The results are in. So what now?

The votes have been counted and the government is in. The UK has elected a Conservative majority government and the people of Scotland have overwhelmingly voted Scottish Nationalist. The Labour party are coming to terms with a woeful performance that saw the loss of several big beasts and the obliteration of their presence in Scotland. The Liberal Democrats - the biggest losers on the night - are dealing with the near annihilation of their nationwide support. The election was not nearly as close as anybody predicted and we have seen the resignation of, not one but, three party leaders.

Whether you voted Conservative, Labour, SNP or the ominously labelled 'other', we must all face this question: what do we do now? Whether you are pleased or despondent, here are three things to bear in mind.

We must pray for our leaders

You don't have to like them, you don't have to agree with them and you certainly didn't have to vote for them. What the Bible does insist we do is pray for them (1 Tim 2:1-3; Jer 29:7). Even [insert most hated party here] are capable of making right decisions some of the time. Even [insert most hated party here] can work for the good of the people some of the time. Where [insert most hated party here] do not appear to be working in the best interests of all the people, or appear to be pressing ahead with whatever folly we wish they wouldn't, surely that is all the more reason to pray for them! Let's remember -whether we are in favour or not - to bring our leaders before the Lord in prayer.

God is still sovereign

Indeed, what would be the point of praying otherwise? Scripture is clear that God is the one who sets and removes leaders (Dan 2:21) and they are ultimately under his control (Jn 19:10f; Rom 13:1). God has established the leaders we have and put them in place. 

Romans 13:4, 6 go further still and tell us - even in the face of what appears to be the case - governments are God's ministers for good. Before we cast this off as trite nonsense and begin getting het up by all the terrible things we know [insert hated party here] are going to do, let's remember Paul was no stranger to the less amicable face of government. Nor was he so stupid as to ignore history (especially recent history of Antiochus IV Epiphanes). Paul wasn't being trite. He recognised rulers are put in place by God and work only according to his sovereign will. No matter how terrible they may seem at times, they generally seek to work for the good of the people and - even where they do not - are only permitted in such action because it serves the ultimate, sovereign purposes of God.

Government is fleeting

The book of Daniel is dedicated to these twin truths: (1) God is in control; (2) all kingdoms and rulers are fleeting. No matter how powerful (or bad) kings and rulers may appear, they are here today and gone tomorrow (or, here today and gone in five years).

Whether we see the next 5 years as a trial to be endured or a blessing from Heaven, it is so because God said it would be. In 5 years time, we will have new leaders and a new government which will be viewed in the same way. In each case, they are there because God put them there. What is for sure is they will not be there forever. We either see this as a time of blessing on our country or one to be worked through. However we see it, it is not forever. God sets the rulers but he also removes them too.

God's power made perfect in weakness (even in this small way)

It is Easter Monday. The last day of the Easter period (mainly noted here because Easter Sunday is a bank holiday and so it stands in lieu of a proper day off for most people). And me and my family have been sick the whole way through!

I preached on Maundy Thursday evening (on Jesus' comments about washing from John 13) and Good Friday (on the three crosses and respective responses of two criminals either side of Jesus). If you are interested, you can listen back to those here and here. 

I had planned to speak on Easter Sunday about Matthew's account of three very different responses to the resurrection event. Sadly, having croaked my way through Good Friday (I edited out the coughing fits for the online upload) it all proved too much and a contingency speaker was drafted in last minute on Sunday morning (who I am told did a stellar job). Instead of sitting under some uplifting ministry on the resurrection of Christ, I had the joy of sitting in a medical walk-in centre - wife and son in tow - to find out whether we had an infection that required antibiotics or just a horrible virus that we had to wait out (for those that care, it was the latter - which really stinks because not only is it hanging around but there is nothing we can adequately medicate with either!)

But here is what encouraged me. I felt totally sick and ill, had to help look after my family who felt much the same, and had no hope of preaching Sunday morning (that's not the encouraging bit). I also know the gentleman who stepped into the breach to cover the preaching was not looking forward to delivering an off-the-cuff word or having to deliver my poorly planned, inadequate notes that he wouldn't get sight of until about 10 minutes before the service started (his servant heart and willingness to do so is more encouraging but that's not quite it either). What was so encouraging is that despite every reason for everything to fall apart, the church was full, the service went ahead and the word was well received.

Often what we plan to be great isn't as great as we might hope. Other times, what doesn't go to plan at all and ought to be a disaster is no such thing. I am reminded time and again of Christ's words to the apostle Paul in 2 Corinthians 12:9 “My grace is sufficient for you, for my power is made perfect in weakness.” You don't get much weaker than a preacher that physically can't deliver the sermon and a stand-in working from notes he has neither seen nor prepared!

And what more appropriate day than Easter Sunday for such things to happen. What looked like a disaster to the disciples on Good Friday, the death of their Lord on a shameful Roman cross, proved at Easter Sunday to be the plan of salvation God had ordained before the foundation of the world. What would have never been the plan of you and me was the appointed means by which God brought salvation to the world. What, by rights, should have been a total disaster and the end of the Jesus cult was God's greatest glory and the beginning of his 2000 year old church.

All that is to say, what may appear disastrous and seem destined to failure may be the very means by which God brings glory to himself. Whether that is in the small (or slightly bigger) parts of a church service or in the huge, grand sweep of salvation-history, God chooses the weak things by which to glorify himself. He chooses not to conform to human convention and wisdom. He chooses a virus to knock-out a church pastor and stop him preaching the word in order to glorify himself through another man taking his place and doing a far better job because he is almost certainly relying on the Lord in a way this pastor probably wasn't going to because his "power is made perfect in weakness".

God, Utilitarianism & Deontological Ethics

I have been struck by two interesting (almost certainly not original) thoughts. The first is clear and obvious: God's law exists for our benefit. Though it shows how sinful we are, when we receive his Spirit we are capable of keeping it with the Spirit's help. As such, our actions can be deemed good or bad according to whether we are living in line with his divine decrees. In essence, God calls us to live under a framework of deontological ethics.

According to Kantian deontological ethics, consequences do not determine whether an action is morally good. Rather, good actions are determined by individual motives which are borne out of adherence to universal morals. For Kant, a good will and right motive determines whether an action is good, not the consequences of the action itself. In simple terms, Kant argues for a model of personal integrity. He says individuals should only act (1) according to laws they wish to be universal and (2) treating humanity as an end, not merely a means. This is a remarkably similar statement to Jesus' "Golden Rule" in Luke 6:31 and his comments in Matthew 22:39. It is little wonder then that many deontological ethicists are moral absolutists and often hold to Divine Command Theory.

That God's word calls us to personal integrity, based upon the moral law (summarised in the 10 Commandments), is clear enough. The Penal Substitution model of atonement encourages a guilt-righteousness worldview. All are personally guilty of breaking God's moral law - and thus liable to judgment - and are only counted personally righteous once found in Christ. On this view, our guilt is determined by our ability to keep God's moral law. Our actions are only morally good when motivated by a desire to keep God's law and when we positively manage to do so.

The second thought, in contrast to the first, is that God (in a sense) is the ultimate utilitarian. If Divine Command Theory is to be believed, an action is only morally right when God decrees it morally right. But this means God cannot himself be held to a Kantian ethical model because he is not governed by any external moral law. His motives cannot be judged according to a set rule because he sets the rules. Though his law flows from his divine character, God's goodness is not determined by adherence to a prescribed list of rules. Rather, his goodness is essential to his nature thus he cannot be deemed good according to Kantian ethics.

If we dispense with the Benthamite terminology of 'the greatest happiness principle', it is possible to see that God works for the greatest ultimate good of mankind (a fundamentally utilitarian view). God's greatest desire is that all men everywhere be saved. On both the Calvinist and Molinist views, God has ordered the world such that the greatest possible number of people will freely choose to turn to him. Both the Calvinist and Molinist views differ on the mechanics and order of how he does that, and more fundamentally over the nature of what constitutes freedom, but they do both agree God orders events to win the greatest number freely to himself (1). In essence, God seeks to implement the greatest possible amount of good by his activity in the world.

It is also clear from scripture that God orders the events of the world to work out his greater plan. He orchestrates good and restrains evil to achieve his purposes. He permits - without being the author of - sin and wrongdoing where such will serve his ultimate glory. Plenty of examples can cited from scripture, such as the story of Joseph or the roles of Daniel or Esther during periods of judgment for Israel/Judah, but is seen most clearly through Jesus Christ's death on the cross. A gross act of sin and injustice on the part of those who tried and crucified him. Yet, this was an act of sin permitted by God and determined before the foundation of the world, to achieve his greater salvific purposes. God ordered the act, without being the author of the sin, to achieve his good ends.

So why does God, who appears to be the ultimate utilitarian, demand that those who trust him follow a deontological system of ethics? It is specifically because God is the ultimate utilitarian that deontological ethics are necessary for his followers. Because God is omniscient - holding knowledge not only of all actual events but also of all possible events - he can see how each universal event, from the greatest to the smallest, can work for ultimate good. Further, because God is God, he alone can determine, without interpretative fallibility, those actions that can truly be deemed good and those which are objectively bad. 

As mere human beings, our subjective attempts to determine ultimate good are liable to fail as we cannot see the bigger picture and only know good from bad as a result of God's divine command and general revelation. God requires a deontological ethic of his followers because we cannot truly determine utilitarian principles. God is the ultimate utilitarian because he is the only one in any position to determine the greatest possible good. Our subjective attempts to figure that out will fail because we cannot see the bigger picture and have no knowledge of future possible events (and subsequent consequences). God, on the other hand, is perfectly capable of this and in his sovereign goodness divinely decrees those good actions that will work for the greatest possible good. In such circumstances as individuals fail to obey his divine decrees, it is only because God has permitted their disobedience to bring about an even greater good as part of his ultimate plan of redemption in Christ.

Utilitarianism fails at a human level. We cannot possibly know what actions will bring about the greatest good. The only one who can truly know this is God himself. He gives us divine commands and orders the world so the greatest possible good may come about. He calls us to live under a deontological framework of ethics because to do anything else would result in sub-optimal goodness. 

In layman's terms: if we're charged with bringing about the best of all possible worlds, we'd make a right hash of it. God gives us good commands because he knows (a) what is ultimately good and (b) what direction we need in order to attain it.
Notes

1. For a more full discussion of these issues see here, here and here. For further reading see William Lane Craig's book The Only Wise God, Bruce Ware's God's Greater Glory and John Frame's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God

Middle Knowledge, Free Will and the Reformed Schema

I previously outlined a theodicy which sought to integrate the Molinist conception of Middle Knowledge into a framework of compablist free will that would synchronise with the reformed schema. 

I argued a framework of libertarian free will, as postulated by Molinism, presumes there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which one can ever freely respond to the call of the gospel. Similarly, on this framework, the grounding objection has traction. True libertarian free will, by definition, means God cannot know how an agent would freely act because he has no grounds for knowing. The Molinist argues circumstance as a basis for decision making makes any choice, the circumstances around which had been set by God, a compatiblist notion. As such, an agent's decision making becomes totally arbitrary. Conversely, on a compatablist framework, such objections do not arise. God's middle knowledge is grounded in an agent's nature and their decision making is not arbitrary but flows from the deepest desires of the agent, now rooted in an inherited sin-nature.

However, given that sin is grounded in an agent's deepest desire rooted in their nature, such a view leads us to suggest Adam and Eve must have been made with an inclination to sin before the fall. Therefore, I argued Adam and Eve had libertarian free will prior to the fall but, following Adam's sin, humankind was limited to compatablist free will. This meant that pre-fall Adam and Eve were capable of neutral moral decision making thus initially acted without specific inclination toward sin and without God being the author of sin. Post-fall, humankind lost libertarian free will and inherited a sin nature such that any agent now has an inclination to sin and God merely permits their desire to sin for sufficient reason without being the author of the sin itself. You can view the full argument here.

For issues of space, there were a couple of questions I left unanswered and it seems right to address those now. The two key questions are these: (1) if pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, how can God conceive his salvific plan in accordance with the reformed schema; (2) if the grounding objection has traction, is it not special pleading to exclude pre-fall Adam and Eve from its scope?

The first of these objections has a relatively straightforward answer. The concept of Middle Knowledge contends that God's foreknowledge not only extends to what he knows will happen but also what would have happened across an infinite number of possible worlds. If God conceived a possible world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would fall, it is fairly easy to see how - having used his middle knowledge to conceive of such a world - this would also extend to his salvific plan post-fall. Libertarian free will contends that, given freedom permitting circumstances, an agent can act in any way they choose. Middle Knowledge argues that under such freedom permitting circumstances, although an agent can freely choose to act in any way, God conceived a world in which he knows they will act in a particular way. If we leave aside the grounding objection for a moment, God's salvific plan on a reformed schema still holds if we posit libertarian free will for pre-fall Adam and Eve. God merely conceived of a world, using his middle knowledge, in which Adam and Eve would freely sin, lose their libertarian free will such that God could enact a greater plan of salvation through compatiblist means.

The second question is much more difficult. I am convinced the bigger problem for the Molinist is not the grounding objection but the argument there exist any freedom permitting circumstances under which an agent can freely choose to respond to the gospel call given our inherited sin-nature. Nevertheless, if the grounding objection is valid (and I think it probably is), is it not special pleading to allow Adam and Eve libertarian free will whilst claiming the grounding objection rules out libertarian free will for everybody else? 

It strikes me there are three possible solutions to this problem: 

(1) The most straightforward solution is that there were no possible worlds in which Adam and Eve would not have sinned given free choice. Therefore, God had to conceive a possible world each of which involved Adam and Eve's fall.

(2) The second possible solution is that whilst Adam and Eve had libertarian free will, God nonetheless grounded his middle knowledge in the nature of Adam and Eve. Although their nature was not, at this point, a sin-nature and was therefore not inclined to sin, it is at least possible their neutral moral nature - being unique in human history - was created in such a way that God could ground his middle knowledge.

(3) The third possible solution: God's conception of any possible world begins with the question of whether Adam and Eve obey God or fail to follow the single command he gave them. However long Adam and Eve were in the Garden of Eden pre-fall and whatever they did prior to their disobedience is really of no moral importance. The only moral question was whether they would obey God or not. As such, there was no reason for God to give Adam and Eve compatablist free will because their every decision was morally neutral except in respect to God's one command. For the reformed schema, this means God had to conceive a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin without making the circumstances in which they were placed the sole basis of the decision itself. It seems possible, given their freedom to act neutrally entirely apart from God's command, that a world could be conceived in which Adam and Eve would sin of their own free volition given passage of time foreknown by God. In fact, this argument is backed up by God's guarding of the tree of life, the inference being that further passage of time would have likely allowed Adam and Eve to also eat of this tree too. Therefore, God conceived a world in which he foreknew Adam and Eve would sin allowing him to enact a greater plan of salvation that depended on the loss of libertarian free will. 

I am thoroughly unconvinced of solution (1). This solution fails because freedom permitting circumstances insist Adam and Eve could act another way but will act in a particular way. This solution leaves absolutely no room for that. Equally, it does nothing to take us away from the problem that Adam and Eve must therefore have been inclined to sin prior to their inherited sin-nature. 

Nevertheless, I think (2) and (3) may be valid solutions. The central problem with (2), however, is that one cannot take the argument any further. I cannot go any of the way to explaining the inclinations of this neutral moral nature. Whilst it is possible to show the inclinations of a post-fall sin-nature and how this affects action I cannot do the same with this moral nature. Nonetheless, that there is an element that cannot be readily explained does not necessarily make it an invalid solution. One must accept that Adam and Eve had a unique nature in human history and the biblical writers, especially Paul, tend to emphasise inherited sin nature rather than Adam's unique pre-fall nature. It is also possible to argue that in grounding the pre-fall nature this way we effectively posit a compatablist framework pre-fall and are led back to the same initial issue: that Adam and Eve were created with an inclination to sin. Nevertheless, it still seems valid that God could ground his middle knowledge in Adam and Eve's pre-fall nature whilst still granting them libertarian free will.

The central weakness in (3) is that it could be read as God guessing that over the course of time Adam and Eve would probably fall at which point he could enact his real plan. Such a reading leads us to the God of Open Theism - a conception totally rejected by reformed theologians. Nonetheless, it still strikes me as eminently possible that God could conceive a world in which he knew, with clarity, that Adam and Eve would freely sin given passage of time. This is not guess work on God's part but certain knowledge that Adam and Eve's freedom permitting circumstances would lead them to sin thus necessitating a conceived world in which they would fall, libertarian free will would be restricted and the reformed schema of God's salvific purposes are enacted from a plan conceived in eternity past. This third option seems the most compatible with both the reformed schema and the concept of middle knowledge.

Free will, sin and the sovereignty of God

I have had cause to think through issues of theodicy, sovereignty and free will of late. Specifically, I have been keen to re-evaluate how far Molinism and classical statements of Reformed theology are compatible. To some extent, one would not expect Molinism to synchronise with reformation theology given that Molina himself was a Jesuit and counter-reformer. Nevertheless, several theologians and philosophers, including Bruce Ware and John Frame, have sought to synchronise aspects of Molinism with a compatibilist view of free will. Specifically, they are keen to argue in favour of God's Middle Knowledge without adopting a framework of libertarian free will.

William Lane Craig, probably the best known contemporary defender of Molinism, outlines three positions on God's sovereignty and human free will here. The specific problem with this Molinist view, as outlined by Craig, is the assumption that there exist freedom permitting circumstances under which an individual would freely choose to respond to the universal offer of salvation. According to scripture, our sin-nature means that without the working of the Holy Spirit one cannot come to faith in Christ. For the Molinist, such intervention is just as deterministic as the Calvinism they eschew yet they continue to uphold this truth. Further, I find the grounding objection compelling - that God could not exhaustively know an individual's free actions by simply knowing their circumstances. If an individual possesses libertarian freedom, God cannot know for certain what this free agent will actually choose in any set of circumstances as they are perfectly able to choose otherwise.

However, Ware and Frame both contend Middle Knowledge is validated and strengthened when viewed within a compatibilist framework of free will. On this view, the grounding objection simply does not apply. God knows precisely how an agent will respond in any given set of circumstances because such knowledge is predicated on the nature of that individual. Ware argues that it is neither God working on the will of the individual, nor the circumstances themselves, that ultimately cause the individual to choose as they do. Instead, he argues, it is the nature of the individual - when particular circumstantial factors are present -  that causes the agent to do what they, by nature, most want to do.

On Ware's view, God's sovereignty is maintained without making Him the author of evil. God grounds his Middle Knowledge in the nature, and thus deepest desires, of each agent. Therefore, God knows an agent will do action A in circumstances X based upon the very nature and deepest desire of the individual. However, God can know (and be assured) if he actualises circumstances Y the agent will freely choose action B, equally according to his nature. Thus, God uses his Middle Knowledge to determine which actions to permit according to the deepest desire of the agent or whether to alter the circumstances. An individual is responsible for their own action because they freely chose them and God is not responsible as he merely permits the choice. It is neither God, nor the circumstances, that  determine the choice but rather the deepest desire of the agent according to his nature. 

God's permission of evil is then best explained through the principle of sufficient reason. This is seen most clearly in Christ's salvific work on the cross. 1 Corinthians 2:8 makes clear had those who crucified Christ known what they were doing, they would never have done it. However, God had sufficient reason to actualise a world in which the deepest desire of the individuals involved, the sinful act of crucifying an innocent, would take place. Namely, the salvation of the world. God did not cause the sin, it was borne from the desire of the agents involved, yet through his middle knowledge God permitted the circumstances through which this sin would take place for sufficient reason.

Jonathan Edwards argued, along these lines, that the will is never neutral. As Ware suggests, every decision is borne from the deepest desire of any agent, rooted in their very nature. The problem, as Dr John Gerstner highlights, comes not in the present but in the pre-fall world. Outlined here, the issue is as follows: "if Edwards was right in saying the will could not be neutral (no decision could stem from neutrality, there must be an inclination toward whatever choice is made) then it HAS to follow that God created man with a nature that was inclined to sin". Gerstner calls this the "thorn in the flesh" of all reformed theologians.

However, this is not a problem if we argue that pre-fall Adam and Eve had libertarian free will. Pre-fall, Adam and Eve had no sin-nature and were indeed capable of making neutral decisions. However, post-fall, they inherited a sin-nature and thus lost their libertarian free will. Indeed, God's restraining hand became necessary because libertarian free will would lead to continual, unending sin without restraint. Thus, post-fall, Adam and Eve lost their libertarian free will and inherited compatibilist free will. The Devil's lie - that Adam and Eve were shackled by God - led to the sad irony of their previous libertarian free will being lost and their becoming more shackled than ever they were before. On this reading, Adam and Eve's sin was entirely their own. Post-fall, God permitted (but did not cause) the deepest desires of individual agents - based upon inherited sin nature such that He can know how any being will act in any given circumstance - in order to bring about his divinely appointed will. 

Therefore, we can posit the Molinist view in respect to the pre-fall creation of the world. God indeed actualised a world, including libertarian free will, in which Adam and Eve sinned. However, following the fall - based on the principle of sufficient reason - God limited human agency to a compatibilist framework. Within this compatibilist framework, we no longer face the pitfall of Molinism which maintains, despite acknowledging the reality of human sin-nature, there exists freedom permitted circumstances under which individuals freely choose Christ caused by nothing outside of the agent. Terrence Tiessen is apt to comment:

. . . if the complete set of factors leaves the person with a final choice that is influenced by nothing in or outside himself, then it escapes me how the decision between two equally viable and possible courses of action can be anything but arbitrary. Granted, there are many contributing factors or “reasons” but, since the sum total of them is insufficient to explain this choice rather than that one, the decision appears to be “random.” I see no way to escape that conclusion given all the premises.

On the compatibilist view, decisions are not arbitrary. They are based on the deep-seated desires of the agent which are borne out of the individual's very nature. However, such choices are not caused by God for He uses his middle knowledge to permit certain desires based on the principle of sufficient reason.

Why should we bother with prayer?

If prayer is merely 'talking to God', what are we hoping to communicate to Him that he doesn't already know? If God has a pre-ordained plan, what are we hoping to achieve when we ask him to divert from his deterministic designs? Are we hoping to change the mind of, or communicate something unknown to, a sovereign, almighty God?

In the first instance, we should not overlook the fact that prayer is commanded in scripture. 1 Thessalonians 5:17, amongst other verses, make clear that God commands us to pray to Him. So, on one level, we should bother with prayer because God commands us to pray. However, whilst this asserts why we ought to pray it doesn't explain why God wants us to pray in the first place. The real question revolves around why a sovereign God commands us to pray when he already knows our thoughts and is in control of everything.

We can glean from Daniel 4:35, Proverbs 19:21, Ephesians 1:11, et al that God is sovereign and in control of everything. Rather than causing us to ask why we should bother with prayer these verses should give us real encouragement to engage in prayer. For, if God is not sovereign, what point is there in asking him to do anything when it is likely beyond his power? It is specifically because God has the power to change events and human hearts that prayer is of any value at all. 

Nevertheless, although the sovereignty of God should cause us to see value in prayer, we are still led back to the original question. If God is in control and works everything ‘according to the counsel of his good will’, why bother bringing anything to Him when he will do as he wills anyway? What exactly are we hoping to achieve through prayer?

In 2 Corinthians 1:10-11, Paul speaks about prayer in a rather unexpected way. He appears to suggest that God's divine will is specifically fulfilled as a result of 'the prayers of many'. Thomas Aquinas picks up this theme in Summa Theologiæ and argues "we do not pray in order to change the decree of divine providence, rather we pray in order to acquire by petitionary prayer what God has determined would be obtained by our prayers". In short, when we pray it is because God, in his sovereignty, has moved us to pray. When our prayers are granted it is because God willed us to pray and, through our prayers, he willed to work.

Although God can, and will, bring about his purposes by his own strength, he has stated the way in which he wants those purposes to to be worked out. God wants to work out his purposes through the prayers of his people. Indeed, this is part of God's rich grace toward us. He can save whomever he wants, heal whomever he wants and bring about whatever events he wants without interference yet God, in his grace, actively includes us in his plan by making prayer the means by which he brings about his divine purposes. When we pray, we are actively - rather than passively or deterministically - participating in God's divine plan. God wills us to pray and, through our prayers, he is pleased to work. 

Our prayers are the means by which God works out his plans and purposes. We are active participants in God's plan when we pray. By his grace, we are included and associated in the working out of his sovereign and perfect plan - we play an active part in all that God decrees is good - when we pray.

This same truth is why we should engage in evangelism and mission. Yes, the Lord commanded us to do it; and yes, God is sovereign and can save whomever he wills without our help. However, God has determined the way he wants to draw people to himself and enlarge his kingdom. He calls us to evangelise and engage in mission because he wants to graciously include us in his plan of salvation. We are associated with the ultimate good of bringing people to a knowledge of Christ, to a position where they can glorify God and enjoy him forever, when we engage in evangelism and the Lord chooses to work through us.

When a child helps their parent bake a cake, the work may take longer and there may be more mess in the kitchen, but there can be no doubt the child most definitely helped. Though it would be easier to do it themselves, in allowing the child to help, a parent gives a sense of ownership of the task to the child and allows them to learn something otherwise unattainable. Similarly, although the Lord could do it faster and with less mess without our help, just like the child in the kitchen, he graciously allows us to be part of his perfect plan. We can lay claim to active involvement in God's plan because we, albeit in our small and clumsy way, most definitely helped. We are given an opportunity to grow in ways that would be utterly unattainable were God to enact his plan without reference to us. 

Prayer and evangelism are God's most gracious ways of actively including us in his plan and are a significant source of growth in the Christian life. Our question should not be 'why should I bother?' but rather 'why would I not?'.