question? It seems that government are pressing on with this approach because they do not want to be seen attacking Islam alone. But there simply is no escaping that it is not the Christians, Jews, Hindus, Sikhs or Buddhist who are having any effect on the British terror threat level. Until such time as we accept the source of the problem, we will continue to be hit with these cack-handed attempts to address the problem.

Third, this sort of approach does absolutely nothing to address the root problem. The issues that government are (rightly) concerned about are terrorist activities and the incitement to violence. Sadly, the government have extended their attempts to to deal with these two issues to anything deemed "extremist". Quite apart from failing to define nebulous "British values" and defining extremism as anything which doesn't accord with them, this does nothing to address the root of the problem. As noted by Haras Rafiq - director of the counter-extremism think tank Quilliam - "“It is very noticeable that the main Islamist groups are not really up in arms about this. They want it, because it will feed the narrative of grievance and victimhood they love. They will be able to use it to say, ‘look, we told you so’.” We have moved from trying to stop people breaking the law, and actively damaging others, to trying to inculcate views and values by diktat.

Fourth, this approach goes against anything that can be considered tolerable in a free and liberal society. It is the outworking of precisely the issue noted at the beginning of this post. It is the tyranny of liberalism that cannot cope with permitting views outside of the cultural zeitgeist. Extremism is being defined in this case as a refusal to push "British values". As noted on the blog before (here and here), British values seem to be defined as a refusal to actively promote current cultural views on issues such as homosexuality, gay marriage and the ever-slippery value of tolerance (without tolerating religious views, of course!) In the name of counter-extremism, religious adherents and faith leaders who have otherwise lived in the UK for centuries without such interference by the state are now being subject to measures that would in any other area be considered draconian, authoritarian and illiberal. If such measure were enacted within politics because of the actions of certain political terrorist organisation within our midst, people would rightly be up in arms. When it comes to issues of religious belief, it does seem the same criteria are not applied.

This tyranny of liberalism began under the New Labour era and has been continued under David Cameron's Conservative rule. I have written to my local MP - a close ally of Jeremy Corbyn - regarding several recent troubling announcements from Theresa May's office. He has given assurance, in no uncertain terms and without usual political obfuscation, that he has the same concerns and in no way supports the measures. I understand Jeremy Corbyn similarly recognises the issue and rejects this approach. If you are wondering why I am pleased Jeremy Corbyn has won the Labour leadership, this is no small factor.

For my part, I will not submit to any national register. I will not permit the state to determine what I teach in my own church. I will not allow the state to interfere with what scripture clearly teaches. I will not allow my sermons and studies to be vetted. I refuse to be deemed a threat to state security simply because I do not always agree with the prevalent government agenda. I am not prepared to be subjected to statist, Communist-style interference and I will not subject my church communicants and congregants to the vacuous homilies permitted in accordance with the whims of the government of the day. One hopes and prays there are enough sensible voices in parliament to recognise precisely why.

MP claims EDOs should be used against teachers who hold traditional views on marriage

It has been reported in The Telegraph and The Independent that the introduction of Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs) - the latest government anti-terror legislation - will be used against teachers who hold to a traditional view of marriage. A Tory backbench MP has written to one of his constituents and claimed EDOs should be used in "a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong". Both the National Secular Society and the Christian Institute have criticised the comments. This blog has already highlighted some of the issues surrounding EDOs here and here. For a reasoned explanation of the problems surrounding these recent troubling developments, you can do much worse than read the Archbishop Cranmer blog.

Mark Spencer, backbench Conservative MP for Sherwood, has this to say in a letter to a constituent:

I believe that everybody in society has a right to free speech and to express their views without fear of persecution. The EDOs will not serve to limit but rather to guarantee it: it is those who seek to stop other people expressing their beliefs who will be targeted. Let me give you an example, one which lots of constituents have been writing about – talking about gay marriage in schools.

The new legislation specifically targets hate speech, so teachers will still be free to express their understanding of the term ‘marriage’, and their moral opposition to its use in some situations without breaking the new laws. The EDOs, in this case, would apply to a situation where a teacher was specifically teaching that gay marriage is wrong.

If this case seems like an (ironically) extreme approach to those holding traditional views on marriage, it is entirely consistent with Theresa May's claim: “I want to see new civil powers to target extremists who stay within the law but still spread poisonous hatred..”; and David Cameron's comment: “For too long, we have been a passively tolerant society, saying to our citizens ‘as long as you obey the law, we will leave you alone'”.

This is dangerous territory for the government. We have moved from a position where dissenting opinion was tolerated, to a place where it was not, to a situation where only the active affirmation of state orthodoxy will do. Not only will the government refuse to tolerate anybody who actively opposes gay marriage but they are now also making it virtually impossible to do anything other than affirm it without question. It is now official policy that certain views - specifically traditional views on marriage - are illegal to express. This is totalitarian control of the very worst order.

Aside from the clear issues related to freedom of speech and freedom of thought, this particular case becomes even more ridiculous when one remembers that there are parts of the UK that still uphold the traditional view of marriage. Northern Ireland has yet to pass a gay marriage act which, bizarrely, makes the entire Stormont government guilty of extremism according to our new prescribed definition. Just as ludicrous is the thought that our own government, up until a few months ago, were themselves guilty of extremism according to this new definition. Every Westminster MP that abstained or voted against gay marriage should, presumably, be subject to EDOs in retrospect. Even if the government aren't concerned about retroactive action, those who have never fully affirmed the new prescribed direction must surely be investigated as extremists as they remain belligerently unreformed.

We are told that we must all actively support, without reserve, nebulous "British values". And what are those values? Apparently the affirmation of whatever the government tells us they are. And if we do not assent? We are extremists and fall foul of EDOs; even if you are non-violent, not inciting violence and are in every respect obeying the current law. That is, we can be prosecuted even when - to all intents and purposes - we are obeying the government. It is utterly ludicrous and terrifyingly dangerous.

On the Ashers Bakery judgment

The Ashers Bakery judgment has been published and the bakers are found to have broken equality legislation. The full judgment is worth reading and can be found here. For a helpful, and relatively brief, summary of why this is an astonishing (if somewhat unsurprising) result see Archbishop Cranmer.

It bears saying that the principle of equal service is a good and valid one. Few would disagree that service ought not to be denied to somebody simply because of their sexual orientation or political beliefs. A bakery that bakes standardised cakes ought not to refuse service to an individual simply because they are homosexual, subscribe to a political party whom the service provider does not or support a campaign the service provider does not/cannot. The Asher case, however, was never about the provision of a standard service being denied to somebody because of their religious or political beliefs. Rather, this was a case of somebody being denied a particular service that would have been denied to anybody else requesting that same identical service.

Rather than offer a summary of the whole case (others have done a better job of that already), I rather want to direct your attention to a handful of rather concerning elements of the judgment itself.

Point 39 of the judgment states the defendants must have known the plaintiff was homosexual and/or associated with homosexual people because of his support for gay marriage, the claim he worked for a small volunteer organisation and the stated graphic on the cake including the word 'QueerSpace'. Certainly there are plenty of heterosexual people that support gay marriage and there is no particular reason for the defendants to have any knowledge of what 'QueerSpace' actually is or does. The presumption of the judge was that this service was denied because the plaintiff was homosexual. However, point 7 of the judgment states quite clearly that the plaintiff 'had previously purchased items at this branch of the 1st Defendant Company'. Were it the case the defendant was denied service because of his homosexuality - which, according to the judge, was 'abundantly clear' - it is virtually impossible to account for the previous provision of service.

Point 41 of the judgment quotes a number of cases that make concerning statements regarding the nature of discrimination. One judgment avers 'discrimination... is something subtle insidious or hidden' while another states motive and purpose have no basis in judgments on discrimination. point 42 then goes on to argue that the necessary comparator is not a heterosexual person purchasing the same cake but a person of undisclosed sexual orientation purchasing a pro-traditional marriage cake. The comparison is laughable. The very cause of discrimination was not the sexual orientation of the person purchasing the cake, which was not known to the defendants and the judgment offers no great evidence they were aware of such orientation, but the message contained on the cake. Equally, even were the judgment correct on this point, it beggars belief that the previous service to this same individual was then not considered as evidence his sexuality had nothing to do with the refusal of service. As the bakery stated throughout, there have been a number of other cakes that were deemed indecent or offensive that they also refused to bake.

Point 43 acknowledges that the bakery 'cancelled the order as they oppose same sex marriage'. It is something of a logical leap to then find, as in Point 46, 'the 2nd and 3rd Defendants have unlawfully discriminated against the Plaintiff on the ground of his sexual orientation'. The prior service of the plaintiff, the provision of cakes bearing no specific political slogans, speaks against this. Moreover, acknowledging that it is indeed the message to which they object in no way implies discrimination against the individual. It, not implicitly, but explicitly implies a refusal to assert political and/or religious slogans and opinions that the service provider themselves do not hold and cannot in good conscience state.

Points 53-60 seek to establish that the Plaintiff held a political opinion and was discriminated against on these grounds. On balance, I suspect the judge is correct in asserting this is a political opinion and is almost certainly correct that the defendants knew the Plaintiff's political opinion on gay marriage (as per their letter and the specific writing on the cake itself). However, it is patently not the case that the political opinion held by the Plaintiff was the basis of discrimination. The purpose of the legislation is to stop the refusal of a standard service to those who hold specific political opinions. However, it is not the purpose of the legislation to coerce service providers to create material and products that actively promote political beliefs and opinions contrary to those they campaigned against. Again, had the bakery refused to serve the Plaintiff a standard cake simply because he supported gay marriage, this would legitimately fall foul of the law. That they refused to bake a cake bearing a political slogan to which they themselves object and campaigned against ought to be outside the scope of this legislation.

Point 64 of the judgment is, frankly, ludicrous. It states 'if the Plaintiff had ordered a cake with the words "support marriage" or "support heterosexual marriage" I have no doubt such a cake would have been provided. It is the word gay to which the 2nd and 3rd Defendants took exception'. That is patently not true. It is the campaign in favour of gay marriage to which they took exception. Now, whatever one's views on gay marriage, it is surely inappropriate to force anybody to produce materials and products which actively promote a position and/or campaign to which they themselves specifically disagree. For example, would it be right for a homosexual baker to produce a cake saying "no to gay marriage" despite campaigning in favour for it? It strikes me that would be just as unfair as the case we are discussing.

The absurdities of this judgment are not hard to discern. For one, the defendants have been found guilty of refusing to bake a cake which supports a position that is currently unlawful. In other words, they have been found guilty of standing up for the existing law of their province. 

It has also been deemed illegal to not provide services and products which directly contravene the views and opinions of the service provider. Now, service providers are compelled to produce products and provide services in favour of campaigns to which they themselves specifically campaigned against.

Further, Asher's Bakery were found to have discriminated against a legitimate political opinion. Though gay marriage is currently not legal in the province, it is certainly not illegal to hold the view that gay marriage ought to be legalised. Such a judgment, however, means a BNP member who requests a cake from a Jewish baker bearing the slogan "Hitler: the best leader we never had" would be compelled to produce such a product on the grounds that to do otherwise would be to discriminate against a political opinion that is not illegal to hold.

The bakers' religious views were found to be moot in this case. As such, religious believers will be compelled to offer products and services to those who request blasphemous, religiously offensive or religiously unconscionable products. If an EDL supporter (holding a political view) asked a muslim baker to produce a cake with a picture of Mohammad and the caption "false prophet" underneath (a religious view), would they be compelled to make such a cake on the grounds to do so is to discriminate against political opinion?

There is no doubt that most agree political opinion, sexual orientation and religious beliefs should not be a basis for withholding products and services. Such a position was always intended to stop those who supported one political party, were of one particular sexual orientation or religious belief from refusing to provide services to a person of any other. What they were never intended to do was compel people with deeply held beliefs and convictions to provide services and products specifically advocating and promoting views contrary to their own that would involve the suppression of conscience. It does not take a genius to see a distinction between refusal to serve a gay man because he is gay (evidently wrong) and refusal to provide a product bearing a slogan supporting a position which you have spent some time campaigning against. As far as I can tell, Ashers Bakery were seeking that distinction. Their service of the Plaintiff and their refusal to bake a particular product (rather than serve the man at all) speak to this. One can only hope an appeal judge recognises this too.

Thinking biblically about politics

I came across this helpful post by Martin Salter. His church - Grace Community Church, Bedford - are currently going through a series aimed at helping their members think biblically about the upcoming election. I thought it was a useful post highlighting the key questions we need to think about when it comes to voting.

To that end, I thought I would go a little bit further and engage with those questions myself. Like Martin, I have no desire to tell my congregation how to vote (honestly!) I must admit, I'm not great at keeping my tendencies under my hat (as a quick glance at the 'about the author' page of this blog will show), so I'm pretty sure most my congregation know where I sit politically and where I am likely to place my vote. Despite that, I am not in the business of defying gospel unity simply because someone thinks and votes differently to me. I just wanted to think through Martin's question and show my working.

1. How do you view the state? Beast or servant of God?

It seems hard to maintain a scriptural argument that the state is inherently evil. Passages such as Romans 13:1-7 and 1 Peter 2:13-17 seem clear enough that God appoints rulers for our good. That is not to say that the state will always act in godly, honourable ways. Even the most rudimentary knowledge of history shows that to be patently false. However, Paul and Peter suggest the state is God's servant for our good.

A proper view of God's sovereignty, providence and agency in the world may help us out here too. There can be no doubt that some evil empires and autocratic rulers have done heinous things that cannot, in any meaningful way, be considered godly. However, even such leaders are still God's servants. They hold power only because the Lord allows it and their acts of evil are only permitted by God to serve his greater purposes. Though they may not appear to act for the good of their own people much of the time, they are nonetheless permitted to act as they do within the grand scheme of God's plan.

Yet, the general thrust of Pauline and Petrine writings on government make clear that rulers are God's servants. What is more, they suggest rulers are generally there for our good. Whether we can make arguments about ungodly leadership and those who rule in ways that don't appear to be for the good of the people, we surely cannot suppose that the state is necessarily, inherently evil.

2. What do you think the state should do? Big or small? Why?

There seem to be very few (if any) biblical imperatives for the state. Some of the things that seem important are these:

• To collect tax for the collective good (cf. Mt 20:20f; Rom 13:7)
• A taxation system based upon ability to pay (cf. Deut 16:17)
• To punish evil and encourage good (cf. Deut 16:18-20; Rom13:4; 1 Pet 2:14)
• To allow a certain degree of individual freedoms (cf. 1 Pet 2:16)
• Equality before the law regardless of gender, status, or country of origin (cf. Deut 16:11f)

One of the key reasons argued in favour of a small state on principle, is the inherent evil of the state itself. As already said, there is no biblical reason to assume the state is inherently evil. Therefore, there is no reason to insist on a small state for this reason.

As we consider the things we have highlighted as important for the state (NB: this is not exhaustive), it strikes me none of these things are affected directly by big or small government. Each of these things can be achieved, in some measure, on either system.

Nevertheless, it would be my contention that the collective good for which tax is collected is best achieved through a large public sector. Certainly, I would argue state ownership of certain (most?) public services serves the collective good in a better way than allowing such things to be run by private enterprise for the primary purposes of profit.

Beyond this, we must consider how the state can work for the benefit of the people. It strikes me there is biblical warrant to consider the state a fundamental good for the benefit of the people whereas there is no scriptural warrant to view business and private enterprise as inherently good (scripturally speaking). That is not to say business is necessarily evil all the time but it is to say there is no biblical warrant to consider businesses as inherently good nor as working for the best interests of the people. 

Scripture has much to say about the value of work and a government that creates jobs does a great service for its people. Even where such job require state funding, work is itself valuable and preferable to welfare (which requires state funding too). A large public sector generally provides greater scope for work than attempting to create jobs through the private sector.

3. On what basis does the state function?

In the run-up to the last election, I wrote an article here discussing this very issue. I stand by most of my considerations there.

In summary (though I suggest you read the article itself), I make a sort of case for natural law as the basis of legislation (or natural rights, akin to Locke and Hobbes argument). I begin with the central premise that all men and women are made in the image of God and are therefore born with certain rights (unalienable rights, if we want to go for Jeffersonian language). I go on to argue that whatever does not impinge upon the common rights of others ought to be lawful. Whatever impinges on the common rights of others ought to be illegal.

This view is primarily about legislation that affect individuals. In particular, it takes account of 1 Peter 2:16, which appears to allow for a certain degree of personal freedom. Beyond this personal form of legislation, government is primarily to seek the collective good of its people. Taking account of those personal freedoms, such collective good will be worked out in different ways depending on context and individual disposition of the policy maker.

4. How do you view the relationship between church/Christians and the state – disengagement, suspicion, co-belligerence, sphere-sovereignty, or something else?

I would advocate a form - if not the exact form expressed by Kuyper - of sphere sovereignty.For both the protection of the state, the people and the church it is absolutely right for there to be a separation between religion and politics. There ought to be no state church nor one particular dominant religious voice (Christian, secular, or any other). That is to protect the people from undue influence of one particular religious (or non-religious) persuasion and also to protect those religious (or non-religious) institutions from unnecessary interference by the state.

As in (3), I believe Christians (churches simply being collections of Christian people) have particular rights inherent to them. The state should not interfere in matters of religion except, and only when, certain religious practices interfere directly with the inherent rights of another.

The obvious issue with this position is what happens when religious freedoms directly conflict with the freedoms of another. For example, should the religious freedom of a group who deem it acceptable to engage in child-sacrifice be respected? Clearly, as this religious practice impinges directly on the inherent rights of the child in question, the government would be entirely justified in intervening here. Of course, there are legitimate questions to be had over what constitutes interfering with the inherent rights of an individual and how far such things are central to the freedom to practice one's religion. But, as a general rule, this seems a sensible position.

However, the issue is often not so clear cut. In today's climate, it is very often religious freedom pitted against sexual freedom. For example, should a church that objects on biblical grounds to homosexual marriage be forced to carry them out because a homosexual couple seeking to marry are entitled to do so legally? With a separation of church and state, this question becomes incredibly straightforward. The government are the only organisation permitted to carry out marriages. So a church would be in no position to carry out the legal ceremony. Weddings would then only be carried out as a religious, non-legally binding, ceremony. There would be no cause for government intervention as marriage was permitted to the couple in law, as to everyone else, whereas the church would be free to bless (or not) the marriage according to their own conscience. Such questions, naturally, become much more complex with no separation of church and state.

This is broadly how I answer those questions. How about you? Why not comment below and explain how you address these things? Answering these question can really help you work out where to place your vote.

Free speech means nothing without the right to offend

The latest edition of Evangelicals Now carries an article which asks the question should free speech include the right to intentionally offend? Disappointingly, the author seems to conclude that it should not. He states "Freedom of speech should not mean freedom to say anything. Cartoons that diminish people by ridiculing their faith come into the category of journalistic jihadi and are on a par with hate speech."

Almost everybody agrees there should be some boundaries to free speech. The vast majority of people accept slander and liable to be legitimate limits. Most agree that it is not acceptable to spout, or print, lies about others. Many, though not all, believe words that are liable to incite violence should not sit within the bounds of free speech. Others are quite happy to disallow anything termed "hate speech", which includes anti-religious sentiments and racially motivated comments among other things. We are now moving toward a situation where some even consider offensive language to be unacceptable.

The problem with "hate speech" or "offensive language" is that such terms are so nebulous and subjective that the range of things disallowed is enormous. The world is full of people waiting to be offended or deem words hateful. In recent years, there have been multiple stories of police action against street preachers, protesters and political activists on such grounds. When anti-terror legislation - intended to suppress acts of violence against the country - is used to eject elderly gentlemen who object to party speeches (see here) we have undoubtedly pressed the limits of free speech too far.

I am wholly for liable and slander legislation. Indeed, these are civil laws that do not tend to lead to imprisonment but damages and reparation (and rightly so). Though I have some sympathy with the thought behind legislation that prohibits incitement to violence, I am not so sure this should be considered a legal offence (see here). I am absolutely sure that neither "hate speech" nor offensive language should be considered illegal (see here, here, here, here, here, here and here).

The line between "hate speech" and "offensive language" is not clear cut. It is most certainly offensive to spout racist insults in the street. In fact, we may call this hateful. There is nothing good, endearing or acceptable about it. Yet, offensive as such repugnant views may be banning their very utterance won't change the attitudes of those who express them. If such views turn into harassment, assault or worse we have laws to address such behaviour that cover all people regardless of gender, creed, colour or sexuality. I don't care if somebody assaults me because of something about my person to which they take exception. I simply care that they assaulted me and I want them treated as anybody else who may have assaulted anybody else for any other reason.

We may find Charlie Hebdo unnecessarily inflammatory and offensive. If that is the case, the answer is not to ban it but not to buy it. Offence over what they print is no reason to ban them from printing it. Free speech should include the right to intentionally offend. In fact, free speech means nothing without the right to offend. Christians are well aware that the gospel is a cause of offence (cf. Rom 9:33; 1 Cor. 1:23; 1 Pet 2:8) and yet we rightly continue to preach it regardless. If we demand the right to offend through the preaching of the gospel (as well we ought), we must accept that others should also have the right to offend us. 

Extremism, free speech and mother's logic

Sir Peter Fahy - Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police - has today voiced concerns that Britain is in danger of becoming a police state. His comments, reported in the Guardian, come in the wake of Theresa May's recent advocation of Extremism Disruption Orders (EDOs). Fundamentally, he believes the police are being asked to increasingly define and determine extremism rather than being asked to enforce a clear set of guidelines. This blog has previously commented on this issue here and here.

Sir Peter is concerned that police constables are having to make snap decisions about what does, and does not, constitute extremism. He cites several examples in which it is less than ideal for police officers to make spur of the moment judgments on whether an incident must be considered extremist. Whilst he states his support for EDOs, he argues the definition of extremism and extremist behaviour ought to be determined by other members of civic society. In effect, he suggests the police ought to be told what constitutes extremism and then given the task of enforcing such parameters.

It is certainly true that the police are increasingly asked to go beyond mere law enforcement. At a basic level, they make legal interpretations - whether within a clear set of guidelines or not - that are routinely not borne out in the courts. There have been several examples of police arresting street preachers, protestors and others under the guise of 'extremism' or 'hate speech' that subsequently never led to charges or were thrown out of court. So current efforts to interpret the law are not going terribly well and to ask the police to now define the law on the spot is unlikely to go any better.

Fahy said government, academics and civil society needed to decide where the line fell between free speech and extremism. But this is rather troubling. Why need there be a line between free speech and extremism? Surely the very nature of free speech is that it is free, extreme or otherwise. If we begin drawing lines around acceptable words, we are on the fast track to only being allowed to utter state authorised orthodoxies. Free speech and free debate are disallowed under such a system.

Fahy is right that police shouldn't be about enforcing what can and can't be said. Sadly, he is wrong that such should be the preserve of others in civic society. We already have laws against violence, harrassment, terrorism and the rest. Such actions are dangerous and are rightly controlled. Speech does not cause such actions. Even in cases of an individual "inciting" violence, it is the one who makes effort and plans to carry out the act who should be found guilty. Unless there is some evidence of coercion and duress, it's difficult to see how speech can be held accountable. 

Most of us can surely remember a time, as I certainly can, when we responded to parental punishment with the enduring line "but he told me to". I can also recall my mother's incredulity and typical response (as I'm sure I employed it more than once) "if he told you to stick your hand in the fire, would you do that too?" 

Sadly, it seems, the government no longer take such a sensible line. Now, according to government, the one who even suggests a course of action is guilty. Worse yet, most will not suggest a specific course of action but will talk in generalities around a point. So now, even if they only infer or suggest an action, they may be guilty. Indeed, they may neither infer nor suggest but build a framework within which one might conceivably draw a personal conclusion to act. For such they would be guilty too.

I think I prefer my mother's logic.

Willful misapplication of the law: a case in point

Three days ago, I commented on the Home Secretary's troubling new proposal to introduce Extremism Disruption Orders. You can see my comments here. My central concern was the stifling of free speech and free debate coupled with the almost certain willful misapplication of the law. Such proposals will have grave knock-on effects, not only for those whose faith is lived out in the public square, but also those who proclaim their faith from the heretofore safety of their own religious building.

For those who doubt the heavy-handed application of the law, an interesting case in point can be viewed here and here. A gentleman who went to Taunton town centre to share his faith has been specifically targeted by police. Market traders have been encouraged to film his street preaching in order to "prove" his words are offensive. Having encouraged locals to aid their evidence-gathering exercise, the evangelist in question is now being prosecuted under Section 5 of the Public Order Act (the very section that has since been amended due to such policing, as you can see here).

The fact the police encouraged market traders to film the man in question is not particularly troubling. Anybody can decide to film anyone else. If anything, it may even help his evangelistic efforts knowing that several market traders are intently listening to his message and, better yet, are keeping it for posterity. Even better again, they are probably passing it on to police as "evidence" meaning his message is being spread further than he could ever have hoped. All of that is to say the filming is not really the problem.

The real issue is that the police predetermined the level of offence and the extent to which Mr Overd was likely to breach the peace and then sought to incite the public themselves gather evidence to prove how offensive he was being. It also seems apparent that those listening were not all that incensed, given a number of complainants "failing to remember what he had said or forgetting when the alleged offensive remarks had taken place". Worse still, Mr Overd is now being prosecuted for a factually-based comparison of the lives of Jesus and Mohammad based upon historical evidence as Mr Overd understood and interpreted it.

Whatever one may feel about his mode of evangelism or the wisdom of making such comparisons, it is undoubtedly beyond question that Mr Overd should be free to do so without police intervention. Muslims, market traders and the multitudes should be free to tell Mr Overd that they don't care for his comments with equal freedom. Those same people should be free to agree and support his comments should they choose to do so. This really isn't a matter for police involvement. There was no danger of violence and certainly no call to arms.

This issue is pertinent because anybody doubting that proposed Extremism Disruption Orders will be misapplied to shut down evangelical street preachers, or even less vocal expressions of evangelicalism, need only look to the application of existing laws. Stories abound, not least this case in point, of such things using existing legislation never intended to be used in this way. The Home Secretary makes no bones about intending to permit the application of the law to people such as Mr Overd. If current legislation, never intended in this way, can be used to stifle free debate and inhibit free speech, what will come of such freedoms when the expressed position of the legislation is to inhibit in precisely these ways?

Know that this is a real issue. An issue that no longer only impacts upon evangelicals brave enough to share their faith in public ways but will affect all those who are evangelical on a Sunday morning, within their own buildings, preaching orthodoxy to their own congregations. We may have spent much time thinking they are coming for the street preachers but I'm not a street preacher so I did nothing. Well, as ever, our inactivity because it doesn't affect us means our comfortable position inside our own church buildings is likely to be next.

Extremist Disruption Orders and ill-judged legislation

Forcing through ill-judged legislation to solve a particular mischief seems to be an unfortunate recurring theme for governments of all stripes. We have already endured a raft of New Labour anti-terror legislation that, whilst primarily aimed at those who espouse violent extremism, was so haphazardly applied (or, mischievously, depending on your predilection) that "extremism" and "hate crimes" were interpreted to include anyone proclaiming anything other than banal, state-approved views. Nonetheless, though over zealously applied, it is probably fair to say the central mischief in mind was genuinely the primary target of the proposed law.

This is what makes the new Extremist Disruption Orders posited by the Home Secretary, Theresa May, so concerning. Not only have past lessons of anti-terror efforts not been heeded, May now goes one step further. In her conference speech, she states outright:

..to live in a modern liberal state is not to live in a moral vacuum. We have to stand up for our values as a nation. There will, I know, be some who say that what I describe as extremism is merely social conservatism. But if others described a woman’s intellect as “deficient”, denounced people on the basis of their religious beliefs, or rejected the democratic process, we would quite rightly condemn their bigotry. And there will be others who say I am wrong to link these kinds of beliefs with the violent extremism we agree we must confront. To them I say, yes, not all extremism leads to violence. And not all extremists are violent. But the damage extremists cause to our society is reason enough to act. And there is, undoubtedly, a thread that binds the kind of extremism that promotes intolerance, hatred and a sense of superiority over others to the actions of those who want to impose their values on us through violence.

And there we have it. Not only "extremism" that leads to violence but "extremism" of all forms. And how do we define such a nebulous term? Though evidently not an exhaustive list, the Home Secretary considers those who believe women to be intellectually "deficient" and those who "denounce" others on the basis of their religious beliefs should be included. Is it offensive to state such things? Almost certainly. Are such views worthy of police intervention? Almost certainly not. More to the point, are those who face the force of the law likely to have done either of those things? In many cases, probably not.

As the Cranmer blog rightly points out "the policy is reasoned and moderate in expression, but the legislation will be almost Marxist in its application as it is wilfully misinterpreted and misapplied to Evangelical Christians (ie those who publicly proclaim the Good News) in exactly the same manner as anti-terror legislation has been invoked to eject a disgruntled pensioner from a Labour Party conference".

The central problem with outlawing "extremism in all its forms" (as the Home Secretary went on to promise) is that such a vacuous subjective term is patently open to abuse. It simply ought not to be illegal to voice an opinion or view that may be deemed "extremist" based upon some undisclosed, subjective assessment. The sad truth is, there are an inordinate number of pressure groups and hyper-sensitive people just waiting to be offended. Worse, they use such attacks on their sensibilities, now bolstered by this egregious law, to see the miscreant removed from the public square for their, often unintentionally, offensive statement. It has also been known for some to actively elicit "offensive" comments (suggesting the view cannot be so unpalatable if questions are being asked for the purpose of obtaining the comment itself) simply so they can involve police in a matter they shouldn't even entertain. As Cranmer correctly states, "For the secular state to seek to define “extremist views” reduces freedom of speech and freedom of religion to the lawful expression of culturally orthodox utterances".

Many Evangelical Christians may think this is an abstract problem that doesn't affect most of us. Surely it only affects street preachers with "offensive" views, those passing out irrelevant literature and others engaged in dated modes of evangelism. But even the central target of this legislation, so-called Islamist "hate preachers", are predominantly not addressing people out in town but inside mosques. They are not ramming their views down people's throats out on the street, they are stating their views on the internet for those who care to listen. That is not to say such views - if they are genuinely those that cause and incite violence - shouldn't be addressed. It is simply to say that such views are being addressed without being in the public domain in the way a street preacher or literature distributor happens to be.

If Evangelicalism is now lumped into the same category as Radical Islamism in the minds of many (not least, the UK government), the idea that only those engaged in active, public evangelism will be affected is cloud-cuckoo land. Most evangelicals still hold views that may be deemed "offensive" by some, state them inside their church buildings and put them up on websites for those who care to listen. Though the clampdown on nebulous "extremist" views begins with Islam, we can be in little doubt that it will extend to Christianity and will not only include those public enough to do their evangelism outside their building. For, if an offensive or "extremist" view in the mosque can lead to legislation and police action, the church is unlikely to fare any better.

The reality is there is no universal human right against being offended. As Cranmer correctly notes, "Extremist opinion that does not involve a call to arms or incite people to acts of terrorism ought to be tolerated by the liberal democratic state. Otherwise those who seek to undermine our liberty and overthrow democracy have won". One can only hope the divergent, yet unerringly consistent, voices of David Davies, Peter Tatchell and many others are finally heeded on this matter.

"Christian" assemblies and cake

This week has seen a furore over a couple of, dare I say, non-issues.

In the first, the Bishop of Oxford, the Rt Rev'd John Prtichard - Church of England head of education - has opined on whether assemblies "of a broadly Christian nature" should continue in schools. He has concluded they should not. Unsurprisingly, the British Humanist Association (BHA), whose sole raison d'etre is to see the removal of all expressions of faith from public life, applaud the comments. The Daily Telegraph, amongst others, were less than impressed.

Let's not pretend that the Bishop of Oxford and the BHA are singing off the same hymn sheet. The BHA want to see any hint of faith removed from schools and other public arenas altogether. The Bishop of Oxford is less keen on that and more interested in "liberating" schools and offering a time for "spirituality" of differing forms.

Now, I can't say I agree with the reasoning of either the Bishop of Oxford or the BHA. However, I do agree that assemblies "of a broadly Christian nature" should no longer be enforced in schools. I take this view for three main reasons:

Firstly, removing the compulsion for "Christian" assemblies does not mean that we can no longer have assemblies "of a broadly Christian nature". All this would do is remove the compulsion for it to be "broadly Christian". Second, the makeup of schools in the UK is not "broadly Christian". In some areas, schools are majority muslim and in other areas there is a clear mix of beliefs. Even in majority white British schools, to say most are from "broadly Christian" backgrounds is probably false. Finally, and most significantly, assemblies "of a broadly Christian nature" - certainly stretching back as far as when I was at school (and I suspect further) - means, in practice, asinine rubbish that barely accords with any conceived notion of Christianity. I would far rather we had assemblies that didn't even purport to be Christian - whether they also amount to asinine nonsense or otherwise - than we keep up a pretence of "Christian" assemblies that are no such thing.

In the second cause of consternation, a Northern Irish bakery is being taken to court over their refusal to bake a cake containing a slogan in favour of gay marriage, which is still unlawful in the province. The cake was also asked to contain a logo for the campaign group QueerSpace and photograph of Sesame Street characters Bert & Ernie hugging. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland are seeking to argue the bakery has discriminated against Gareth Lee, the volunteer LGBT activist who ordered the cake, on grounds that refusal breaches equality legislation outlawing discrimination in the provision of goods and services. Asher Bakery argue they are not discriminating against homosexual people - whom they are happy to serve - they were simply unwilling to bake a cake containing the requested content.

On this particular issue, I rather have sympathy for the bakery. Should they have simply refused to bake a cake for a homosexual person, or refused to bake a cake because it would be used at a gay marriage ceremony, I should think Mr Lee would have a legitimate case. This would be open and shut discrimination. Indeed, in my personal opinion, it would be equally unnecessary for the Christian conscience to refuse such a request as they would have no part in the actions of the individual nor any part in the day. That they inevitably serve cakes to others - whose lifestyles and parties they no doubt do not endorse - would rather support the claim.

However, the bakery have not refused to serve Mr Lee. They have not refused to bake a cake for any particular gathering. What they have done is refuse to bake content that they find goes against their conscience. It is also worth noting this is not the first cake they have refused. The bakery have turned down cakes containing pornographic images, profanity and other offensive material. The issue is not the person ordering, nor the occasion for which it is ordered, but the content of the cake itself. 

Though this is obviously an emotive and current issue, let us make the same case for a white supremacist asking for a cake containing racially offensive material. Now, most of us would have no problem defending the bakery for refusing such business. Nobody would be screaming political discrimination here and, were they to, most would ignore it and side with the bakers. Yet, on the actual issue at hand - again a matter of content rather than buyer - we have a discrimination case being brought. Aside from their mainstream palatability, what is the difference between the two cases?

If this discrimination case goes ahead, and is won, a series of questions will follow. Most significant of these would be are there any grounds to ever refuse business now? Would the bakery be forced to produce any content, no matter what it contained, or face legal action? If so, would this extend to any and every service provider? Would Christians be forced to produce content for people specifically seeking to belittle their own faith?

I broadly think anti-discrimination legislation is good. I am certainly not arguing that Christians should never serve people with whom they disagree. It is quite right that people should be served equally as people. Nevertheless, in this particular case, I find myself siding with the bakery. They aren't refusing to serve people equally, they are simply refusing particular content regardless of whomever it is that was asking for it, LGBT or otherwise.

Christian parenting and emotional abuse

The Guardian report that the government are seeking to implement a law that would see parents face jail for harming a child's "physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development". In a column in the same paper, Oliver James - author of Not in Your Genes: The Truth About the Findings of the Human Genome Project - has offered a comment here explaining why he believes this is a good move. In truth, this move strikes me as more than a little troubling.

There are some things to which most normal, sensible people who function as good citizens will assent. One such thing is that the physical and emotional abuse of children is a terrible thing. Good Christians should assent to this too since Paul tells parents to love, and not to provoke, our children (Eph 6:4; Col 3:21; Ti 2:4).

Whilst most people can spot the obvious extremes, the boundaries of that which constitutes physical child abuse are a little hazy and the cause of some debate (is smacking abusive? What level of force is acceptable? is any physical chastisement acceptable?). Across most of Europe, the answer to that last question comes in the form of a definite 'no'. In Britain, the edges are a bit more fuzzy. Regardless of our personal opinions on such questions, if we are unclear on that which constitutes physical abuse, how on earth are we supposed to navigate that which constitutes "intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural" abuse?

Though these questions are tricky, as with physical abuse, legislation and case law will draw the line somewhere. In respect to the physical, the furthest the line may be drawn would be to say all forms of physical chastisement represent abuse. At worst, this would mean any use of force - no matter how minor - could be forbidden. In reality, this would simply amount to a ban on open-hand smacking which, at the risk of alienating some christian readers, is not an attack on scripture, christian parenting nor a major undermining of all discipline.

However, what concerns me most about these new proposals is precisely where does one draw the line in respect to emotional, intellectual, social and behavioural abuse? Of course, as with physical abuse, most of us could point out extreme examples. Of course, extreme behaviour being what it is, most people are not engaging in it. Where the issue lies is in the fuzzy edges - where exactly do the boundaries of intellectual, emotional, social and behavioural abuse begin?

If the writing and twitter ranting of Richard Dawkins is to be heeded, then all forms of religious upbringing are most definitely included. If the writing and twitter ranting of some adherents of religion are to be heeded, all beliefs apart from their own are included. Similarly, some ardent political activists are bound to shout indoctrination at any child brought up under the oppressive views of competing political theories. All of that is before we even get to those confused notions of tolerance that will tolerate anything but intolerance and would castigate all as abusive who do not assent to the acceptance of culturally approved views.

Nobody should want to see a child emotionally abused any more than they should want to see one physically abused. My concern is that, in a no doubt well meaning attempt to address particular noxious behaviours, we inadvertently (or, if one is to be cynical, actively) proscribe certain beliefs and views as abusive that are no such thing. Indeed, that which is abusive may well change in accordance with the cultural zeitgeist. 

If it is unpalatable for the church to speak negatively of homosexuality, one can only presume that to hold to the scriptural teaching on this issue in the family will be deemed emotionally abusive. To not allow your child to indulge all the sinful desires of their heart, no matter how deeply felt, could this in turn be deemed abusive? In truth, as potential parenting problems go, for Christians this is far bigger than any sort of ban on smacking.

Gay Marriage (again)

It was reported in Tuesday's Telegraph that UKIP would "strip Christian weddings of their legal status". Similarly, ten days earlier, Simon Hughes - Liberal Democrat justice minister - said Christian wedding ceremonies "should have no legal status". In both cases, an argument was advanced for the separation of Church and State. Under such rules, all religious groups (not just Christians) would be expected to undertake two ceremonies: a state-recognised marriage followed by a religious ceremony if the couple wish. Hughes argued "you would have a ceremony by which the state recognises the marriage, the wedding, and then the faith community has the ceremony which gives that the authority”. The Archbishop Cranmer blog has commented on the UKIP story here whilst The Christian Institute report on Simon Hughes' comments here.

This blog has made no secret of its position on either Church/State separation (see here, here & here) or gay marriage (see here & here). Rather unusually, one finds oneself in agreement with both UKIP and the Liberal Democrats simultaneously.

For Cranmer, the issue revolves around the disestablishment of the Church of England coupled to his rampant Euro-scepticism. The position espoused by Farage and Hughes would necessitate the disestablishment of the state church which, to His Grace, would be anathema. For the Christian Institute, much of the issue revolves around parity for homosexual marriage. Having previously denounced civil partnerships as "gay marriage in all but name" (see here & here), it is difficult for them to maintain "although the media and some homosexuals like to call civil partnerships ‘gay marriages’, they are not marriages in law or in reality" as they have since tried (see here). Their argument revolves around the existence of civil partnerships which, they claim, make gay marriage null and void. In truth, the objection is less about legal parity as cultural equality, an issue on which the boat sailed some while ago.

For the Christian, it is always difficult to work one's faith out in the public square. What are the issues on which we ought to legislate? Should we seek to implement scriptural commands in civil law? If so, which? How far do we allow for cultural mores that seem antithetical to scripture? Before we can answer the questions surrounding gay marriage, we must first address these basic first principles (my attempt to answer some of these can be read here). 

The non-conformist, dissenting tradition to which I belong has a long history of seeking freedom as a disenfranchised group. How sad it is that many now view evangelicals, most of whom belong to this camp, as limiting to themselves the freedoms for which they fought bitter battles. It is equally unfortunate that those who holds such views often fail to recognise it is precisely those battles won long ago that allow minority groups the freedom to campaign for their own interests over and against the opinion of many evangelicals.

On the issue of gay marriage, the proposals outlined by Farage and Hughes provide an opportunity for Christians to support another minority group's right to freedom (as we ourselves would expect from others) whilst maintaining a clear, scriptural view of the issue at hand. The State may grant legal, contractual living agreements to whomever it will whilst, with the separation of Church and State, the Church may provide ceremonies for whomever it will too. This solution removes discrimination at state level, the absurdity of certain churches forbidden to carry out ceremonies against their wishes whilst affording no protection to those who cannot countenance carrying them out, and grants legal parity to all whilst making provision for each to carry out their marriage (both institution and individual) in the manner befitting their belief and culture.

Offense, liberalism and ever increasing doublespeak

Truly we live in strange times.

We have a government, having concluded 'insulting' words or behaviours a term so broad it led to unfair arrest and removed the phrase from Section 5 of the Public Order Act, who have deemed the much wider-reaching 'annoying' words or behaviours to be more equitable. To speak against this, you may wish to add your name to the campaign petition here.

We have Liberal Democrat parliamentary candidate Maajid Nawaz being hounded by a fellow Liberal Democrat, Mohammad Shafiq, for stating he, as a muslim, did not find a particular cartoon offensive. Having retweeted the cartoon, Mr Shaffiq deemed it offensive and called for the deselection of Mr Nawaz in the face of any principle that can legitimately be deemed 'liberal'. To speak against this and lend your support to Mr Nawaz, you may wish to add your name to the petition here.

Today, The Guardian reports a story regarding Transport for London (TfL) advertising. An ad campaign by gay rights charity Stonewall, deemed legal and allowed to run on London buses, stated "Some people are gay. Get over it!" (indeed some are and so we should). A follow up campaign by the Core Issues Trust, which read ""Not Gay! Ex-Gay, Post-Gay and Proud. Get over it!" (indeed some are and so we should), was pulled when mayor Boris Johnson involved himself in the dispute by insisting it was "offensive to gays" and should be banned. The original High Court ruling stated the ban was legal as it could "cause grave offence". The Court of Appeal judgment has brought the verdict into doubt - not based on the possibility of offence - rather based on the suggestion the ban was enforced because the mayor potentially acted "for an improper purpose" (allegedly to secure support from the gay community before his 2012 re-election campaign). It seems the case rests on the potentially improper intervention of the London Mayor. If he is deemed to have not acted improperly, the ruling will remain legal because it was potentially offensive.

Stranger stilll, Cranmer recently commented that Wells cathedral were planning to screen The Last Temptation of Jesus whilst a local theatre in County Antrim bowed to Christian pressure and refused to run a significantly less controversial stage-showThe Bible: The Complete Word of God (Abridged). As His Grace noted:

It is a bizarre state of affairs when a hallowed historic cathedral - built to glorify God and magnify the name of Jesus - can turn cinema for a night and play host to an offensive interpretation and false representation of the gospel, while a secular theatre is prohibited from performing the superficially profane. Of course, Christians may freely choose not to attend the Cathedral screening, thereby avoiding the taking of offence, but so could they have chosen not to attend the Theatre at the Mill, which is effectively censoring performance out of respect for religious views not held by very may indeed.

Aptly, he concluded "only in Northern Ireland do Christians demand artistic censorship in the secular space, thereby resurrecting the paternal role of the Lord Chamberlain as society's guardian of artistic morality and decency. And only in England do sacred cathedrals host that which is artistically immoral and indecent. Both decisions are utterly wrong, morally amiss, and a cause of great shame".

Seemingly, we live in a world in which offence can be taken by anyone for anything. Apologies can be demanded, careers can be broken and almost anything can be banned when the watchword is spoken. As examples above show, this takes us into a situation where the Liberal Democrats rail against liberal values and the post-war liberal consensus is not liberal at all. It is doublespeak in the truest sense.

All of this, of course, is nothing new. What was surprising is that even the BBC (or, Andrew Neil at any rate) acknowledged, when interviewing Mohammad Shaffiq, that there was (a) a discrepancy in a Liberal Democrat seeking to silence another view (especially one from within its own ranks) and, (b) offence has become the watchword by which anything can be banned, silenced or broken. What was rather less surprising was the total lack of BBC admission they engage in and encourage exactly this sort of behaviour.

How long must we endure this doublespeak (e.g. claims to a liberal consensus that is fundamentally illiberal), ludicrous rulings and proscriptive limits on speech that must accord with state orthodoxy and the cultural zeitgeist? Surely we should all welcome a range of views and, even where we disagree with them, allow them to be stated. Yes, we may find the position that Britain was flooded because of gay marriage strange and to speak against the facts of scripture and culture (see here for why). However, surely we are a better country for allowing such views (and all the richer for allowing others to challenge them if they wish). Otherwise, we are destined to have nothing but the ability to parrot back bland, prescribed orthodoxies to which we can all sweetly assent.

Freedom to be annoying

It is broadly accepted that for a society to be deemed 'free' it must protect individual rights to free speech and expression. Over recent years, however, such rights have been incrementally eroding, one restriction at a time. Now, our current government has determined to further undermine these basic freedoms. 

Not content with restricting freedom of the press, the Home Secretary has unveiled government plans to replace Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) with a series of new civil injunctions that will clamp down on anything likely to cause "annoyance".

As John Bingham writes in the Telegraph: 

Christian preachers, buskers and peaceful protesters could effectively be driven off the streets under draconian new powers designed to clamp on anyone deemed “annoying”, according to a former Director of Public Prosecutions.

Lord Macdonald QC said Theresa May, the Home Secretary’s plans for a new civil injunctions to replace Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (Asbos) amount to “gross state interference” with people’s private lives and basic freedoms.

In a formal legal opinion being circulated to peers, he savages the proposals as opening the way for the outright “suppression” of anything deemed “potentially annoying” with only “vague” justification.

Lord MacDonald QC, writing in a legal opinion commission drafted for the Christian Institute, states:

The danger in this Bill is that it potentially empowers State interference against such activities in the face of shockingly low safeguards and little apparent acknowledgement of the potential effect of its provisions on the ability of citizens to exercise core rights without undue interference... A lone individual standing outside the entrance to a bank holding a sign objecting to its role in the financial crisis, a busker outside a shopping centre, or a street preacher proclaiming the end of days to passers-by may all be capable of causing nuisance and annoyance to some person, but the question is whether they should be subject to such broad legislative intervention as is proposed in this bill.

As I have commented here, here and here, offense routinely appears to be interpreted by police and other authorities as a justification for investigation under the Public Order Act. Despite a reform to Section 5 of the Public Order Act (see here), such continues to occur. Bizarrely, despite changing this law so as not to criminalise "insulting" words or behaviour, the government are now seeking to outlaw "annoying" words or behaviour on even more spurious grounds.

As I highlighted here, this will affect many more Christians than just those engaged in street preaching and tracting (and, whatever our views on these modes of evangelism, the restrictions on such work should still cause us concern). If "offense", the previous watchword, has been replaced with "annoyance", we can guarantee what begins as a clampdown on those doing evangelism outside the church will surely end up impinging on that which goes on inside the church (not least if we "do mission" inside the church and/or bill our services as "public meetings"). How long before a person "annoyed" on the street enters a church building only to be equally annoyed there? What about those parts of scripture that may be considered "offensive"; the public reading of which, and almost certainly the exposition of which, will soon be deemed both offensive and annoying?

Personally, I do not share Cranmer's view of where he "draws the line" regarding free speech. It is my view that we already have sufficient laws against offensive and obnoxious behaviours - and that is quite right. Offensive, obnoxious or annoying words - unpleasant though they may be - should not be subject to controls. Prejudice, discrimination and incitement - whatever danger they pose - are not the heart of the issue. Individuals should be free to spout prejudice and discrimination, whatever form it takes, just as the rest of us should be free to explain in no uncertain terms why such views are vile and repugnant. Individuals should not be free to discriminate or act prejudicially but there should be no bar on these views being aired. How else can we rebuff such incoherent nonsense but for it being spoken? Similarly, incitement is not the issue. We may want to say the words of those who incite violence are so dangerous they must be curbed. But it is not the words that do the violence but those who act upon them - nobody makes anyone else do anything. If we have sufficient controls on behaviour there is no reason to place further controls upon speech.

Some may well find the activities of Christian people offensive, annoying, contentious, eccentric, heretical, unwelcome and provocative just as many Christian people may find the same of others. Surely that is the price we pay for a free society and society is all the richer for such expressions. As the Cranmer blog put it: "freedom reigns while people are at liberty to spout their views."