Should we bother with debate between evolution and creationism?

The Guardian today carried a piece titled 'Bill Nye v Ken Ham: should scientists bother to debate creationism?' 

I don't wish to get into the rights and wrongs of either theory here. I am not going to spend any time defending either position. Nevertheless, I couldn't disagree more with the article.

The piece states "creationism is not science". Theistic Science, within which creationism falls, may be many things. One may wish to argue it is a false interpretation of the facts. However, to argue that it, by definition, is not science is hard to maintain. An incorrect interpretation of observable facts does not make something non-scientific. Its overall explanation may be wrong, its interpretation of the facts as we have them may be incorrect, but its interpretive stance does not, of itself, make it unscientific.

The article goes on to state creationism is "a religious belief". Again, we may want to argue, in many cases, it is motivated by religious texts and principles. We may suggest it is an interpretation of observable evidence that is filtered through a religious framework. However, to claim creationism is itself a "religious belief" is strictly untrue. Certainly, some non-scientists may accept creationism based on their own religious texts without reference to science. That would certainly be nothing more than a "religious belief". However, creationism itself is an appeal to science. We may want to argue such an appeal is entirely unjustified but that is another matter.

The writer seems perturbed, not only by the possibility of creationism being taught in science classrooms, but at the theory getting a hearing at all. Surely good science is about observing, testing, predicting and reviewing. If creationism is errant, it stands to reason that good science will win the day through such a peer review process. To simply disallow creationism, refusing it a platform lest it gain any credibility, can only be described as censorship. Science has a long history of competing models and interpretations vying for broad acceptance within the scientific community. Through careful review and better predictions coming from superior models, one theory advances above another. Rarely was censorship the answer but good scientific research leading to better predictive models.

The article argues "by standing on a stage alongside [Bill] Nye, [Ken] Ham [president of Kentucky's creation museum] appears to have a legitimate and equally opposing viewpoint to him, suggesting that evolution is somehow controversial and poorly evidenced". Well, there is no denying evolution is controversial (and it is hardly controversial to accept that point). This has absolutely no bearing on its validity but is a brute fact evidence by the article itself and the plethora of books dedicated to the subject from both sides. 

However, giving a platform to a creationist does not suggests evolution is poorly evidenced merely by virtue of their standing next to each other. What will call into question a poor theory is the weight of argument provided by both sides. If evolution is found to be overwhelmingly convincing, and creationism flounders under the challenge, it strikes me evolution is strengthened, rather than weakened, by such an exchange. If the concern is that creationism may prove to be more convincing, it strikes me as thoroughly bad science to censor its place in a debate simply because it may prove more compelling on the evidence. In truth, the platform offers no credibility to a credulous view.

Like it or not, there are scientists in respected academic institutions who accept creationism (many more than just Prof. Stuart Burgess). Of course, there is no doubting creationism is a minority view. Nevertheless, such men and women are making scientific advances, in a variety of fields, alongside their evolutionist counterparts. To censor the view, and remove it from scientific debate, ill behooves science itself. If creationism is a theory destined to be disproved, then each scientific advance will disprove it beyond doubt. If it is a theory of value, then it is nothing short of scandalous that some are seeking its censorship.

No historian fears the holocaust denier because the view is so patently errant. Were the outcome not so emotionally charged and culturally sensitive, I am sure such debates would take place and holocaust denial would be clearly and openly shown to be the hollow lie it so evidently is. If such is so clearly the case using the historical method, on which a greater number of facts can be questioned on subjective grounds, how much more will the scientific method - in which  observable phenomena are largely agreed upon by competing theories; debate centering around interpretation - show up absurdity and false evidence. 

The bottom line is this: what does the truth have to fear from evidence-based research and debate? 

Free will, sin and the sovereignty of God

I have had cause to think through issues of theodicy, sovereignty and free will of late. Specifically, I have been keen to re-evaluate how far Molinism and classical statements of Reformed theology are compatible. To some extent, one would not expect Molinism to synchronise with reformation theology given that Molina himself was a Jesuit and counter-reformer. Nevertheless, several theologians and philosophers, including Bruce Ware and John Frame, have sought to synchronise aspects of Molinism with a compatibilist view of free will. Specifically, they are keen to argue in favour of God's Middle Knowledge without adopting a framework of libertarian free will.

William Lane Craig, probably the best known contemporary defender of Molinism, outlines three positions on God's sovereignty and human free will here. The specific problem with this Molinist view, as outlined by Craig, is the assumption that there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which an individual would freely choose to respond to the universal offer of salvation. According to scripture, our sin-nature means that without the working of the Holy Spirit one cannot come to faith in Christ. For the Molinist, such intervention is just as deterministic as the Calvinism they eschew yet they continue to uphold this truth. Further, I find the grounding objection compelling - that God could not exhaustively know an individual's free actions by simply knowing their circumstances. If an individual possesses libertarian freedom, God cannot know for certain what this free agent will actually choose in any set of circumstances as they are perfectly able to choose otherwise.

However, Ware and Frame both contend Middle Knowledge is validated and strengthened when viewed within a compatibilist framework of free will. On this view, the grounding objection simply does not apply. God knows precisely how an agent will respond in any given set of circumstances because such knowledge is predicated on the nature of that individual. Ware argues that it is neither God working on the will of the individual, nor the circumstances themselves, that ultimately cause the individual to choose as they do. Instead, he argues, it is the nature of the individual - when particular circumstantial factors are present -  that causes the agent to do what they, by nature, most want to do.

On Ware's view, God's sovereignty is maintained without making Him the author of evil. God grounds his Middle Knowledge in the nature, and thus deepest desires, of each agent. Therefore, God knows an agent will do action A in circumstances X based upon the very nature and deepest desire of the individual. However, God can know (and be assured) if he actualises circumstances Y the agent will freely choose action B, equally according to his nature. Thus, God uses his Middle Knowledge to determine which actions to permit according to the deepest desire of the agent or whether to alter the circumstances. An individual is responsible for their own action because they freely chose them and God is not responsible as he merely permits the choice. It is neither God, nor the circumstances, that  determine the choice but rather the deepest desire of the agent according to his nature. 

God's permission of evil is then best explained through the principle of sufficient reason. This is seen most clearly in Christ's salvific work on the cross. 1 Corinthians 2:8 makes clear had those who crucified Christ known what they were doing, they would never have done it. However, God had sufficient reason to actualise a world in which the deepest desire of the individuals involved, the sinful act of crucifying an innocent, would take place. Namely, the salvation of the world. God did not cause the sin, it was borne from the desire of the agents involved, yet through his middle knowledge God permitted the circumstances through which this sin would take place for sufficient reason.

Jonathan Edwards argued, along these lines, that the will is never neutral. As Ware suggests, every decision is borne from the deepest desire of any agent, rooted in their very nature. The problem, as Dr John Gerstner highlights, comes not in the present but in the pre-fall world. Outlined here, the issue is as follows: "if Edwards was right in saying the will could not be neutral (no decision could stem from neutrality, there must be an inclination toward whatever choice is made) then it HAS to follow that God created man with a nature that was inclined to sin". Gerstner calls this the "thorn in the flesh" of all reformed theologians.

However, this is not a problem if we argue that pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will. Pre-fall, Adam and Eve had no sin-nature and were indeed capable of making neutral decisions. However, post-fall, they inherited a sin-nature and thus lost their libertarian free will. Indeed, God's restraining hand became necessary because libertarian free will would lead to continual, unending sin without restraint. Thus, post-fall, Adam and Eve lost their libertarian free will and inherited compatibilist free will. The Devil's lie - that Adam and Eve were shackled by God - led to the sad irony of their previous libertarian free will being lost and their becoming more shackled than ever they were before. On this reading, Adam and Eve's sin was entirely their own. Post-fall, God permitted (but did not cause) the deepest desires of individual agents - based upon inherited sin nature such that He can know how any being will act in any given circumstance - in order to bring about his divinely appointed will. 

Therefore, we can posit the Molinist view in respect to the pre-fall creation of the world. God indeed actualised a world, including libertarian free will, in which Adam and Eve sinned. However, following the fall - based on the principle of sufficient reason - God limited human agency to a compatibilist framework. Within this compatibilist framework, we no longer face the pitfall of Molinism which maintains, despite acknowledging the reality of human sin-nature, there exists freedom permitted circumstances under which individuals freely choose Christ caused by nothing outside of the agent. Terrence Tiessen is apt to comment:

. . . if the complete set of factors leaves the person with a final choice that is influenced by nothing in or outside himself, then it escapes me how the decision between two equally viable and possible courses of action can be anything but arbitrary. Granted, there are many contributing factors or “reasons” but, since the sum total of them is insufficient to explain this choice rather than that one, the decision appears to be “random.” I see no way to escape that conclusion given all the premises.

On the compatibilist view, decisions are not arbitrary. They are based on the deep-seated desires of the agent which are borne out of the individual's very nature. However, such choices are not caused by God for He uses his middle knowledge to permit certain desires based on the principle of sufficient reason.

AC Grayling & Free Schools

AC Grayling, in yesterday's Independent, wrote a comment piece titled 'Creationist Free Schools are an abuse - ancient ignorance has no place in education'. Now, this blogger by no means agrees with the title of the piece (well, not the first half of it, at any rate). Nonetheless, I must admit to being no great supporter of faith schools. On this, at least, I am in agreement with Grayling. However, my reasons are entirely different to those put forward in his article.

Although I am not a fan of 'religious' schools per se, I would not proscribe them - just as I wouldn't ban the public/private schools that so blight our education system. I would, however, deny such schools the the benefit of the public purse. If Christians, Muslims, Jews - dare I even say, Atheists - want to run schools built around their own particular ethos/worldview/prejudice (delete as you deem appropriate) who are we to stop them? However, whilst such schools should be allowed to function, it seems absurd that Atheists should be forced to fund Christian schools, Jews to fund Muslim establishments and vice versa. I can entirely see how it would stick in the craw for AC Grayling to fund schools built around ethoses with which he so vehemently disagrees, just as it would no doubt be a cause for consternation amongst religious believer to fund his new educational venture.

My main concerns regarding faith schools have almost nothing to do with what, or even how, they teach. For the most part their teaching is very good. OfSTED judge faith-based education by the same standards as state schools and find no cause for concern.  Indeed, if we abide by the statistics alone and question them not at all, state schools appear to offer a generally better level education than their secular state counterparts.

This brings me to the nub of why I do not support faith schools. For, whilst the statistics appear to bear out that faith schools offer a better education, selection policies go a long way to creating this impression. Many faith schools have selection policies taking a percentage of entrants on faith requirements and a remaining number based on examination. Such policies can guarantee at least 50% of the school intake are 'above average' students. Whilst, no doubt, children of genuine 'faith-subscribers' make up some of the remaining 50%, it is well known that a mere nod and wink from a local minister/vicar/priest is enough to see one selected on the faith criteria. Parents with the motivation to prove they subscribe to the faith necessary for selection tend to take more of an active interest in their own child's education. Typically, though not exclusively, such children come from middle class backgrounds and have both the privilege and parental motivation to encourage achievement.

Equally problematic is the segregation of children from such an early age. This is not an issue of tensions between local Catholic/Protestant or Jewish/Islamic schools. Such issues of group belonging and the 'rival other' exist just as much between local secular schools. Rather, this is an issue of segregating out 'your' people from 'another' people. Indeed, how can we hope our children will respond and interact appropriately with people from different backgrounds if they have spent their entire childhood hiding from those same people? How can they hope to respond properly to others faiths if they have predominantly grown up in the presence of those who share their basic and fundamental views?

However, none of this is to suggest - as AC Grayling does - that faith schools are 'an abuse'. Certainly, they are no more an abuse than private education and - as I stated from the outset - I would place faith schools in exactly the same bracket. Grayling's article is faulty for several reasons.

Grayling asserts 'figures reported in The Independent this week show that 132 of the 517 applications to open free schools in the past couple of years have come from faith groups'. What he fails to tell us is that many of these applications were rejected, notably one from a Plymouth Brethren group the only details of which we are given is that they 'teach creationism'. He then goes on to state 'Creationists and fundamentalists of various stamps are eager to open schools so that they can proselytise the young, knowing that this is by far the chief way that religious belief survives in the world'. One is unsure what facts and figures Grayling has to back up the claim that 'religion' is propagated predominantly through faith schools. Such baseless comments are hardly following evidence where it leads.

Grayling also argues 'education should be about how to think, not what to think; it should be about learning, enquiry, testing evidence and arguments, not indoctrination of the young into having “faith” in one or other of the many ancient belief systems that constitute religion'. Of course, very few would disagree. His implication, however, is that faith schools specifically 'indoctrinate' children into having a particular faith. One cannot help but feel OfSTED would most certainly be making enquiries and bringing schools into special measures if such were the case. Moreover, if this were the case, surely figures would bear out that the majority of children from a faith school background remain devout to that faith and I'm not so sure such evidence exists. Of course, this may simply mean these faith schools are rubbish at indoctrination but, if that is the case, Grayling has little to worry about as it suggests the minds of young children are not as easily manipulated as he thinks.

All of this is by the by. No Free School with a faith ethos is run upon the lines Grayling imagines. He tries to differentiate his own educational venture by arguing, 'in being taught about religion (as opposed to being taught to believe religious dogmas), they will see for themselves the conflicting claims, the basis in ancient ignorance, and the too often baleful effects of religion on human lives and societies'. The inference is clearly that faith schools enforce religious doctrine rather than teach generally about religions. I must say, RE lessons in both faith and secular state schools do exactly what he outlines his educational institution is seeking to do. He has erected an imaginary approach to RE that simply does not exist either in faith or state schools. 

Nor has 'creationism' wormed into science classrooms by the back door. All GCSE biology examination boards require an understanding and knowledge of evolutionary theory and ask no questions about Intelligent Design or 'Creationism' of any form. Both faith schools and state schools are tied to the examination boards and must teach what they require. At best, certain teachers - and yes, perhaps a handful of schools - question elements of evolutionary theory and highlight some of its perceived flaws. But surely, at worst, this is just academic rigour and should be applauded? The only basis for upset would be if teachers and schools refused to teach evolutionary theory or they purposefully taught error to lead pupils to a false position. The former cannot occur due to the nature of independent exam boards and the latter would be a matter in which OfSTED would involve themselves and on which the exam results of that school would plummet, also causing OfSTED involvement. Surely Grayling isn't suggesting that flaws (if there are any), or current unknowns within evolutionary theory cannot be explored at all? That hardly appears to support his view that 'education should be about how to think, not what to think; it should be about learning, enquiry, testing evidence and arguments'. 

To save us from this imaginary evil, Grayling and others have created their own college. He states:

I and my colleagues at the New College of the Humanities have put in a bid to open a free school in Camden with a concentration in the arts and humanities. One stringent principle of its educational ethos is to be that pupils must be encouraged and equipped to think for themselves, to challenge, to ask questions, to have a very good case for committing themselves to any ideological viewpoint, whether political, religious or otherwise. That is the overwhelming responsibility of education.

So, just how different to a faith school is this new venture? AC Grayling is a Vice President of the British Humanist Association and himself committed to particular beliefs. His desire to encourage children to 'have a very good case' before committing themselves to anything is problematic when Grayling appoints himself arbiter of that which constitutes a 'good case'. This is seen most pointedly in that he rejects the evidences and case put forward, both in debate and writing, of one of the world's leading philosophers. This means any child who comes to a faith position must construct a better, stronger case than that put forward by Dr William Lane Craig before Grayling will approve it. On this evidence, one must say his approach is unlike any Free Schools with a faith ethos. For his approach will most certainly revolve around humanist indoctrination.

Grayling ends his article by arguing:

A young mind is a beautiful opportunity: receptive, curious, quick to soak up information and techniques; it is something to be treated with utmost respect, not twisted into shapes that conform to antique dogmas, but given every chance to grow and discover. That is what a free school should aim for: an education in intellectual autonomy.

The problem for Grayling is that he does not believe in true intellectual autonomy. Ultimately, he believes anyone who comes to a faith belief has, definitionally, reached a non-evidenced, baseless conclusion. As such, Grayling says that children can be autonomous as long as they autonomously reach his position. Such a view can hardly be said to be 'not twisting minds into shapes that conform'.

Creation, evolution and the existence of God

 It has long been argued that the theory of evolution represents a stumbling block for the truth claims of the Bible. However, the supposed dichotomy between creation and evolution is an entirely false one. In the following video, William Lane Craig explains why:





It is often argued that those who believe in special creation seek to manipulate science to fit their predisposed religious views. However, as Dr. Craig highlights, the Christian is in a unique position to weigh up what evidence there is and draw conclusions from it knowing that God is not done away with in either explanation. In contrast, the Atheist cannot accept any conclusion, such as special creation, that fundamentally requires the existence of God and is thus wedded to evolutionary theory regardless of where the evidence may, or may not, point. As Alvin Plantinga comments, for the Atheist evolution 'is the only game in town'. When this false dichotomy inevitably rears its head, we should ask to what beliefs are those who put forward the evidence committed and are they free to follow the evidence where it may lead?