I have been struck by two interesting (almost certainly not original) thoughts. The first is clear and obvious: God's law exists for our benefit. Though it shows how sinful we are, when we receive his Spirit we are capable of keeping it with the Spirit's help. As such, our actions can be deemed good or bad according to whether we are living in line with his divine decrees. In essence, God calls us to live under a framework of deontological ethics.
According to Kantian deontological ethics, consequences do not determine whether an action is morally good. Rather, good actions are determined by individual motives which are borne out of adherence to universal morals. For Kant, a good will and right motive determines whether an action is good, not the consequences of the action itself. In simple terms, Kant argues for a model of personal integrity. He says individuals should only act (1) according to laws they wish to be universal and (2) treating humanity as an end, not merely a means. This is a remarkably similar statement to Jesus' "Golden Rule" in Luke 6:31 and his comments in Matthew 22:39. It is little wonder then that many deontological ethicists are moral absolutists and often hold to Divine Command Theory.
That God's word calls us to personal integrity, based upon the moral law (summarised in the 10 Commandments), is clear enough. The Penal Substitution model of atonement encourages a guilt-righteousness worldview. All are personally guilty of breaking God's moral law - and thus liable to judgment - and are only counted personally righteous once found in Christ. On this view, our guilt is determined by our ability to keep God's moral law. Our actions are only morally good when motivated by a desire to keep God's law and when we positively manage to do so.
The second thought, in contrast to the first, is that God (in a sense) is the ultimate utilitarian. If Divine Command Theory is to be believed, an action is only morally right when God decrees it morally right. But this means God cannot himself be held to a Kantian ethical model because he is not governed by any external moral law. His motives cannot be judged according to a set rule because he sets the rules. Though his law flows from his divine character, God's goodness is not determined by adherence to a prescribed list of rules. Rather, his goodness is essential to his nature thus he cannot be deemed good according to Kantian ethics.
If we dispense with the Benthamite terminology of 'the greatest happiness principle', it is possible to see that God works for the greatest ultimate good of mankind (a fundamentally utilitarian view). God's greatest desire is that all men everywhere be saved. On both the Calvinist and Molinist views, God has ordered the world such that the greatest possible number of people will freely choose to turn to him. Both the Calvinist and Molinist views differ on the mechanics and order of how he does that, and more fundamentally over the nature of what constitutes freedom, but they do both agree God orders events to win the greatest number freely to himself (1). In essence, God seeks to implement the greatest possible amount of good by his activity in the world.
It is also clear from scripture that God orders the events of the world to work out his greater plan. He orchestrates good and restrains evil to achieve his purposes. He permits - without being the author of - sin and wrongdoing where such will serve his ultimate glory. Plenty of examples can cited from scripture, such as the story of Joseph or the roles of Daniel or Esther during periods of judgment for Israel/Judah, but is seen most clearly through Jesus Christ's death on the cross. A gross act of sin and injustice on the part of those who tried and crucified him. Yet, this was an act of sin permitted by God and determined before the foundation of the world, to achieve his greater salvific purposes. God ordered the act, without being the author of the sin, to achieve his good ends.
So why does God, who appears to be the ultimate utilitarian, demand that those who trust him follow a deontological system of ethics? It is specifically because God is the ultimate utilitarian that deontological ethics are necessary for his followers. Because God is omniscient - holding knowledge not only of all actual events but also of all possible events - he can see how each universal event, from the greatest to the smallest, can work for ultimate good. Further, because God is God, he alone can determine, without interpretative fallibility, those actions that can truly be deemed good and those which are objectively bad.
As mere human beings, our subjective attempts to determine ultimate good are liable to fail as we cannot see the bigger picture and only know good from bad as a result of God's divine command and general revelation. God requires a deontological ethic of his followers because we cannot truly determine utilitarian principles. God is the ultimate utilitarian because he is the only one in any position to determine the greatest possible good. Our subjective attempts to figure that out will fail because we cannot see the bigger picture and have no knowledge of future possible events (and subsequent consequences). God, on the other hand, is perfectly capable of this and in his sovereign goodness divinely decrees those good actions that will work for the greatest possible good. In such circumstances as individuals fail to obey his divine decrees, it is only because God has permitted their disobedience to bring about an even greater good as part of his ultimate plan of redemption in Christ.
Utilitarianism fails at a human level. We cannot possibly know what actions will bring about the greatest good. The only one who can truly know this is God himself. He gives us divine commands and orders the world so the greatest possible good may come about. He calls us to live under a deontological framework of ethics because to do anything else would result in sub-optimal goodness.
In layman's terms: if we're charged with bringing about the best of all possible worlds, we'd make a right hash of it. God gives us good commands because he knows (a) what is ultimately good and (b) what direction we need in order to attain it.
Notes
Showing posts with label molinism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label molinism. Show all posts
Thursday, 4 December 2014
Monday, 2 December 2013
Middle Knowledge, Free Will and the Reformed Schema
I previously outlined a theodicy which sought to integrate the Molinist conception of Middle Knowledge into a framework of compablist free will that would synchronise with the reformed schema.
I argued a framework of libertarian free will, as postulated by Molinism, presumes there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which one can ever freely respond to the call of the gospel. Similarly, on this framework, the grounding objection has traction. True libertarian free will, by definition, means God cannot know how an agent would freely act because he has no grounds for knowing. The Molinist argues circumstance as a basis for decision making makes any choice, the circumstances around which had been set by God, a compatiblist notion. As such, an agent's decision making becomes totally arbitrary. Conversely, on a compatablist framework, such objections do not arise. God's middle knowledge is grounded in an agent's nature and their decision making is not arbitrary but flows from the deepest desires of the agent, now rooted in an inherited sin-nature.
However, given that sin is grounded in an agent's deepest desire rooted in their nature, such a view leads us to suggest Adam and Eve must have been made with an inclination to sin before the fall. Therefore, I argued Adam and Eve had libertarian free will prior to the fall but, following Adam's sin, humankind was limited to compatablist free will. This meant that pre-fall Adam and Eve were capable of neutral moral decision making thus initially acted without specific inclination toward sin and without God being the author of sin. Post-fall, humankind lost libertarian free will and inherited a sin nature such that any agent now has an inclination to sin and God merely permits their desire to sin for sufficient reason without being the author of the sin itself. You can view the full argument here.
For issues of space, there were a couple of questions I left unanswered and it seems right to address those now. The two key questions are these: (1) if pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, how can God conceive his salvific plan in accordance with the reformed schema; (2) if the grounding objection has traction, is it not special pleading to exclude pre-fall Adam and Eve from its scope?
The first of these objections has a relatively straightforward answer. The concept of Middle Knowledge contends that God's foreknowledge not only extends to what he knows will happen but also what would have happened across an infinite number of possible worlds. If God conceived a possible world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would fall, it is fairly easy to see how - having used his middle knowledge to conceive of such a world - this would also extend to his salvific plan post-fall. Libertarian free will contends that, given freedom permitting circumstances, an agent can act in any way they choose. Middle Knowledge argues that under such freedom permitting circumstances, although an agent can freely choose to act in any way, God conceived a world in which he knows they will act in a particular way. If we leave aside the grounding objection for a moment, God's salvific plan on a reformed schema still holds if we posit libertarian free will for pre-fall Adam and Eve. God merely conceived of a world, using his middle knowledge, in which Adam and Eve would freely sin, lose their libertarian free will such that God could enact a greater plan of salvation through compatiblist means.
The second question is much more difficult. I am convinced the bigger problem for the Molinist is not the grounding objection but the argument there exist any freedom permitting circumstances under which an agent can freely choose to respond to the gospel call given our inherited sin-nature. Nevertheless, if the grounding objection is valid (and I think it probably is), is it not special pleading to allow Adam and Eve libertarian free will whilst claiming the grounding objection rules out libertarian free will for everybody else?
It strikes me there are three possible solutions to this problem:
(1) The most straightforward solution is that there were no possible worlds in which Adam and Eve would not have sinned given free choice. Therefore, God had to conceive a possible world each of which involved Adam and Eve's fall.
(2) The second possible solution is that whilst Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, God nonetheless grounded his middle knowledge in the nature of Adam and Eve. Although their nature was not, at this point, a sin-nature and was therefore not inclined to sin, it is at least possible their neutral moral nature - being unique in human history - was created in such a way that God could ground his middle knowledge.
(3) The third possible solution: God's conception of any possible world begins with the question of whether Adam and Eve obey God or fail to follow the single command he gave them. However long Adam and Eve were in the Garden of Eden pre-fall and whatever they did prior to their disobedience is really of no moral importance. The only moral question was whether they would obey God or not. As such, there was no reason for God to give Adam and Eve compatablist free will because their every decision was morally neutral except in respect to God's one command. For the reformed schema, this means God had to conceive a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin without making the circumstances in which they were placed the sole basis of the decision itself. It seems possible, given their freedom to act neutrally entirely apart from God's command, that a world could be conceived in which Adam and Eve would sin of their own free volition given passage of time foreknown by God. In fact, this argument is backed up by God's guarding of the tree of life, the inference being that further passage of time would have likely allowed Adam and Eve to also eat of this tree too. Therefore, God conceived a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin allowing him to enact a greater plan of salvation that depended on the loss of libertarian free will.
I am thoroughly unconvinced of solution (1). This solution fails because freedom permitting circumstances insist Adam and Eve could act another way but will act in a particular way. This solution leaves absolutely no room for that. Equally, it does nothing to take us away from the problem that Adam and Eve must therefore have been inclined to sin prior to their inherited sin-nature.
Nevertheless, I think (2) and (3) may be valid solutions. The central problem with (2), however, is that one cannot take the argument any further. I cannot go any of the way to explaining the inclinations of this neutral moral nature. Whilst it is possible to show the inclinations of a post-fall sin-nature and how this affects action I cannot do the same with this moral nature. Nonetheless, that there is an element that cannot be readily explained does not necessarily make it an invalid solution. One must accept that Adam and Eve had a unique nature in human history and the biblical writers, especially Paul, tend to emphasise inherited sin nature rather than Adam's unique pre-fall nature. It is also possible to argue that in grounding the pre-fall nature this way we effectively posit a compatablist framework pre-fall and are led back to the same initial issue: that Adam and Eve were created with an inclination to sin. Nevertheless, it still seems valid that God could ground his middle knowledge in Adam and Eve's pre-fall nature whilst still granting them libertarian free will.
The central weakness in (3) is that it could be read as God guessing that over the course of time Adam and Eve would probably fall at which point he could enact his real plan. Such a reading leads us to the God of Open Theism - a conception totally rejected by reformed theologians. Nonetheless, it still strikes me as eminently possible that God could conceive a world in which he knew, with clarity, that Adam and Eve would freely sin given passage of time. This is not guess work on God's part but certain knowledge that Adam and Eve's freedom permitting circumstances would lead them to sin thus necessitating a conceived world in which they would fall, libertarian free will would be restricted and the reformed schema of God's salvific purposes are enacted from a plan conceived in eternity past. This third option seems the most compatible with both the reformed schema and the concept of middle knowledge.
I argued a framework of libertarian free will, as postulated by Molinism, presumes there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which one can ever freely respond to the call of the gospel. Similarly, on this framework, the grounding objection has traction. True libertarian free will, by definition, means God cannot know how an agent would freely act because he has no grounds for knowing. The Molinist argues circumstance as a basis for decision making makes any choice, the circumstances around which had been set by God, a compatiblist notion. As such, an agent's decision making becomes totally arbitrary. Conversely, on a compatablist framework, such objections do not arise. God's middle knowledge is grounded in an agent's nature and their decision making is not arbitrary but flows from the deepest desires of the agent, now rooted in an inherited sin-nature.
However, given that sin is grounded in an agent's deepest desire rooted in their nature, such a view leads us to suggest Adam and Eve must have been made with an inclination to sin before the fall. Therefore, I argued Adam and Eve had libertarian free will prior to the fall but, following Adam's sin, humankind was limited to compatablist free will. This meant that pre-fall Adam and Eve were capable of neutral moral decision making thus initially acted without specific inclination toward sin and without God being the author of sin. Post-fall, humankind lost libertarian free will and inherited a sin nature such that any agent now has an inclination to sin and God merely permits their desire to sin for sufficient reason without being the author of the sin itself. You can view the full argument here.
For issues of space, there were a couple of questions I left unanswered and it seems right to address those now. The two key questions are these: (1) if pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, how can God conceive his salvific plan in accordance with the reformed schema; (2) if the grounding objection has traction, is it not special pleading to exclude pre-fall Adam and Eve from its scope?
The first of these objections has a relatively straightforward answer. The concept of Middle Knowledge contends that God's foreknowledge not only extends to what he knows will happen but also what would have happened across an infinite number of possible worlds. If God conceived a possible world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would fall, it is fairly easy to see how - having used his middle knowledge to conceive of such a world - this would also extend to his salvific plan post-fall. Libertarian free will contends that, given freedom permitting circumstances, an agent can act in any way they choose. Middle Knowledge argues that under such freedom permitting circumstances, although an agent can freely choose to act in any way, God conceived a world in which he knows they will act in a particular way. If we leave aside the grounding objection for a moment, God's salvific plan on a reformed schema still holds if we posit libertarian free will for pre-fall Adam and Eve. God merely conceived of a world, using his middle knowledge, in which Adam and Eve would freely sin, lose their libertarian free will such that God could enact a greater plan of salvation through compatiblist means.
The second question is much more difficult. I am convinced the bigger problem for the Molinist is not the grounding objection but the argument there exist any freedom permitting circumstances under which an agent can freely choose to respond to the gospel call given our inherited sin-nature. Nevertheless, if the grounding objection is valid (and I think it probably is), is it not special pleading to allow Adam and Eve libertarian free will whilst claiming the grounding objection rules out libertarian free will for everybody else?
It strikes me there are three possible solutions to this problem:
(1) The most straightforward solution is that there were no possible worlds in which Adam and Eve would not have sinned given free choice. Therefore, God had to conceive a possible world each of which involved Adam and Eve's fall.
(2) The second possible solution is that whilst Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, God nonetheless grounded his middle knowledge in the nature of Adam and Eve. Although their nature was not, at this point, a sin-nature and was therefore not inclined to sin, it is at least possible their neutral moral nature - being unique in human history - was created in such a way that God could ground his middle knowledge.
(3) The third possible solution: God's conception of any possible world begins with the question of whether Adam and Eve obey God or fail to follow the single command he gave them. However long Adam and Eve were in the Garden of Eden pre-fall and whatever they did prior to their disobedience is really of no moral importance. The only moral question was whether they would obey God or not. As such, there was no reason for God to give Adam and Eve compatablist free will because their every decision was morally neutral except in respect to God's one command. For the reformed schema, this means God had to conceive a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin without making the circumstances in which they were placed the sole basis of the decision itself. It seems possible, given their freedom to act neutrally entirely apart from God's command, that a world could be conceived in which Adam and Eve would sin of their own free volition given passage of time foreknown by God. In fact, this argument is backed up by God's guarding of the tree of life, the inference being that further passage of time would have likely allowed Adam and Eve to also eat of this tree too. Therefore, God conceived a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin allowing him to enact a greater plan of salvation that depended on the loss of libertarian free will.
I am thoroughly unconvinced of solution (1). This solution fails because freedom permitting circumstances insist Adam and Eve could act another way but will act in a particular way. This solution leaves absolutely no room for that. Equally, it does nothing to take us away from the problem that Adam and Eve must therefore have been inclined to sin prior to their inherited sin-nature.
Nevertheless, I think (2) and (3) may be valid solutions. The central problem with (2), however, is that one cannot take the argument any further. I cannot go any of the way to explaining the inclinations of this neutral moral nature. Whilst it is possible to show the inclinations of a post-fall sin-nature and how this affects action I cannot do the same with this moral nature. Nonetheless, that there is an element that cannot be readily explained does not necessarily make it an invalid solution. One must accept that Adam and Eve had a unique nature in human history and the biblical writers, especially Paul, tend to emphasise inherited sin nature rather than Adam's unique pre-fall nature. It is also possible to argue that in grounding the pre-fall nature this way we effectively posit a compatablist framework pre-fall and are led back to the same initial issue: that Adam and Eve were created with an inclination to sin. Nevertheless, it still seems valid that God could ground his middle knowledge in Adam and Eve's pre-fall nature whilst still granting them libertarian free will.
The central weakness in (3) is that it could be read as God guessing that over the course of time Adam and Eve would probably fall at which point he could enact his real plan. Such a reading leads us to the God of Open Theism - a conception totally rejected by reformed theologians. Nonetheless, it still strikes me as eminently possible that God could conceive a world in which he knew, with clarity, that Adam and Eve would freely sin given passage of time. This is not guess work on God's part but certain knowledge that Adam and Eve's freedom permitting circumstances would lead them to sin thus necessitating a conceived world in which they would fall, libertarian free will would be restricted and the reformed schema of God's salvific purposes are enacted from a plan conceived in eternity past. This third option seems the most compatible with both the reformed schema and the concept of middle knowledge.
Tuesday, 6 August 2013
Free will, sin and the sovereignty of God
I have had cause to think through issues of theodicy, sovereignty and free will of late. Specifically, I have been keen to re-evaluate how far Molinism and classical statements of Reformed theology are compatible. To some extent, one would not expect Molinism to synchronise with reformation theology given that Molina himself was a Jesuit and counter-reformer. Nevertheless, several theologians and philosophers, including Bruce Ware and John Frame, have sought to synchronise aspects of Molinism with a compatibilist view of free will. Specifically, they are keen to argue in favour of God's Middle Knowledge without adopting a framework of libertarian free will.
William Lane Craig, probably the best known contemporary defender of Molinism, outlines three positions on God's sovereignty and human free will here. The specific problem with this Molinist view, as outlined by Craig, is the assumption that there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which an individual would freely choose to respond to the universal offer of salvation. According to scripture, our sin-nature means that without the working of the Holy Spirit one cannot come to faith in Christ. For the Molinist, such intervention is just as deterministic as the Calvinism they eschew yet they continue to uphold this truth. Further, I find the grounding objection compelling - that God could not exhaustively know an individual's free actions by simply knowing their circumstances. If an individual possesses libertarian freedom, God cannot know for certain what this free agent will actually choose in any set of circumstances as they are perfectly able to choose otherwise.
However, Ware and Frame both contend Middle Knowledge is validated and strengthened when viewed within a compatibilist framework of free will. On this view, the grounding objection simply does not apply. God knows precisely how an agent will respond in any given set of circumstances because such knowledge is predicated on the nature of that individual. Ware argues that it is neither God working on the will of the individual, nor the circumstances themselves, that ultimately cause the individual to choose as they do. Instead, he argues, it is the nature of the individual - when particular circumstantial factors are present - that causes the agent to do what they, by nature, most want to do.
On Ware's view, God's sovereignty is maintained without making Him the author of evil. God grounds his Middle Knowledge in the nature, and thus deepest desires, of each agent. Therefore, God knows an agent will do action A in circumstances X based upon the very nature and deepest desire of the individual. However, God can know (and be assured) if he actualises circumstances Y the agent will freely choose action B, equally according to his nature. Thus, God uses his Middle Knowledge to determine which actions to permit according to the deepest desire of the agent or whether to alter the circumstances. An individual is responsible for their own action because they freely chose them and God is not responsible as he merely permits the choice. It is neither God, nor the circumstances, that determine the choice but rather the deepest desire of the agent according to his nature.
God's permission of evil is then best explained through the principle of sufficient reason. This is seen most clearly in Christ's salvific work on the cross. 1 Corinthians 2:8 makes clear had those who crucified Christ known what they were doing, they would never have done it. However, God had sufficient reason to actualise a world in which the deepest desire of the individuals involved, the sinful act of crucifying an innocent, would take place. Namely, the salvation of the world. God did not cause the sin, it was borne from the desire of the agents involved, yet through his middle knowledge God permitted the circumstances through which this sin would take place for sufficient reason.
Jonathan Edwards argued, along these lines, that the will is never neutral. As Ware suggests, every decision is borne from the deepest desire of any agent, rooted in their very nature. The problem, as Dr John Gerstner highlights, comes not in the present but in the pre-fall world. Outlined here, the issue is as follows: "if Edwards was right in saying the will could not be neutral (no decision could stem from neutrality, there must be an inclination toward whatever choice is made) then it HAS to follow that God created man with a nature that was inclined to sin". Gerstner calls this the "thorn in the flesh" of all reformed theologians.
However, this is not a problem if we argue that pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will. Pre-fall, Adam and Eve had no sin-nature and were indeed capable of making neutral decisions. However, post-fall, they inherited a sin-nature and thus lost their libertarian free will. Indeed, God's restraining hand became necessary because libertarian free will would lead to continual, unending sin without restraint. Thus, post-fall, Adam and Eve lost their libertarian free will and inherited compatibilist free will. The Devil's lie - that Adam and Eve were shackled by God - led to the sad irony of their previous libertarian free will being lost and their becoming more shackled than ever they were before. On this reading, Adam and Eve's sin was entirely their own. Post-fall, God permitted (but did not cause) the deepest desires of individual agents - based upon inherited sin nature such that He can know how any being will act in any given circumstance - in order to bring about his divinely appointed will.
Therefore, we can posit the Molinist view in respect to the pre-fall creation of the world. God indeed actualised a world, including libertarian free will, in which Adam and Eve sinned. However, following the fall - based on the principle of sufficient reason - God limited human agency to a compatibilist framework. Within this compatibilist framework, we no longer face the pitfall of Molinism which maintains, despite acknowledging the reality of human sin-nature, there exists freedom permitted circumstances under which individuals freely choose Christ caused by nothing outside of the agent. Terrence Tiessen is apt to comment:
William Lane Craig, probably the best known contemporary defender of Molinism, outlines three positions on God's sovereignty and human free will here. The specific problem with this Molinist view, as outlined by Craig, is the assumption that there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which an individual would freely choose to respond to the universal offer of salvation. According to scripture, our sin-nature means that without the working of the Holy Spirit one cannot come to faith in Christ. For the Molinist, such intervention is just as deterministic as the Calvinism they eschew yet they continue to uphold this truth. Further, I find the grounding objection compelling - that God could not exhaustively know an individual's free actions by simply knowing their circumstances. If an individual possesses libertarian freedom, God cannot know for certain what this free agent will actually choose in any set of circumstances as they are perfectly able to choose otherwise.
However, Ware and Frame both contend Middle Knowledge is validated and strengthened when viewed within a compatibilist framework of free will. On this view, the grounding objection simply does not apply. God knows precisely how an agent will respond in any given set of circumstances because such knowledge is predicated on the nature of that individual. Ware argues that it is neither God working on the will of the individual, nor the circumstances themselves, that ultimately cause the individual to choose as they do. Instead, he argues, it is the nature of the individual - when particular circumstantial factors are present - that causes the agent to do what they, by nature, most want to do.
On Ware's view, God's sovereignty is maintained without making Him the author of evil. God grounds his Middle Knowledge in the nature, and thus deepest desires, of each agent. Therefore, God knows an agent will do action A in circumstances X based upon the very nature and deepest desire of the individual. However, God can know (and be assured) if he actualises circumstances Y the agent will freely choose action B, equally according to his nature. Thus, God uses his Middle Knowledge to determine which actions to permit according to the deepest desire of the agent or whether to alter the circumstances. An individual is responsible for their own action because they freely chose them and God is not responsible as he merely permits the choice. It is neither God, nor the circumstances, that determine the choice but rather the deepest desire of the agent according to his nature.
God's permission of evil is then best explained through the principle of sufficient reason. This is seen most clearly in Christ's salvific work on the cross. 1 Corinthians 2:8 makes clear had those who crucified Christ known what they were doing, they would never have done it. However, God had sufficient reason to actualise a world in which the deepest desire of the individuals involved, the sinful act of crucifying an innocent, would take place. Namely, the salvation of the world. God did not cause the sin, it was borne from the desire of the agents involved, yet through his middle knowledge God permitted the circumstances through which this sin would take place for sufficient reason.
Jonathan Edwards argued, along these lines, that the will is never neutral. As Ware suggests, every decision is borne from the deepest desire of any agent, rooted in their very nature. The problem, as Dr John Gerstner highlights, comes not in the present but in the pre-fall world. Outlined here, the issue is as follows: "if Edwards was right in saying the will could not be neutral (no decision could stem from neutrality, there must be an inclination toward whatever choice is made) then it HAS to follow that God created man with a nature that was inclined to sin". Gerstner calls this the "thorn in the flesh" of all reformed theologians.
However, this is not a problem if we argue that pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will. Pre-fall, Adam and Eve had no sin-nature and were indeed capable of making neutral decisions. However, post-fall, they inherited a sin-nature and thus lost their libertarian free will. Indeed, God's restraining hand became necessary because libertarian free will would lead to continual, unending sin without restraint. Thus, post-fall, Adam and Eve lost their libertarian free will and inherited compatibilist free will. The Devil's lie - that Adam and Eve were shackled by God - led to the sad irony of their previous libertarian free will being lost and their becoming more shackled than ever they were before. On this reading, Adam and Eve's sin was entirely their own. Post-fall, God permitted (but did not cause) the deepest desires of individual agents - based upon inherited sin nature such that He can know how any being will act in any given circumstance - in order to bring about his divinely appointed will.
Therefore, we can posit the Molinist view in respect to the pre-fall creation of the world. God indeed actualised a world, including libertarian free will, in which Adam and Eve sinned. However, following the fall - based on the principle of sufficient reason - God limited human agency to a compatibilist framework. Within this compatibilist framework, we no longer face the pitfall of Molinism which maintains, despite acknowledging the reality of human sin-nature, there exists freedom permitted circumstances under which individuals freely choose Christ caused by nothing outside of the agent. Terrence Tiessen is apt to comment:
. . . if the complete set of factors leaves the person with a final choice that is influenced by nothing in or outside himself, then it escapes me how the decision between two equally viable and possible courses of action can be anything but arbitrary. Granted, there are many contributing factors or “reasons” but, since the sum total of them is insufficient to explain this choice rather than that one, the decision appears to be “random.” I see no way to escape that conclusion given all the premises.On the compatibilist view, decisions are not arbitrary. They are based on the deep-seated desires of the agent which are borne out of the individual's very nature. However, such choices are not caused by God for He uses his middle knowledge to permit certain desires based on the principle of sufficient reason.
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